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ABSTRACT
 
 Currently, our societies demand a permanent and trustable security. The number and typolo-
gy of threats that they are facing on daily basis can lead to their eminent collapse. The ground of the 
above-mentioned status quo is simple: a security applied en mass is based on a fallacies and myths. 
This mythical security puts on risk much more than an ordinary clash between theoretical security 
models: the entire social peace system is questioned. Transversally to those threats is proposed the 
traceability concept, frequently used in bioscience and biometric technologies, but not in common 
use for spatial analysis purposes. Within this unprecedented research founded in the field of the 
spatial analysis, we will analyze the main security driving forces existing in our societies - from a 
multi-scale perspective - with the aim to achieve a final social improvement.
 The doctoral thesis presented herein covers a comprehensive pursuit of the spatial conduct 
behaviour and its traceability. In this thesis, focused on urban areas, it will be analyzed how the 
contemporary surveillance technologies work, evaluating whether those technologies and mass 
programs are covering the security demanded by the societies. Within the following chapters we will 
review how modern security have intentionally designed and developed a smokescreen that is 
tricking a true pragmatic security and which is creating an unprecedented security failure. Once this 
smokescreen is revealed and questioned, the results are demonstrating minimal capabilities of its 
application and profitability for traceability purposes. What we presented herein, is not exclusively a 
meta-theoretical analysis of a state of art. We have considered that our duty - as a researcher and 
citizen - goes beyond the hypothetical framework and it includes finding of practical and applicable 
results. Consequently, we have prepared two case of study in order to illustrate this research: the Cen-
tral District of Madrid and the Central District of Warsaw. Within both cities we have analyzed the 
realistic capabilities to trace criminal actions and to monitorize non-desirable social conducts using 
the already existing surveillance tools. The results are simply startling. Currently, a trustable traceabi-
lity does not exist. Due to that, we designed a method that would not be connected with any extra 
costs and which would be applicable for any urban area in the world.
Keywords: Security, traceability, spatial-analysis, prognosis, urban areas, surveillance
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RESUMEN
 
 Actualmente, nuestras sociedades demandan un estado permanente y verificable de seguri-
dad. Los riesgos y amenazas a los que nos enfrentamos a diario pueden constituir el punto de 
inflexión que derive a nuestras sociedades - tal y como las conocemos y comprendemos - hacia un 
colapso inminente. Los motivos de dicho status quo son simples: la seguridad - como producto - apli-
cada en masa se fundamenta en un arquetipo de falacias y mitos. A pesar de que objetivamente son 
indiscutibles las capacidades de vigilia tecnológica actual, la ratio volumen- eficiencia es sumamente 
cuestionable. Consecuentemente, el producto resultante adquirido - la seguridad como garantía de la 
paz y orden social - pone en riesgo mucho más que una mera confrontación entre planteamientos 
meta-teóricos: el conjunto de paz y garantías sociales vigentes en nuestra sociedad está en riesgo.
 Transversalmente al conjunto de riesgos y amenazas presentes nos encontramos con el 
concepto de la trazabilidad, frecuentemente usado en ciencias naturales y tecnologías vinculadas al 
análisis biométrico, pero raramente asociado al análisis espacial. Durante la presente investigación, 
de la cual no existen precedentes en cuanto al tratamiento de la temática, nos centraremos en el análi-
sis de las fuerzas motrices vinculadas a la seguridad – desde una perspectiva multiescalar – con el 
objetivo de aportar un beneficio social.
 La presente tesis doctoral se centra en la búsqueda y comprensión de la conducta y compor-
tamiento espacial así como su correspondiente trazabilidad. En esta tesis, focalizada en entornos 
urbanos, se analizará como funcionan las tecnologías de vigilia contemporánea, evaluando sí dichas 
tecnologías y programas gubernamentales cubren la seguridad demandada por nuestras sociedades. 
En los siguiente capítulos revisaremos como la seguridad actual ha desarrollado intencionadamente 
un constructo fundamentado en una ilusión óptica, que activa y conscientemente manipula, nuestra 
percepción sobre el estado real de nuestra seguridad, creando – dicha ilusión – un fallo de seguridad 
a escala global sin precedentes. Al cuestionarnos dicho constructo óptico e onírico, los resultados son 
sobrecogedores. Actualmente en los entornos urbanos – y máxime en las zonas rurales – no existe la 
capacidad ni el conocimiento para trazar actividades criminales ni conductas sociales no deseables.
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  Con la presente tesis, tenemos la intención de no presentar exclusivamente un análisis del 
estado de la cuestión, sino alegando a nuestro deber como investigadores y ciudadanos, a aportar un 
producto que transcienda del marco hipotético-teórico alcanzando una aplicación práctica y aplicable 
de los resultados obtenidos. En consecuencia y a modo de ilustración hemos preparado dos casos de 
estudio - el Distrito Centro de Madrid y el Distrito Centro de Varsovia – con el objetivo de demostrar 
el estado vigente de dichos entornos en términos de trazabilidad de las actividades criminales y su 
potencial mejora mediante el uso de la metodología desarrollada durante la presente investigación. Sí 
bien el diagnostico de las capacidades vigentes resulta sobrecogedor, debemos hacer hincapié en los 
resultados aportados por la metodología propuesta, que fundamentada en la utilización de los siste-
mas instalados – evitando sobrecostes o la necesidad de generar presupuestos extraordinarios – 
permite incrementar significativamente la resolución penal de actividades criminales. Así mismo, 
cabe mencionar el alto grado de aplicabilidad en terceros entornos de la metodología desarrollada, 
abriendo las puerta a una implementación generalizada de los protocolos desarrollados a escala 
global.
Palabras clave: Seguridad, trazabilidad, análisis espacial, prognosis, entornos urbanos, vigilancia, 
CCTV.
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ABSTRAKT
 
 Obecnie nasze społeczeństwo wymaga stałego i wiarygodnego bezpieczeństwa. Liczba i 
typologia zagrożeń, z którymi zmierzamy się na co dzień, może doprowadzić do jego całkowitego 
upadku. Przyczyna powyższego stanu rzeczy jest prosta: bezpieczeństwo aplikowane en mass jest 
oparte na błędnych mniemaniach i mitach. To mityczne bezpieczeństwo stawia w niebezpieczeństwie 
znacznie więcej niż tylko zwykłe zderzenie między teoretycznymi modelami bezpieczeństwa: cały 
system społeczny jest kwestionowany. Poprzecznie do tych zagrożeń jest zaproponowany koncept 
identyfikowalności, który jest często używany w bionaukach oraz w technologiach biometrycznych, 
jednakże nie jest powszechnie używany dla celów analizy przestrzennej. W ramach tej bezpreceden-
sowej pracy badawczej w dziedzinie analizy przestrzennej, poddamy analizie główne siły napędowe 
bezpieczeństwa w naszym społeczeństwie – z wielkoskalowej perspektywy – w celu osiągnięcia 
ostatecznej poprawy społecznej.
 Niniejsza praca doktorska pokrywa kompleksową pogoń za przestrzennym kierunkiem 
zachowania i jego identyfikowalnością. W tej pracy, skoncentrowanej na obszarach miejskich, będzie 
poddane analizie sposób w jaki współczesne systemy nadzoru pracują, oceniając czy te systemy i 
programy stosowane masowo, pokrywają bezpieczeństwo wymagane przez społeczeństwo. W 
następnych rozdziałach przeanalizujemy w jaki sposób współczesne bezpieczeństwo celowo zaproje-
ktowało i rozwinęło zasłonę dymną, która oszukuje prawdziwe i pragmatyczne bezpieczeństwo, oraz 
która tworzy bezprecedensowe fiasko bezpieczeństwa.
 To, co zostało przedstawione w niniejszej pracy, nie jest wyłącznie meta-teoretyczną analizą 
stanu wiedzy. Uznaliśmy, że nasz obowiązek – jako badacza i obywatela – wychodzi poza hipotetycz-
ne ramy i obejmuje znalezienie praktycznych i mających zastosowanie rezultatów. W konsekwencji, 
przygotowaliśmy dwa studia przypadków w celu zilustrowania niniejszej pracy badawczej, obejmu-
jące: Dzielnicę Centralną Madrytu oraz Dzielnicę Centralną Warszawy. W obydwu miastach podda-
liśmy analizie realne możliwości śledzenia przestępczych czynów oraz monitorowania niepożądan-
ych zachowań społecznych przy użyciu obecnie
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istniejących systemów nadzorów. Wyniki są zwyczajnie wstrząsające. Obecnie, wiarygodna identyfi-
kowalność nie istnieje. W związku z powyższym, zaprojektowaliśmy metodę, która nie jest związana 
z dodatkowymi kosztami oraz która może być zastosowana w każdym miejskim obszarze na świecie.
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo, identyfikowalność, analiza przestrzenna, prognoza, obszar miejs-
ki, nadzór
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INDEX OF ACRONYMS
 9/11: September 11th 2001. Day of terrorist attack in USA
 A.D.A.S.: Airborne Data Acquisition System 
 A.I.: Artificial Intelligence 
 A.N.N.V.: Artificial Neuronal Network Visibility 
 A.O.A.: Angle of Arrival
 C.B.D.: Central Business District
 C.C.T.V.: Closed Circuit Television System
 C.I.S.: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
 C.N.P.: Cuerpo Nacional de Policia
 C.P.T.E.D.: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
 C.S.S.: Critical Security Studies 
 Cell ID: Cell Phone Identification 
 E.B.G.M.: Elastic Bunch Graph Matching 
 E.I.T.A.: Economic Impact of Terrorism Attack
 E.U.: European Union
 F.R.C.: Facial Recognition Capability 
 G.C.: Guardia Civil
 G.I.S.: Geographical Information System 
 G.S.M.: Global System for Mobile Communications
 G.T.D.: Global Terrorism Database
 HUMINT: Human Intelligence 
 I.E.D.: Improvise Explosive Devices
 I.S.O.: International Standardization Organization  
 IMINT: Image Intelligence 
 K-NN: Nearest Neighbour 
 L.E.O.: Low Earth Orbit satellites 
 M.R.S.: Monitoring Ring System 
 N.G.O.: Non Governmental Organization
 P.C.A.: Principal Component Analysis
 P.C.R.: Polymerase Chain Reaction 
 P.I.V.: Preference Interest View
 P.R.C.: Plate Recognition Capability
 R.F.L.P.: Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism 
 R.I.V.: Regular Interest View
 R.S.S.: Received Signal Strength 
 S.I.V.: Secondary Interest View
 S.R.C.: Subject Recognition Capability
 S.T.A.R.T.: Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
 S.T.R.: Short Tandem Repeat
 SIGINT: Signal Intelligence
 T.A.: Timing Advance
 T.A.V.E.: Terrorism Attack Vulnerability Evaluation 
 T.R.C.: Tracking Recognition Capability
 U.S.A.: United States of America
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I. A MATTER OF SECURITY
 The following dissertation blends multiple skills and approaches. In consequence, there is 
not political, social nor scientific ideology hidden behind the following lines. It is in essence a com-
prehensive effort of objective analysis. During the research required for this thesis the Author contac-
ted with multiple organizations and institutions in order to propose this innovative point of view as 
well as the on-going conclusions with surprising effect: some of them answered, while others still 
maintain silence. The names of those public institutions - which theoretically must serve to the natio-
nal and social interest, but due to their stereotypes and fake convictions decided to not answer or 
denied any kind of collaboration - will not be disclosed to let them maintain the minimum of public 
prestige that they currently hold.
 From this research perspective, we can just hope and expect that no one else will find and use 
for wrong proposes the security gaps that in the moment of writing this lines are still existing. Unfor-
tunately, our history and cemeteries are full of innocent citizens who lost their most valuable asset: 
their lives, due to the institutional negligence of responsibility. It shall be considered as a social duty 
as well as a normal procedure of the institutions personnel to actively claim for the proper security 
protocols, procedures and measures. Being conscious of that, the above-mentioned negligence should 
be charged not only with the moral responsibility but also with criminal proceedings.
NOTE TO THE READER
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 This note nor the following pages shall not be considered by the reader as a witch-hunting. 
Taking into account that this is not political text, in this point it shall be highlighted publicly the cost 
of negligence’s actions lead by the responsible and head directors of certain institutions in terms of 
human lives. Lack of open-mindedness and arrogance in security field has - without any doubt - too 
high price. We shall stress that this price does not need to be paid if we will be looking for more 
efficient and innovative solutions.
 The whole research process: from the collection of data, including the methodology, to the 
analysis, was developed under the public information frame. Despite that, the research results in criti-
cal information. Hence, the access to some sections of this dissertation will be restricted or limited. 
Consequently, databases and raw information linked to critical security gaps or threats will not be 
attached or disclosed in order to maintain and preserve the security of those institutions or people who 
could be targeted. In such case, the Author counts on the reader’s understanding in that matter.
20
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 Security threats are one of the most lethal features of our democratic systems. They have the 
chance to influence or even determine the fate of our nations. Since centuries ago, humanity has 
expected that times of war & conflict will disappear and the common sense and proper behaviour will 
lead our societies to a peaceful scenario (Otero Novas, 2011). Nevertheless we shall check our 
borders to notice how the war & conflict is still present on the Old Continent. Despite that Europe 
experienced the most powerful massacre and acts of war, the decisions taken by governments lead us 
to similar scenarios nowadays.
 The Arab spring and its consequences to the North African border and European security 
(Dancygier, 2010), the chronic Moldavian conflict and the new Ukraine threat, are just reminding us 
how far we are from the peaceful utopia. Parallel to those chronic clashes we had observed an expo-
nential growth of the nationalism (in regional and national scale), which is highlighting the indepen-
dence movement. The result of the above-mentioned is desegregation – process currently influencing 
not only the traditional independence willing (observed in periphery regions), but also the macro-po-
litics. The Brexit represents just the tip of the iceberg in comparison with the all on-going social and 
political movements against the membership in the European Union.
FOREWORD
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 The spectre of threats and challenges that each and every nation might deal with depends 
strictly on some synthetic indicators and index. The geopolitical ambitions, the social structure, the 
main cultural background, as well as the third party interest in determining the future and internal 
politics are just few of them. Starting from the total security concept that does not exist even in an 
absolutely isolated nation,  in a higher or lower level, all states are influenced by  at least one - third 
party which is another nation - geographically contiguous or not. We shall assume the above-mentio-
ned scheme as a normal procedure in case that our aim is to understand the geopolitics. In fact the 
security as a multispectral concept is directly influenced by multi- state actions. It shall be highlighted 
that certain actions of states shall be considered as intentionally taken without the proper foresight of 
consequences for the other nations.  
 Notwithstanding the above words, all the nations – similarly to the higher authorities of 
micro and medium entities – try to establish a status quo between the potential enemies and their 
allies in order to avoid the mutual annihilation of the parties. The previous acknowledgement was 
learned by the most influencing nations during the official Cold War and currently is applied as 
“unofficial” one.
 Ulrich (Beck, 2002:9) reveals how societies react against the above-mentioned scenarios. 
The author identifies five elements that determine our actions as an individual and also as a collective: 
a) risk includes the destructive force of war; b) we are gaining membership in a global community of 
threats; c) scientific progress now consists in undermining the experts role; d) the attitude towards life 
is determined by fear; e) the business lead by fear will profit from the loosing nerve: the suspicious 
and suspect citizen is obliged to be grateful when he is photographed, searched, scanned and subjec-
ted to investigation - undoubtedly for his own safety. Beck underlines how in accordance with those 
‘knick points’ the ‘security is becoming a profitable public and private sector consumer good like 
water and electricity’ (Ibid.). This theoretical framework results indispensable to delve into the 
current geopolitics and security threats issues or to be more explicit: to understand the driving forces 
- internals and externals - that are controlling or reproducing security inconsistencies within a region 
or area of interest. 
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 In accordance with that, we might oversee that the main transverse axe of connectivity in 
between those assets and the pragmatism - the reality that we observe - is the certainty that no matter 
the hierarchical specifications of any of the components of the system: all of them are equally under 
the driving forces of it. This scenario determine even a more convulse environment of actions and 
counteractions to deal within the native interest.
 It is under this complexity where the terrorism - as an ideology -, organized crime - as wor-
king establishment and procedure -, hybrid wars - as a simultaneous projection of soft and hard power 
- and irregular migration flows - understood as a political and sociological weapon - proliferated 
worldwide with the connivance of those groups - the size of the entity might fluctuate from national 
to local powers - that use them as coercive or instrumental tool to achieve their political goals.
 It is not without a high percentage of certainty to claim that the power is the final goal of 
those political aspirations (Ziegler, 2010; Ziegler, 2013), and a blank route map will serve for the 
exercise of the public power for their own economical and strategic benefit (Ziegler, 2013). The final 
goal is frequently not a tangible input rather a intangible one transformed in direct and submissive 
influence (Rothkopf, 2008; Chomsky, 2016). Despite the complexity of the system in which we can 
observe its own spiky essence (Friedman, 2007) and inconsequence of the history continuum as 
opposed to Fukuyama (2006), where even some nations (Burleigh, 2008) support third entities to be 
self-attacked and to use that excuse to have public and political support to utilize the tools that under 
normal circumstances will not be publicly supported (frequent black operations) - we can observe 
how the new geopolitics (Lacoste, 2009) with its own multi-state projection can be synthetically divi-
ded - based on functional and operational specifications - in three main areas that will be discussed 
deeply further.
 Those predefined geopolitical configurations were adopted by Bauman (2006; 2011; 2015) 
to determine the basic cause-effect correlation. Those contributions blended with the world-known 
“liquid” concept lead us to a higher state of acknowledgement about interconnectivity processes. But 
all those are referring in essence to macro scale. It is a big and round table game where 
23
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powers deal, clash and succumb day after other. Utilizing the liquid perception we directly arrive 
from the world stratosphere of geopolitics to the human interface. Focusing on the geopolitics: 
conflicts, wars, clash, subversion or insurgency - just to name few of them - represent tiny move-
ments, some with strategic background, some lead by the nature to the conflict. However, when we 
directly focus on the human perspective - those tiny movements turn into failed states, massive flows 
of migrations, independency movements, organized crime or in the worst scenario, a summary of all. 
The result is in essence calculated, meditated and well planned - within the worst possible meaning - 
process of dehumanization of the affected population.
 Rolling into the ground of geopolitics, but still from a stochastic point of view Castells 
(2007; 2008) as well as Puyol (1990; 2002) make a comprehensive analysis about how the outer 
geopolitics influences and determines the human framework as well as how this social interface 
reacts into social movements (Castells, 2012). Notwithstanding the above- mentioned, all those 
analysis are focused on a vertical scalar process rather than on the operational systemic complexity. 
A system that if we will examine from a high dynamic range – not from the establishment perspective 
that we are used to – we could observe how it is fulfilled by multi-stochastic vortex and vectors that 
result into the main social driving forces with one special feature: the time-space ratio of direct 
action-reaction. In other words, we observe how there is a lack of understanding of how global and 
multi-scale process influences into our spatial conduct and behaviour. Moreover, we are far away 
from understanding its consequences within the broader range of time.
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 Security, Justice and Freedom constitutes the three main elements of the Spanish Constitu-
tion signed in 1978 (Cruz Villalón 2000). Those principles are at the end ensuring the existence of our 
society as well as those nations which governments are based on democratic criteria. Nowadays, one 
cannot think about the Kingdom of Spain as an entity without justice and freedom of speech. But to 
guarantee this essence we must not resign for other values such as the security, understood not as a 
police state rather as a fact and perception issue that maintain the equilibrium between the freedom 
and the neutralization of the treats. The concept of security had been evolving in the last centuries 
being adapted to the risks and the treats of each age (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). The result of that was, 
and still is, the redesign and development of multiple paradigms (Paris, 2006) that answered the need 
of understanding the modern risks, treats and insecurity issues that attempted to neutralize societies 
among the history. Humanity had always the expectation that the conflict will be a relic of the past as 
a result of the utopian willing of stability and prosperity. However the history as well as the present 
time shows us that those expectations are wrong (Smith, 2007). Fortunately or unfortunately the 
conflict is an inherent part of the human condition (Beck, 2009). 
 Despite the fact that the intrinsic variables of those conflicts had been constantly changing 
among the centuries, they could permute with high virulence in order to be adapted to the new treats 
and objectives that the current conflict will demand (de Rouen, 2004). In result, we have a context 
that requires a constant work out against those risks that rely on our societies.
1. INTRODUCTION
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 In the current global world, conflicts have the aim to migrate and hatch out from theoretical 
not well-known circumstances and environments evolving into open war. Indeed, this “hidden” 
process is based on a non-geopolitical multifactorial analysis. Under these circumstances, and always 
within the goal of the stability of our societies, our governments might react in advance. Hence, the 
government might forecast the incubation, rising up and emerging of any kind of potential conflict 
that will represent a treat or a block to our societies and national interests.
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Presence of conflict Other countries
2000 - 2014
1950 - 2000
Figure 1.1. Evolution of World Conflicts: 1950 - 2014
Source: author, 2017
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 Even though our neighboring countries might have common interests in terms of National 
Security treats, beside that from time to time they behave in an opposite way, at the end, each country 
has its own specific risks, treats and conflicts to manage (IASN, 2014). In resume, each nation is 
responsible of the actions, or the lack of them, to prevent the existence of an internal or external 
conflict. Nowadays, with the current engines of vigil we cannot accept the lack of knowledge, the 
surprising emergence or what is worst, the lack of foreseeing the consequences.
 To guarantee a proportional, stable, sustained and efficient response, to any kind of threat 
that influence our daily politics - or that certainly will do in a close future - it is required a national 
strategic approach (ESN, 2013). In that sense, we find in the Spanish Strategic National Security a 
theoretical frame report. Without involving into a detailed discussion whether the above-mentioned 
document is assuming the real needs of our nation or not, it might be considered that it is heading in 
a good direction.
 A prolific government onto national security defense culture (Palomero and Bailón, 2015) 
will define the perception of the risks, which are accepted and combated by the society on daily basis. 
Moreover such theoretical governance of the culture of security (Flint, 2003) will involve the whole 
society in the defense of the nation that is representing (Ibid.). The success in this matter has the 
following logical conditioning: the general concept of security must be influenced by each and every 
field of knowledge. That determines the integral security concept allowing multifactorial perception 
& objective analysis of the risks and threats. This thesis has the aim to contribute in two main areas. 
First is to develop a proposition of methodological procedures regarding urban security analysis and 
prognosis. Second aim is to support the national and international culture of security and defense 
from a geographical perspective.
 The choice of the main corpus of the title of this thesis “Spatial analysis and security progno-
sis in urban areas” is a result of a well though structure aiming to highlight the essence of this docu-
ment. Once we have defined the typology of document, we can focus on the structure of the analysis, 
which in this case is the spatial one. The spatial analysis allows the connectivity between 
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non-precorrelated elements. The concept of analysis is referring to the process of collection and diag-
nosis of data in order to achieve a strategic advance over the general context. Continuing with the 
description of the title we have to underline the area to which is referring to: the city. Urban areas 
became in the last decade the spatial-functional structure with higher percentage of population world-
wide (Puyol, 2012), and because of that, the city constitutes the highest spot of emerging conflicts 
(Adams et al., 1991).
 The next term chosen was the security understood in this context as a social peace in which 
the government guarantees the rights of the citizens without decreasing the level of  18 combat to 
those threats that isolate our societies. At the end, but not less remarkable is the prognosis concept. 
Against any kind of scenario we have four main choices: a) to be proactive; b) to be reactive; c) to be 
passive; d) to be post active (Bas, 2010). The proactive choice gives the strategic advantage to 
prevent, resolve or minimize the threats. In result, the aim of this thesis containing the summary of 
cartographic and spatial analysis is to provide a strategic advantage, so means intelligence, in order 
to prevent, neutralize or minimize criminal behaviors.
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 To begin with the topic we shall mention certain observations that despite are considered to 
be obvious, they used to be unnoticed. Almost every research, moreover academic one – as the 
current thesis – requires more or less concise explanation: (i) of the research’s motivation, what is 
rightly understood as justification, as well as (ii) of the need to conduct the research. The Royal Spa-
nish Language Academy (RAE, 2016) defines justification as: “To prove something with convincing 
arguments, witnesses or documents” (translated by the Author). In consequence, this definition 
concept guides to an empirical proof of a hypothesis, independently of the chosen methodology.
 Conversely, if the present thesis would be supported by any kind of institution, its main goal 
would be focused on design of applicable strategies for current and futures scenarios, not on the empi-
rical demonstration, and consequently all the description would present a need of knowledge rather 
than a justification. It shall be highlighted that such situations, in which those scenarios are created, 
are defined as one-time or transitory being formed in order to achieve a strategic decision-making 
process in accordance with a national or public interest. Accordingly, due to the nature of the demand, 
the main issue it will not consist of providing a proof to a theory, rather it will consist of providing a 
contrast, precise and verifiable argument about the requested topic. Ultimately, the aim is to achieve 
the final solution in decision-making process by the person who might need it and might be responsi-
ble for introducing it. This procedure is characteristic for the intelligence purposes.
2. JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH
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 In accordance with the above mentioned, besides that the objectivity is required in both (aca-
demic and intelligence) attitudes towards research, in the academic one is a must. In consequence, 
any interference within the data is not allowed. The research’s objective is to capture, to harvest, and 
to classify data. Any personal opinions and moral judgments are by default a virus with devastating 
impact on results.
 It shall be considered, taking into account the nature and the topic of this research, that the 
idea of coexistence of both above-mentioned attitudes is legitimized. Starting from the academic 
point of view, it will not be unjustified to claim that any research resulting in a higher level of pragma-
tic, not just intuitive, security does not requires a clarification. Due to the fact that without security – 
as a comprehensive concept – does not exist any kind of freedom and rights, as well as, without the 
capability to make use of freedom and rights does not exist a tangible security, comes to light that a 
research based on the security field helps to explore our – as individuals, community or nation – skills 
to fight and neutralize internal and external threats. Indeed, a security research will firmly root our 
constitutional values. This argument proves to be solid enough to proceed with this kind of research. 
 John  Keegan (2012), one of the most prestigious military analyst, reveals that the security 
threats which Europe is facing, have no precedent in terms of scale and intensity, moreover taking 
into account that they are irrepressible. This affirmation cannot be considered under any circumstan-
ces neither as an alarming nor as a catastrophic. It constitutes a real assessment of the on-going and 
future scenarios. Ultimately, the author makes reference to the topics that historically influenced 
conventional security (i.e: wars, conflict, terrorism, organized crime). In case of application of this 
analysis to the urban areas, the threat scenario will be more complex and transversal.
 The above-mentioned threat scenario did not traditionally constitute an approach from the 
panoptic perspective due to the lack of theoretical – but not practical – connectivity between phases. 
This demonstrates how shallow was the understanding of complex reality, limited to faked and fictio-
nal portrait. In consequence, there is lack of holistic approach towards: (i) internal dynamics of varia-
bles influencing the security as well as (ii) the potential confluence of them.
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 Meanwhile this confluence had been considered as a spontaneous process in terms of urban 
modelling (Shi, 2005) – able to break security structures, the examined case studies reveal stable 
signals of traceability allowing to keep track of certain types or sets of information and hence prevent 
(or at least minimize) breakdowns of security structures.
 Both mentioned approaches – the academic and the intelligence one – historically tried to 
design models and simulations to accomplish strategic projections. In consequence, the prognosis 
became an essential tool for both communities. Decauflé (Bas, 2016:15) remarks that:
 Ultimately the aim of this procedure is not to formulate an absolute truth – considering that 
concept of an absolute knowledge constitutes rather an utopia than a research standard. The goal is to 
provide a set of variants from previously established indicators. Clauser (2008:63) affirms:
 The topic that covers this thesis is located in between both worlds: the broad and the precise. 
Starting from the broad side, the framework of the spatial analysis and urban geography represents 
one of the traditional feature of the geography and more specifically the human geography.
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 “the prospective analysis does not limit itself to blend the real 
and the possible features into a projection system, rather immerses into 
marginal categories of the acknowledge such as the randomness, the 
fading, the revival and the uncertainty”.
 “Delineating the scope of the effort requires the researcher to 
decide if he intends to treat a broad topic in general terms or a limited 
topic in precise terms. [...] Another problem with broad topics is that 
often the treatment tends to be superficial and, thus, of little value to 
anyone who needs substantive information. To produce useful, substan-
tive information about a broad topic area, the researcher, must know his 
topic well before he begins the project”.
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 Moreover, national authors like Sanz (1999, 2001, 2002, 2006) and Fraile (2010, 2011) were 
focused on a comprehensive research in terms of crime and delinquency as well as correlations within 
the territory. On the other hand, in terms of the precise world, we can observe the missing knowledge. 
Once we have the information about how the society conducts its own behaviour supporting or 
neutralizing criminal actions, we might immerse in the understanding of a spatial process: the tracea-
bility or spatial-watching. This is a consequential step forward, which determines the logic of the of 
this research as well as its motivation.
 The world runs faster than we are able to measure. That results in delay in acknowledgement: 
terrorist actions take place causing deaths - in average - hundreds of civilians on daily basis; massive 
irregular migration flows take place all around the world costing millions of lives; sexual and violen-
ce attacks in remote and uncontrolled areas as well as districts of our urban areas sunk in illegal 
activities; significant increase of ordinary crime due to the economic situation; insurgencies and 
governments ousted by black operations lead by third countries; just to name few of the most influen-
tial processes that occur every day.
 Ultimately, we might ask ourselves which is the gap between the understanding of the 
process and its own neutralization? How we can transform the knowledge for social benefits? Why 
cells and organized groups are still operating with absolute impunity? The answer and the key point 
is the following: the traceability. This is the main justification that a research could have: to provide 
a solution to a worldwide problem, a solution applicable to almost every kind of ecosystem, indepen-
dently of the region, nation or continent. This is exactly the reason to write this thesis. This research 
could be just the beginning of a series of projects. Nevertheless, within this thesis we would like to 
establish the starting point for all of them. It might happen that the proposed methodologies and 
procedures will be subjected to criticism. We assume that risk. Some may understand this research as 
another dogmatic tool designed for the social control and the limitation of the human rights and free-
dom. 
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 We are confident to ensure that, if the latter will constitute the conclusion achieved by the 
reader at the end of the thesis, there has not been even a shallow understanding of what we are propo-
sing herin. In accordance with the essence of the topic, most of the on-going process takes place 
hidden inside of a complex nest, frequently hierarchical or adhocratical. Some variables – such as the 
psycho-profile of the subject, the urban structure, the geographical location and its orientation, the 
time or the ephemerides, the internal urban dynamics or the typology of crime to be committed, the 
level of autonomy of the perpetuator – play a decisive role.
 To achieve the announced goal we will immerse into the darkness. We will look for the preci-
se world, in order to observe, analyze, diagnose and finally present the results. This dissertation’s idée 
fixe is that it might provide a direct and efficient improvement for the society.
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3.1. The beginning
 When we began to work on this thesis, at the beginning of the year 2013, the security scena-
rio in Spain was dominated by threats of terrorism, organized crime and common criminality. Indeed, 
this scenario was affected by the cooperation of the above-mentioned actors. Almost a decade after 
the most brutal terrorist act ever happened within our borders, the population felt still exposed to the 
same actors. In that year (2013), the National Centre of Sociological Researches (in Spanish: Centro 
de Investigaciones Sociologicas, hereinafter referred to as: “CIS”) published a document titled: “Na-
tional Defence and the Army Forces” (in Spanish: “La defensa Nacional y las Fuerzas Armadas”, 
hereinafter referred to as: the “Questionnaire”). In the Questionnaire the social opinion about some 
high impact topics was collected and presented. The Questionnaire was composed of 62 direct ques-
tions and answers to most of them had become crucial for this thesis. A high percentage of them was 
dedicated to comprehend the link between citizens and some professions related to the security 
atmosphere. From that research we extracted the basis leading to this methodology.
 The first structural point arising out of the Questionnaire was that our citizens were perfectly 
conscious of our daily basis threats. In hierarchical terms they considered that political instability - as 
well as terrorism - is the most important threat, followed the mass destruction weapons, which they 
consider that could directly influence on our national security.
3. METHODOLOGY
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 The secondary structural point coming to light from the Questionnaire was focused on the 
perception of the investment in our security and defense. It resulted that 23,31 percent of the respon-
dents considered that the budget dedicated to defense is excessive. The observation that our society 
does not accept important investments in national security constitutes a highly interesting issue to be 
researched in further projects.
 The third and crucial point, indispensable to understand this methodological process, was 
formulated in the questions 7a and 8 of the Questionnaire. The interviewer asked in the question 7a if 
the subject would sacrifice his/her life for any reason. The 54 percent of the respondents highlighted 
that they would not sacrifice their lives to defense our nation. However, 91,2 percent of the respon-
dents would accept the sacrifice to save third person’s live; 72,9 percent of the respondents would 
sacrifice their live for freedom and 76 percent of the respondents - for peace. Continuing with the 
question 8 of the Questionnaire: the respondents needed to answer whether in case of military attack 
they would engage voluntarily. The result was that only 16,3 percent of the respondents would be 
willing to engage, meanwhile 39,6 percent of the respondents were claiming to not be willing to do 
it.
 The approach emerging from the Questionnaire was required to construct foundations for the 
methodological process. Due to the fact that this thesis is designed from the first thought to be 
applied, it would have no sense to proceed with a methodology which would not be acceptable by our 
whole nation: from the political point of view to the citizen’s perspective. In accordance with that, we 
extracted some conclusions from the Questionnaire in order to design the adequate methodology for 
this thesis. 
 The procedure, whatever it will be, must be focused on the real and pragmatics threats - those 
that our society is conscious of, having in mind the economical component: designing a working 
protocol with the minimum cost, using the imagination. Here the cost-efficiency ratio is a must. 
Moreover, this protocol shall preserve our constitutional rights, our social peace and freedom – due 
to the fact that those elements represent the most valuable aspect for our citizens. Simultaneously, this 
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protocol cannot imply the citizen’s involvement by default. Under those circumstances, we obtained 
the perfect portrait to begin with the design of our modus operandi. Before taking the first step 
towards this design, we needed to take an important decision regarding the reasoning applied within 
this empirical research which will be influencing on the whole structure of the thesis. The inductive 
and deductive reasoning are the two most fundamental types used for research purposes. 
 Notwithstanding that both approaches are characterized by various pros and cons, the diffe-
rences between them are highly noticeable. Moreover, the mentioned approaches are quasi antagonis-
tic. The inductive reasoning provides the guarantee to start with the data collection having a minimum 
knowledge or at least, a reasonable background about what could be needed. However, this back-
ground is limiting the understanding of the process. On the other hand, the deductive reasoning 
allows to achieve research objective via testing hypothesis. Nevertheless has this disadvantage that 
relies on high quality of data.
 The reader might realize that once we focused on urban security analysis it was mandatory 
to delve into this field: to observe, to live and to feel the area. All that was necessary for one single 
goal: to get a primary and direct knowledge – means data – about the ongoing process and its correla-
tion with the security. In case that we will start from an inductive reasoning, we would be conditioned 
by what other authors or experts considered as important in terms of vulnerabilities. This path, that 
we sincerely respect, would lead us to the systematic reproduction of the content already produced by 
others and to the limitation of application those results to a very restricted case studies. However, at 
the end of the day, by adapting the above- mentioned approach we would not be able to capture the 
essence of case studies.
 In accordance with our convictions regarding the fieldwork and our desperate aim to com-
prehend the process, we jumped directly to the fieldwork. Beginning from a deductive point of view, 
we turned into one of the most radical data collections processes. It shall be highlighted that the 
biggest disadvantage of this approach – high quality data – finally was considered by us as an advan-
tage due to the lack of existing compilation of data in the research field and the necessity of creating
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database: the option of constructing it from nothing gave us this outstanding opportunity of including 
all variables considered by us as important. More detailed reasons for choosing the deductive reaso-
ning as a proper research foundation for this thesis can be found also on the following pages.
 At the initial phase of this thesis, only one case study – consisting of the subdistrict of Sol 
located in the Central District of Madrid (hereinafter referred to as: the “subdistrict of Sol”) – was 
planned. Once the data collection process started there, we began to observe and analyze that area 
from the most general till the most tiny detail. During this process, we were observing the dynamics, 
the conduct, the areas, the history, the buildings and the human interactions including various time of 
day and different spaces within this subdistrict. The area was covered 24/7 for about 500 hours.
 After this initial fieldwork, we did excessive brainstorming of potential lines of research. In 
that period, the Improvised Explosive Devices (hereinafter referred to as: “IED”) and sniper shots 
constituted the potential threats to the security. Hence, we considered to develop a counter- sniper 
map. Ironically, a high number of elements located in the public streets provided critical information 
regarding wind direction and speed as well as ballistic calibration for long distance shooting. Moreo-
ver, during observation of the physical security protocols of certain institutions we made a surprising 
constatation: we discovered that the entrance to the vehicle is located in a spot where the guest is 
directly under the ballistic trajectory, ergo the vehicle is an easy target even for an amateur shooter. 
Other initial idea for the fieldwork, mixed with the previous one, was identification of potential loca-
tions used by terrorist to locate their artefacts. Examination of the latter issue lead us to the conclusion 
that big part of the underground system in Madrid was highly unprotected. Obviously some of those 
possible ideas of research were automatically deleted due to their nature - they could never be publi-
cly presented as a thesis. Henceforth it was needed to focus on a reasonable academic and operational 
target. Here the description of the methodological procedure used for this thesis begins.
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3.1.1 Need of knowledge
 The design of a research project starts from a blank piece of paper, hundreds of hours of 
initial observation, a general concept what to do – definitely not a strictly defined idea – and is much 
more complex than it seems to be. Consequently, the reasonable judgement followed by the prudent 
choice of the topic, which will not convert the thesis into unpublished material, is even more compli-
cated and significant in practice than in theory. Having all that in mind, the process titled as the need 
of knowledge commenced. In essence, this process is typical for any intelligence service: the deci-
sion-maker formulates a question regarding a topic characterized by lack of information which will 
be subsequently provided by the service. Applying it to this doctoral thesis, the formulated question 
was simple: What can we extract from this process in order to improve the security of citizens from a 
pragmatic point of view?
 tFinding an answer for the above mentioned question was far more difficult than expected. 
Indeed, initially there was the lack of any answer and only more questions linked to the initial one 
appeared. Then we started to determine the initial parameters of the research. The spatial concept was 
an obvious choice since the beginning, because it constitutes a native term for geographers. We learn 
to think in accordance with two main variables: time and space and all its derivates. Iconically both 
aspects – time and space – are decisive for a doctoral thesis. The current educational system requires 
to finish the research within 3 years. In case of a failure it is needed to go back and continue once 
again with the same cycle. This is the price of a deductive methodology: to achieve the goal is inevita-
ble to make “mistakes”. Without any doubt, the only way to find the answer for this question was the 
design and performance of the proper data collection process by creation of new methodology.
 The first methodological experience extracted directly from the fieldwork that influenced on 
the methodology was the importance of the proper management of the resources. Most of all, in order 
to perform the fieldwork in efficient manner, we needed to tackle properly three resources: time, 
information and economical budget. Despite the apparent easiness of this task, the fact is that the 
fieldwork consumes a high number of resources taking into account that its purpose is to provide a 
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minimum quantity of high quality data – moreover, if it is performed in a foreign location. Amid the 
struggle to continue with the process there was a noticeable learning curve: the cost-efficiency ratio, 
which at the beginning of the process was minimum, gradually was increasing.
3.1.2. Defining the conceptual limits
 The initial test-research provided an extraordinary information allowing for delimitation of 
the conceptual framework of this thesis. The starting point for further research consisted of the 
following acknowledgement: every single entity or system is vulnerable by default. Their resistance 
depends only on quantity of time and resources dedicated to cause its breakdown. In this point it shall 
be highlighted once again that resources play a determinative role. To be more precise: the security – 
or insecurity – of any entity or system depends of the resources invested to protect or to break the 
security.
 Consequently, this scenario allows us to set accessible objectives in accordance with our 
formulated question. During that initial research phase we observed a lack of potential traceability in 
multiple aspects. Thereby, just this shallow review allowed to detect black areas characterized by lack 
of evidence for criminal actions when such activities took place. In accordance with that, we conside-
red that focusing on the traceability as a transversal concept might direct us to create the ultimate 
solution. The traceability is an excessively broad term: it is covering several sciences and dozens of 
disciplines.
 The spatial geolocalization of the processes is what all of them have in common. That fact 
established the main corpus of the research. On daily basis, hundreds of criminal actions take place 
in the centre of almost every metropolis of the world. Most of them are untraceable; almost in the 
entirety they are not accompanied by any legal consequences. That was the inflection point encoura-
ging to start working on development of proper protocols within this research in order to reduce that 
criminal activity. Although not every criminal behavior taking place on daily basis has the same 
impact on the society, we are neither responsible, nor authorized, nor prepared to judge the scale of 
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this impact. Following this scheme we turn back to the fieldwork in order to evaluate the initial area 
– the subdistrict of Sol – having now in mind this specific aim. Hereby the search for a proper 
tracking systems begins.
3.1.3 Procedures, protocols and resources to address the objectives
 This chapter constitutes the commencement of the one of the most demanding phases of this 
thesis. Immediately after finishing the first recognition process in the subdistrict of Sol we came to 
the conclusion that the superficial review of this small surface was not representative for the whole 
security dynamics. That conclusion equalled with the enlargement of the area of the fieldwork. Due 
to the one of our established objectives – the exclusive use of open source data and fieldwork – we 
began to collect the digital basis of the Central District of Madrid directly from the municipal server 
in multiple scales: from censual district to parcel. That provided an initial and official base map cons-
tituting a reference point for the data collected afterwards.
 Once the new area of study was delimitated, the main variables and attributes – connected 
with it – were set in order to begin with the collection data process. Notwithstanding, before starting 
with the data collection, we needed to verify our ad hoc classification. Turning back to previous 
points, we had considered after evaluation of classification systems presented by various authors in 
the literature – which are specified in the following chapters – to not adopt any of them. Thus, the 
creation of new methodology – and followed by it classification system – started. The reasons to not 
apply any third classification system was based on two main factors: a) a third party classification 
system would polarize the observing reality throughout third eyes prism, what frequently equals to 
perceptual distortions; b) part of the reality spectre could be under- or overvalued. Furthermore, the 
Author of this thesis while analyzing the classification system, detected the need to design a classifi-
cation which will be applicable – from the security perspective – worldwide.
II. ON THE PURSUIT OF THE NEED OF KNOWLEDGE
41
 In order to verify the new classification system, a contrast checklist was designed. The proto-
col was based on the following steps: a) firstly, to identify some random elements located outside of 
study area and to formulate the checklist protocol; b) secondly, to observe if the checklist fix the esta-
blished criteria; c) thirdly, to adjust the pre-design classification; d) finally, to review once again the 
same checklist protocol so far as every element could be easily classified.
 The aim of the creation of this working classification system was its implementation in 
almost every location, preparing it – at the same time – to be adjusted to the local specifications and 
requirements.
 After the creation of the new classification and its verification within the subdistrict of Sol, 
the decision of changing the delimitation scope of the research and to develop further research within 
the Central District of Madrid was made. The reason to revise the scope delimitation of the research 
was to evaluate whether the threats are common for the whole research area or within the new 
research area we could detect – as afterwards happened – new security issues to work with. 
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 Then, another important decision was made: to focus the research on the public domain 
following the one of the broadening research area. It shall be highlighted that it was tempting to put 
the private security analysis in the limelight. That temptation was even greater after making an obser-
vation regarding the meeting places chosen by criminals: they select certain and fix locations. Howe-
ver, focusing solely on the private security could lead to privacy violation and in consequence could 
block publication of this thesis. Thus, this option as an exclusive research option was dismissed. 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned reservations, the private security constitutes an interesting 
topic to be explored – in particular the coalescence between private and public security. However, it 
shall be mentioned that we did not deleted completely private security from the horizon of this thesis 
– in some parts elements were analyzed in case of criss-crossing with public security elements.  
 More importantly, this long and demanding process of contrast and verification was required 
to identify the need of knowledge. Being more explicit: this process was indispensable to reveal what 
is happening and in the same time is imperceptible. By way of contrast, we could simply start with a 
conventional research about a topic with a special motivation for us, but without any application for 
the society. In such hypothetical case, none of those procedures would be required. 
 
           After more than 1200 hours of fieldwork and a comprehensive understanding of the criminal 
behaviour within the Central District of Madrid, we were ready to identify the previously mentioned 
need of knowledge consisting of the accurate traceability of – past, present or future – criminal beha-
viour within the urban area. 
  A resolute reader, familiar with the topic, could consider that there are already existing many 
systems deployed in the urban area to monitorize criminal conducts. Moreover, some authors sugges-
ted that we already live under a constant surveillance (Bauman and Lyon, 2013). The critical point is 
that the later assessment does not constitute a wrong one, only an incomplete one. This is one of the 
most notorious cases of security fallacies: it is the perception that tricks the reality. The question is: 
how this trick is made? This matter will be deeply and comprehensively discussed further, meanwhile 
we will continue with the methodology.   
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 After identifying our target, we began to synthesize the transversal elements that could lead 
us: firstly, to diagnose; secondly, to solve the security puzzles. In accordance with the above-mentio-
ned target, we considered that the Closed Circuit Television systems (hereinafter referred to as: 
“CCTV”) constitute a key feature, capable to provide an accurate traceability. The next step was to 
concentrate on the semiotics of the locations what led us to understand which of the elements are 
iconic not only for citizens but also for criminals. At this point we shall highlight that criminal beha-
viours are undertaken in most cases, due to the – material or immaterial – final benefit which will be 
called as an output. On the way to solve our puzzles, the third step was to acquire the knowledge 
emerging out of the output. Moreover, the understanding and ability to detect, identify and locate the 
output provides the first stone for the foundation to develop methodologies preventing criminal 
actions.
 It might happen that the reader would consider that our approach is dominated by what tradi-
tionally had been defined as Image Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as: “IMINT”) and Human 
Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as: “HUMINT”), meanwhile Signal Intelligence (hereinafter refe-
rred to as: “SIGINT”) and its derivates are avoided. The detailed grounds for not focusing on the 
SIGINT can be found in the dedicated this thesis (see: Section III). Notwithstanding the above-men-
tioned, we can reveal that those reasons are connected with the following factors: a) the capability to 
obtain raw data; b) the increase of chances to have a permanent ultra wide watch; c) the reduction of 
the risk due to use of simple but efficient counter-measures.
 Following the creation of protocol, specific methodologies and procedures for each and 
every of area study were designed – the details will be disclosed on the following pages of this chap-
ter. Once the data collection from the Central District of Madrid was finished, we moved forward with 
our research. At the end of this process and with total of more than 2000 hours of the fieldwork we 
came to the conclusion that it will be required different environment in order to compare the results. 
This conclusion was achieved due to the commencement of working with hypothetical models.
II. ON THE PURSUIT OF THE NEED OF KNOWLEDGE
44
 The question was whether the protocol could be applied to third regions taking into account 
the change of the following factors: a) history; b) urban planimetric; c) extreme weather conditions; 
d) important socio-cultural conduct changes. In order to check the applicability of the protocol the 
Author took decision to test it in a city with different history, different urban planimetric, different 
weather conditions, different socio-cultural conduct that in Madrid. In consequence, we started the 
search and the evaluation of different metropolis in order to choose a foreign candidate – another city, 
where the protocol could be tested and challenged whether it can be applied. The following are the 
names of the cities which were taken under consideration: a) Palmanova (Italy); b) La Paz (Argenti-
na); c) Washington (USA); e) Warsaw (Poland); f) Jaipur (India); g) Moscow (Russia Federation). 
From the above-mentioned possibilities, the city of Warsaw was chosen as second case study due to 
a blend of special features, which will be described in further in dedicated chapter (see: Chapter 7). 
With respect to non-selected ones, the decision to review them periodically and remotely was made.
3.1.4. Efficiency and operability: a methodological must
 Before the collection of the final data in both cities (Madrid and Warsaw) we decided to 
design a scheme that could resolve the needs of both societies in terms of crime prevention, taking 
into account the efficiency and operability. In this matter, once again we faced the dilemma whether 
to use – or not – other methodologies. Due to the fact that most of them are created to be implemented 
with a higher or lower cost, depending on the school and model, but what they have in common is that 
this cost is connected with a significant expenditure – hence, we decided to create our own methodo-
logy and own classification system. In consequence, applying the predefined rules we enabled a 
methodology with considered cost of applicability amounting to zero. Moreover, all that is possible 
due to the use of the already existing infrastructures and local resources.
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3.1.4.a The operability protocol
The following scheme represents the operability protocol:
 
 Developing the operability protocol we needed to choose between two propositions: a) the 
use of infrastructures; b) creation of software. The second proposition was not taken into account 
mainly because represents a support, not the solution, we were looking for. Moreover, the use of any 
software is connected with payments – and this is exactly what we wanted to avoid. Furthermore, this 
thesis is not focused on software engineering – and that constituted another reason to not follow the 
second proposition. Therefore, we focused the attention on the first proposition (i.e.: “a): the use of 
infrastructure”) and we recognized two main options: a.1) the use of existing ones; a.2) the imple-
mentation of new ones. Considering that our goal was the applicability of the solution with the mini-
mum cost, we decided to investigate further the first option: “a.1)” (i.e.: the use of existing infrastruc-
tures).
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 The next step was to select the public and private systems in order to create a common data-
base. The objectives of application of this database will be following: a.1.1) Legal procedure; and 
a.1.2) Prospective analysis. This time we will focus on both of the aforementioned database applica-
tions.
 Beginning from the Legal procedure, the database shall be used to provide the evidence 
back-up. The database as a source of evidence (i.e.: a.1.1) can be examined from two different pers-
pectives: a.1.1.1) as the search for a snapped image; a.1.1.2) as the search for accurate time traceabili-
ty. The first option (i.e.: a.1.1.1) applies to those cases where a legally authorized person submits 
request for disclosure of information from the database in order to find a judicial evidence in connec-
tion with the preparation of any legal (criminal) proceeding. The second case (i.e.: a.1.1.2) applies 
when it is required to track back a subject within a definite range of time.
 Focusing on the second objective of the database use: the Prospective analysis (i.e.: a.1.2) we 
can identify two possible paths of its applicability: a.1.2.1) the traceability in live-image mode; 
a.1.2.2) the tactical use. In order to select the first path (i.e.: a.1.2.1), it is required a high level of 
synchronization of private and public systems. The full usage of those systems will allow to close 
certain visual perimeters, which are controlling the subjects and/or object and are penetrating the 
visual borders.
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Figure 3.1.4. Effectiveness procedure
Source: author, 2017
 
3.1.4.b The efficiency protocol
The following scheme represents the efficiency protocol:
 
 Continuing with the methodology, the time has come to define the efficiency protocol, which 
– probably – constitutes one of the most significant elements presented herein. The reason for its 
importance is not its complexity – on the contrary – is its simplicity what surprises. It shall be highli-
ghted that in the Author’s opinion a simple structure supports better the operative capabilities of any 
solution than a complex one – in particular this efficiency protocol simple structure was designed 
from scratch. The basic and key elements used for its design were: the database, the coverage area and 
the tactical response, which together form its main structure. Firstly, the database contains the nomi-
nal property as well as the technical features that will permit to an expert to choose between one and 
other attribute. Secondly, the coverage area, determined by estimation, provides the global percep-
tion. Finally, the tactical response enables the end-to-end analysis.
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3.2. Methodology for CCTV systems
 The surveillance systems are one of the most controversial security tools used nowadays. 
Supported by many, criticized by others, CCTV cameras represent more and more used tool in public 
and in private domain. Focusing on the methodology, the advantages or disadvantages of those 
systems will be discussed further (see: Chapter 6.4). In order to start from the facts and to avoid the 
social controversy, it shall be mentioned that they are already installed and functioning. Because of 
the aforementioned reason those systems can be smartly used for public and social security purposes 
and interests. As frequently happens with almost every technology, what causes the social objections 
is not the technology itself, the objections are rather caused by the way in which it is used.
 In accordance with that, our methodology scheme proposes a responsible, scalable and 
secure use of this technology. It is not the aim of this thesis or this chapter to suggest a permanent 
watch of the entire society neither a full disconnection from any technology. The final goal is to 
reduce the significant “noise” caused by the existing technology and to increase the pragmatic and 
efficient use of it. All the aforementioned steps are needed to materialize the main idea of introducing 
newly formulated methodology: the social improvement.
 Taking into account the above-mentioned, we shall investigate how to avoid a non- effective 
tactical response or - in other words - a non-proper use of the installed systems: meaning by this gran-
ting to the systems less capabilities that it was designed and determined by their location.
 The aforementioned is indispensable to achieve the established goal for this chapter: the 
creation of methodology which will allow - in any city: on the condition of having its own CCTV 
system already installed - to increase significantly the number of resolved cases, to minimize meanin-
gfully the time to capture a right snapshot of the subject (perpetrator of criminal action), or going 
further, to supervise in live-image mode or in retro-perspective any critical scenario, thereby reducing 
the “noise” of systems and tools previously existing.
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 Notwithstanding the fact that the amount and the quality of the systems are a key element 
that could, in a thundering manner, determine the final result, cause a chaos of those systems and 
guarantee the inability to reach a result at the operative time corresponding to the issue. The main 
objective of clustering various elements is - despite defining groups or categories of them for a statis-
tical analysis, what is also interesting - to generate hierarchical structures that will increase the chance 
to select the specific attributes of interest, such as: the typology, the quality, the surface, the zoom et 
cetera.
 This concept will be incorporated in idea of neuronal network that: (i) connects different 
perspectives observable through existing CCTV systems, (ii) completes the task of developing of 
closable-visual perimeters: understood as the capability to control the ‘in-out’ flow - under any inter-
nal or external circumstances - within specified surface.
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Source: author, 2017
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 The graphic above can be divided in two parts: (a) the aerial view, situated inside the black 
square and (b) the basis perspective, located at the bottom. Beginning with the aerial view: the squa-
res, painted in light grey colour represent the buildings or physical objects that block the visual range 
of CCTV systems. The knots, divided in three categories, as we can observe on the further part of the 
graphic, determine the hierarchical typology. The lines – which are also divided in the same three 
categories as the knots, what is reflected in their different thickness - are showing the geographical 
connections between the visual ranges of two of those systems. The green lines in the down image 
represent this point-to-point linkage. As we can observe on the image the closed-visual-range perime-
ter works in the 3 axes - x, y, z.
 At this point it shall be highlighted that despite the fact that the bigger part of cartographical 
materials prepared for this research was design in 2-D representation, the conceptualization and deve-
lopment of it was thought in 3-D. The 2-D representation, instead of the 3-D, was chosen due to the 
lack of chance to homogenize the three cadastres used for the present research. All of them use hete-
rogeneous patterns, measures and semiology concepts. More importantly, despite the diversity of 
cadastres, the present research – taking into account the cooperation with the authorities – will increa-
se the precision of the above-mentioned systems in many aspects, most of all: in area of visual detec-
tion. According to the national and social security as well as interest hitherto we investigated systems 
focused on the analysis of the external perimeters of any building, green area or any part of the city, 
where the public transit is allowed. Although the potential spectrum of interest goes further: firstly, in 
terms of internal perimeters, secondly, in terms of the space typology extending it to shopping centres 
(over - and underground), main transport infrastructures (also over - and underground), finally, in 
terms of whole regions or cities conglomerates. 
 The above-mentioned extension of spectrum is limited by time, governmental cooperation 
and costs - those three features are not allowing to cover all aspects of reality within this thesis. Despi-
te the aforementioned restrictions, we will rediscover the meaning of security with the help of newly 
formulated approach, simultaneously expanding the research (i.e.: opening of new fieldwork) we will 
have on target the testing of the efficiency protocol.
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 In terms of spatial analysis we considered that the open vertical space might be divided in 
three categories in accordance with the potential transit zones criteria: a) the underground domain, b) 
the public domain, c) the under-aerial domain, which are described in detail below.
 The first category is the underground domain defined as the infrastructure subjacent to the 
public soil. Substantially this domain is restricted to underground infrastructures and services, i.e.: 
tunnels and driving networks. Occasionally it can be identified in malls linked to transport infrastruc-
tures as well as in parking areas (having their own CCTV systems). It shall be highlighted that this 
domain is extremely important for collective security. However, conducting any further analysis to 
comprehend underground urban internal dynamics depends on the cooperation of authorities in 
various aspect, i.e.: as planimetric. In consequence of above- mentioned procedure as well as the 
capability to “close” those areas, this domain will not be included in the developed CCTV census.
 The second category is the public domain - or in other word: baseline - understood as the 
public conventional surface. Hence this category is targeting the streets. In fact, precisely on the 
streets can be found the biggest percentage of all the public systems as well as the private systems. 
This domain is the heart of our investigations.
 The third category is called as the under-aerial domain. This domain is delimited by the part 
of any structure or building existing over the public domain with a public or private access. The 
systems installed in those locations have often two goals: (i) the peripheral control with strategic mea-
ning and; (ii) the peripheral control of the access from the basis or from the top. This domain, equally 
as the underground domain, is characterized by lack of capability to access to some locations. Thus, 
this domain - as well as the underground domain - due to the reason highlighted above will not be 
included in the developed CCTV census and will not be further elaborated in the present research.
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.
 
 In order to create proper ad hoc categories for the research’s CCTV census we analyzed 
several previous classifications developed by others authors. The one which is worth quoting is the 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (2003, hereinafter referred to as: “CPTED”), based 
on logical patterns linked to the next categories: a) Natural surveillance; b) Natural access control; c) 
Territorial reinforcement and; d) Maintenance and Management. Taking into account that the aim of 
this classification is the analysis of the cities’ environments, we considered as justified to refer to it. 
Other authors: Müller and Boss (2004) used a functional procedure to determine the following four 
typologies: a) the control of access; b) the control of conduct; c) the register of evidences; d) the 
evaluation of flows and development.
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 Even though that both classifications can be considered as suitable for strictly academic 
proposes, to verify whether can be used for the present thesis purposes: in particular for the purpose 
of the creation of practical and functional methodologies; we need to analyze what are the needs of 
security and intelligence agencies in order to adjust the above-mentioned categorizations to the 
necessities of those organizations.
 To start with the analysis of the above-mentioned aim, we will target the strategic sector. 
That will determine the functional neuronal networks as well as the decision tree of capabilities with 
the purpose of reduce the time to take tactical decision or for streaming in live-image mode and we 
will use for that the hierarchical clustering concept. The concept of the hierarchical clustering was 
previously presented in the Journal of the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Bailon, 2015). This 
concept is composed of the following elements: a) Preference Interest View; b) Secondary Interest 
View; c) Regular Interest View, which are explained below.
 The first element of the hierarchical clustering is the Preference Interest View (hereinafter 
referred as to: “P.I.V.”) - defined as a group of CCTV systems that as a consequence of their location 
provides the capability to control vital hierarchical roads. The P.I.V is essentially attributed to omnidi-
rectional cameras, however it cannot be described as a quality of all of them in general. The cameras 
used for the P.I.V are located preferentially above 2 meters over the street level. The P.I.V includes 
those systems which are located in the critical transit corridors of the urban area. Those CCTV 
systems constitute an extraordinary tool for the traceability. It shall be highlighted that those systems 
could became indispensable for tactical operations.
 The second element: the Secondary Interest View (hereinafter referred as to: “S.I.V.”) is the 
clustering element represented in all the CCTV systems providing a direct or indirect support to the 
P.I.V’s. This element in terms of: (i) the ability to perform the control of closable-visual perimeters or 
(ii) performing the strategic control is significantly less useful. The strongest characteristic of the 
S.I.V systems is their relatively high density. Additionally, images from the SIV systems can be used 
for spatial interpolation purposes (supporting the P.I.V.).
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 The third element of the hierarchical clustering is the Regular Interest View (hereinafter refe-
rred as to: “R.I.V.”). This clustering component covers the rest of CCTV systems. The RIV congrega-
tion contains CCTV cameras that from a general perspective are not having any influence, however - 
in the long run from a focal perspective - when are relating to specific location can play a decisive 
role.
 The second point of our analysis, but not less important, is the analysis of the capabilities of 
each camera. It is crucial to highlight that the quality and the technical specification of the already 
existing CCTV (public and private) cameras within the areas of study is highly heterogeneous. In 
consequence, it is possible to determine the tactical capabilities of each of them. The procedure to 
gain this information was based on two main aspects: a) on the fieldwork; b) on the estimative 
approach via third system correlation.
 The above mentioned steps were taken during the collection of data, when it was discovered 
that the most of the all installed CCTV cameras have a serial number and a product code. Notwiths-
tanding the above, not all of them are visible – a high percentage of them. After noticing it, the next 
step was to examine once again each and every camera already registered within the CCTV census 
with the aim to obtain those identification codes. In those cases where the identification codes were 
added to the CCTV census, those codes were used to find the direction of the manufacturers. Once 
that information was gained, through reviewing the manufacturers official catalogues located mostly 
on their website, it was possible to determine the camera’s technical specifications. The next step was 
based on another discovery that using a laser distant measure with a point-to-point measure function 
we could determine how high from the ground the camera sensor is located. The most efficient 
manner of addressing this objective is the usage of outdoor laser with a proper screen in order to focus 
on the selected target and to obtain results referring to that target. The devices manufactured by Leica 
Geosystems are the appropriate tools in both conditions – indoor and outdoor – allowing to remotely 
check the height of the camera. Cheaper devices frequently present erroneous results. Once the height 
of the camera was determined, it was required to identify the horizontal and vertical angles in order 
to define the direction and point of focus of the camera.
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 Continuing with the process, it is time for the software applications analysis, which are 
applicable for the purpose of the CCTV security design. In particular, we are interested in software 
allowing for the creation and the representation of the range and the dimension of surveillance. In 
practice: the first step is to enter data for the area for which security system is created and subsequent 
step is to review the design of the security system in 3-D modelling. Substantially, the fact that there 
are plenty of such applications on the market is not making the above-mentioned task easier. Regard-
less of the fact whether the applications are paid or are free – the gratuitous demo period is offered by 
all. After testing several applications, our attention was caught by the Ip Video Systems Design Tool. 
It is worthy to provide this tool’s name because of its simplicity, free access and accurate results. The 
results from entering data into this tool are opening two following paths: a) the GIS analysis; b) the 
field operability via smartphone, which in detail will be described below.
 The first path: the GIS analysis is based on the software capability to include geo-reference 
data as orthophotography, raster maps; or to export data to third party software as for example: Com-
puter Aided Design. The second path: the field operability via smartphone could constitute an 
extraordinary approach to be implemented by security forces. From the whole range of possible 
configurations the following one is worth highlighting due to its simplicity and accurate potential 
results: data implementation in 4-D representation software. For this task the software: Cinema 4D 
due to its capabilities was chosen. This software allows to import free models directly from Google 
Earth and Google Maps including special feature of inserting 3-D representations of buildings. In 
case that all the steps were properly taken, the result will be the city block model including hillshade 
function and the 3-D coverage of the CCTV, allowing to detect black spots of security. Moreover, 
using the platform Unity 3D it is possible to export the result directly to an application and afterwards 
to process that data in Android or iOS system. The result is presented as a 3-D portable interactive 
map with all critical information which might be needed by the governmental security forces. Addi-
tionally, this solution can be updated automatically with encrypted package of data transfer.
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Figure 3.2.3. Data collection procedure
Source: author, 2017
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 The above-mentioned protocol and diagram lead us to an operative classification of the 
CCTV existence through its capabilities. The aim of this classification is the determination: (i) of the 
technical procedures for each CCTV camera and; (ii) of the crime-combating ability, which each 
CCTV camera provides. From the field analysis of the surveillance tools we considered to propose 
the following classification distinguishing: a) Facial Recognition Capability; b) Subject Recognition 
Capability; c) Tracking Recognition Capability; d) Plate Recognition Capability (Bailon, 2015:8) – 
explained in detail below.
 The first element of the above-mentioned classification: the Facial Recognition Capability 
(hereinafter referred to as: “FRC”) is defined as the combination of the quality of the sensor and the 
focus, which are used. Those elements, in turn, may be fixed or variable, depending on the following 
variable: whether zoom is used or not. That combination allows to extract a sharp image of a suspec-
ted subject (crime perpetrator).
 The second element: the Subject Recognition Capability (hereinafter referred to as: “SRC”) 
is determined as the group of systems that enable us to determine the traceability of a subject in an 
urban environment once the subject has been identified (by clothing, posture, etc.). At a specific point 
in time, supposing that the subject passes through such a system at a minimal distance, the cameras 
having SRC function, can perform also FRC function.
 The third element: the Tracking Recognition Capability (hereinafter referred to as: “TRC”) 
is including those cameras that due to their potential low quality, are not allowing neither for FRC nor 
SRC function. Nonetheless, once the subject has been defined, the images captured from TRC came-
ras can help to determine whether the subject has entered – or not – into a field of vision covered by 
any CCTV system. The final element: the Plate Recognition Capability (hereinafter referred to as: 
“PRC”) is covering those cameras which have been equipped with the excellent capacity to identify 
a vehicle’s number plate. In this section were also included mobile systems, equipped with PRC func-
tions, used for vehicles patrolling by police forces.
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 Notwithstanding the above-mentioned classification, another feature was discovered: an 
attribute directly connected with the wall deviation angle – a concept previously described in the 
CCTV census. A wide or narrow angle of deviation can provide a higher strategic perspective for the 
public domain. In accordance with that we considered as indispensable the following division of the 
CCTV cameras: a) open ones – those cameras which deviation angle makes them mainly focused on 
public streets; b) closed ones – those cameras which deviation angle makes them focused on narrow 
targets.
 Coming back to the issue of the applicability of this thesis, we might focus on a fourth varia-
ble: the property. Already at the beginning, we highlighted our interest to blend public and private 
resources. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned interest, circumstantially it might happen that 
private owners would not be interested to make any contribution for the security improvement. 
Taking into account the above-mentioned reservation we considered as legitimate and important to 
mention whether cameras constitute public or private property.
 Moreover, to the CCTV census was added another specification, understood as a descriptive 
feature. This specification divides the CCTV cameras in three categories: a) focal; b) omnidirectional; 
c) zenithal. This division does not make reference to the nature of the CCTV camera, but to the analy-
sis of its point of focus: in other words its ability to grasp focal, omnidirectional or zenithal perspecti-
ve. In practical terms it is possible that a focal camera might behave as an omnidirectional or zenithal. 
The frequent finding was that despite many cameras were programmed for conventional focal use and 
in the same time they were equipped with a structure able to perform pan-tilt zoom remotely. The 
pan-tilt zoom ability is the key-element, because it is changing the camera classification from the 
focal one to the omnidirectional one. Simultaneously, we had discovered that the cameras set as 
omnidirectional ones have been modified to function as focal ones, hence they were classified as 
focal cameras.
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3.3. Methodology for social conduct behaviour 
3.3.1. Classification method
 Despite that the Geography is often classified as a social science, our thirst for knowledge 
and our approach to gain it permeates this classification. By the broadening the academic approach, 
we are well prepared to execute the multispectral analysis. Even though this research is performed in 
the Geography field, using multispectral analysis we will even go beyond the boundaries of Geogra-
phy as a science and by mixing the geographical knowledge with other sciences we will prepare inter-
disciplinary considerations. The following is one of such cases.
 It is impossible to understand the security: as a universal concept and its applicability: as a 
paradigmatic approach without the proper comprehension of the interactions between humans and the 
space. The received feedback is what is modifying – heavily or lightly – the conceptual schemes. The 
mentioned interactions affect on the process of the human perception – they are in fact the psycho-so-
cial structure of the space. Despite the processing of objective data, the background of social conduct 
is based on a dual system of action- reaction. The knick point is that it is not necessarily inborn 
process: it can – and frequently so it is – be socially acquired.
 In accordance with the above-mentioned, the social conduct not only is based on the direct 
self-experiences of a person, but also on the practice of third people. An entity can base its conduct 
on the experiences of the other people: some of those experiences will be taken from people from our 
social perimeter, meanwhile others will be taken from people about the existence of whom that entity 
had no idea. It is just a matter of social–synchronization. We started this area of observations in order 
to – experimentally – observe human conduct and social behaviour in urban areas from a security 
point of view. Despite the extended literature about social behaviour, we desired to obtain raw data in 
order to be able to compare results (including time and space analysis) within subsequent chapters of 
this thesis.
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 When we started to think about this topic, there were many questions about procedures, 
protocols and technical measures. Moreover, the main question was how to classify a subject within 
a minimum range of time. The time to visually categorize a potential subject was one of the most criti-
cal aspects for this methodology.
 Forecasting human behaviour turns to be an extraordinary – and extremely complex – issue. 
Within this effort, we would like to make a step forward to its understanding. Following our main 
propose – the creation of a method and analysis to objective neutralization of crime – we considered 
as a vital to find and comprehend the patterns of movements of victims and perpetrators inside of the 
urban ecosystem. In case of achieving this goal, crime prevention will be reality and consequently the 
statistics will change: in particular, the percentage of committed crimes will be reduced.
 Within the experience of fieldwork, it became easy to detect who could be a victim or a 
perpetrator. Independently of that acknowledgement, there is not so much empiric science involved 
in this detection. Hence, we start to design a contrast methodology to obtain more objective data. The 
art of visual profiling is frequently catalogued as an artificial and non- scientific procedure. Nonethe-
less, this art has the power to break the mind’s preconception in terms of statistical concepts of social 
analytical patterns. The social profiling, although it can be considered as a chimera, offers the oppor-
tunity to classify social clusters in standard classifications. Humans has the internal need to be linked 
to other social elements and are developing ad hoc features and skills that allow them to feel and be 
(focusing especially on feel part) integrated in a cluster.
 In accordance with this human need we decided to start the monitoring of the urban dyna-
mics of social clusters. Potentially, one of the most encouraging specific task to continue with this 
methodology was to find a classification of non-typical profiles. Moreover, all the classifications 
available via open sources, are focused on group’s dynamics and the mentioned issue is not covered 
within them. Close to what we are looking for, is the Sinus-Milieus classification. The Sinus-Milieus 
provides an image of the socio-cultural diversity providing descriptions of people’s sensitivities and 
orientations, values, life goals, lifestyles, attitudes and ocial background.
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 This classification is an operative model of social groups, constructed at the beginning of the 
80’s and upgraded afterwards by private companies (i.e.: by Sinus Institute: http://www.sinus-insti-
tut.de/en/sinus-solutions/sinus-milieus/), and can be considered as a socio- geographic profiling 
foundation including such variables as age, gender and theoretical income capabilities. The 
Sinus-Milieus is currently the best-known and the most influential conceptualization of social groups 
with many applications in politics, business and society. From this classification we can extract ten 
following role-categories: a) conservative-established; b) middle class; c) traditional; d) precarious; 
e) hedonist; f) adaptive – pragmatic; g) social ecological; h) expeditionary; i) performer; j) liberal 
intellectual.
 Nevertheless, this classification is not fitting perfectly to the goal of this research. In practi-
ce, we cannot overestimate variables as gender, age, conflict features, however we cannot stop to look 
for further information and add to the above mentioned classification the homeless category. Hence 
this category will be added as eleventh role-category for the Sinus-Milieus: k) homeless. For further 
social profiling purposes, personal conflict exposure is one of the key- points needed to extract poten-
tial irregular activities. The conflict exposure is deeply linked with the typology of criminal activities 
and leads to the development of the one of the above- mentioned role-category by a person.
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Figure 3.3.1. Profiling of overlapping features
Source: author, 2017
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3.3.2. Boots on the ground
 Even in cases where theory is clear, practice or operative exercises are not. To implement the 
presented methodology we focused on traditional and essential knowledge aspects surrounding the 
following subjects what can be synthesized in: a) the choice of a subject; b) the selection of technical 
instruments for monitoring and recording data, c) discretion; explained in detail below.
 The first step for the implementation of the presented methodology is the choice of a subject 
(person/perpetrator). The most significant for this stage of the research was the process initiating it. 
As more interesting and multiplex was the subject selected for further analysis, as more complex were 
the results obtained. Ultimately the polarization of the predefine clusters was required in order to gain 
clear schemes and patterns including persons socially located between clusters.
 The second required step was the selection of technical instruments for monitoring and 
recording data. The use of cartographic or GPS instrument allowed to record the track. However, this 
aspect will be further discussed within the next point.
 The third and final step is defined as discretion. In big and crowded cities – as a theoretical 
rule – citizens do not pay much attention to the actions of others. That applies to normal day-to- day 
procedures. Since the moment in which a pattern gains its shape, the social attention paid to it – 
grows. The absolute must during the fieldwork was to avoid attention of any security forces as well 
as of any potential observer. What is common to every model construction as well as to every norma-
lization process, that they contain the summary of variables which are not included in the project due 
to the lack of time or due to the simple reason that they are exceeding the goal of the research. Other 
cause for it is that the particular variable analysis will significantly increase the budget needed for the 
research. In the case of this research, we will not include some variables due to the all three 
above-mentioned reasons. In fact, this is the characteristic common to all projects.
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 Some examples of those variables are: demonstrations, weather conditions, working areas 
and seasons. In this part we will focus on them. Besides already mentioned weather conditions, exter-
nal or environment conditions are one of the most influential elements on psycho- geographical-pa-
ths. In particular: cold, rain, wind, heat’s waves, lack of light, are just some examples that affect 
dramatically the way that population moves within the cities. During the present research we got the 
chance to observe how subjects select different paths within huge spectrum of weather conditions: 
from - 20 oC up to + 35 oC. What is more, weather conditions and seasons affect paths in a non-con-
clusive manner. The research was performed during the summer-autumn-winter season in Madrid and 
autumn-winter-spring in Warsaw. It shall be highlighted that the hour of the day constitutes an impor-
tant aspect due to the fact the path chosen by subjects is statistically longer during the midday than 
the path chosen in the morning and in the night.
 On the other hand: demonstrations, riots or unexpected events affect paths chosen by 
subjects in a conclusive manner. When subject is near to a crowded area (lack of personal space, high 
level of noise, chaotic movements of the elements, etc.) can react in one of two possible modes: a) or 
get involved in order to check what is going on; b) or avoid the crowd in order to continue with its 
objective or to escape from the appearing scene. Depending on whether the subject of analysis reacts 
in a) or b) mode, the way of reaction changes the pre-selected psycho- geographical-path inside of 
subject’s mind, reorienting it accordingly to an improvised path or to an adaptive path.
 Considering various variables we shall also analyze the constructions zones as they constitu-
te side function of cities. Urban spaces are in a constant development or in repair. Moreover, we can 
formulate statement that urban spaces are unfinished - constantly under construction. Those develop-
ments, repairs, constructions, changes are affecting citizens. In particular they have influence on the 
way in which population moves and interacts. The status of urban spaces affects on transit paths. In 
particular, citizens having the information about construction changes in specific area will avoid to 
transit through it. On the choice of transit path influence also weather conditions, light and social 
class. Regardless of the above observations, there are also citizens having nothing against the transit 
through such areas.
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 Obviously a deeply interest in this topic must be followed by a proper research in the area: 
the design of ad hoc social classification for the city and of the potential paths was needed. To address 
this approach we got interest in the following variables:
 a) The Sinus-Milieus: already described above with the modification of adding the homeless  
 category;
 b) Gender: taking into account two basic biological ones: male and female;
 c) Age: divided in the following ranges: 0 – 20; 20 – 30; 30 – 45; 45 – 60; up to 60;
 d) Aggressive appearance: determined by the mode of walking, outlook, appearance, contact  
 with other subjects and a combination of those variables;
 e) Typology of path: diverse subjects in different situations choose a determined path. 
 Moreover, depending on the subject’s goal the selected path may change. Because of this fact 
 we formulated three options:
  (i) Point to point type: is represented by those desiring to get from a certain location 
  directly to another one, without having any interest in transit elements; for this type 
  is common to see the subject performing the specific transit as home-work-home 
  path;
  (ii) Observing type: is for those desiring to one place to another paying attention to 
  the transit elements; potentially might be considered as a subcategory of the 
  previous one, however it was separate due to the fact that this path is changing in 
  accordance with the subject’s will;
  (iii) Random type: is for those without specific desire towards transit between  
  places, choosing their path on random basis, paying – or not – attention to the transit  
  elements.
 f) Weather conditions: affecting in complex manner the choice of path. This conditions shall  
 be divided in three categories: sunny, raining, cloudy with addition of the wind conditions,  
 which can be supplemented by each other in low, medium or high manner;
 g) Time of the day, divided in the following manner: (i) Morning (6 a.m. to 12 a.m.); (ii)  
 Midday (12 a.m. to 16 p.m.); (iii) Evening (16 p.m. to 21 p.m.); (iv) Night (21 p.m. to 6 a.m.).
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3.3.3 A matter of technology
 During the development of this part of the research we discovered various inconveniences 
connected with used instruments. To begin with the gadgets we shall mention that urban spaces are 
full of high constructions, undergrounds zones and a big amount of other elements reducing signifi-
cantly the signal reception of any GPS device. The signal range needed for the present research was 
circa +/- 2 m, but due to the circumstances described above, that range was even smaller. The device 
used for GPS tracking was Garmin Fenix 2: GPS-equipped watch with several geolocalization tools 
that allow uploading some basic maps into it.
 Notwithstanding this fact, the initial results showed that the paths taken by the subjects did 
not match the theoretical lines determined by the GPS. Hence, we made meaningful discovery that 
we could not relay on the Garmin product. That situation pushed us to use a smartphone and tablet: 
Samsung Galaxy Note 4 and Apple Ipad Mini in order to literally draw the path line into a base-map. 
In terms of quality and reliability, we found that the Galaxy Note 4 is much more useful in strategic 
terms than the Apple Ipad Mini due to its drawing capabilities, reduced size and longer battery life. 
Some of the best features of the Samsung Galaxy Note 4 were: a) the existence of a drawing inserted 
tool (especially comparing it with Apple finger painting mode); b) the capability to obtain medium 
quality photo of the target; c) the chance to divide physically the screen into two applications in order 
to continue the work on the database meanwhile drawing the path; d) the exchangeable battery; e) the 
external memory slot.
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Figure 3.3.3.1. Protocol for following social patterns
Source: author, 2017
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3.4. On the pursuit of future steps for profiling and criminal prevention
 The capability to understand and to make correlations between paths chosen by subjects with 
specific characteristics as well as between different personalities of subjects and their spatial conduct 
leads us to the social profiling itself and to the determination of the potential role of the subject role 
– as a victim or a perpetrator – in the criminal activities. This procedure opens the ground for sear-
ching of criminal space profitability. This difficult art will probably increase the effectiveness of 
crime prevention. Currently we can find on the market multiple software offering post-criminal 
analysis. This software based its analysis on the existing criminal records in order to extract spatial 
patterns and conducts.
 This method requires large capacities not only in the geomatics field but also in the geogra-
phical understanding. This issue is bothering the author since 2013, when the research forming part 
of the Master Thesis was developed in order to find piracy and terrorism spatial and time patterns in 
the Indian Ocean: with special interest in the Horn of Africa (Bailon, 2013). One of the obtained 
results was the conclusion that although it is possible to determine a pattern or a spatial recurrence – 
even detecting when and where could appear the next threat – a certain prognosis and forecast could 
not take place without the comprehension of the conduct behaviour of those subjects whom will take 
the criminal actions. In that scenario – as well as in any other directly influencing on our societies – 
what determines whom, when and where the criminal action will take place is the profile of the leader. 
Applying these criteria to single entities – subjects – we could extrapolate how perpetrators move 
inside of the urban territory. In consequence, it is possible to extract the paths chosen by victims and 
as we can observe areas of perceptive high criminality ranges are avoided.
 Therefore we considered necessary to proceed with another research project in order to 
investigate the correlation between the subject profiling and the criminal conduct from a spatial and 
geographical point of view. Within this doctoral thesis we executed the path profiling in a number of 
1678 applying for each of the paths the above-mentioned methodology. Despite the volume of recor-
ded information, and the initial results obtained, the effects did not meet the research standards
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and author’s expectations. Hence, further research of this topic is required in order to design new 
methodologies avoiding the disadvantages of the presented one and providing not ambiguous contrast 
test in order to verify the procedure accuracy and its representative capabilities before to proceed with 
mass data collection. In summary, we would like to make a final methodology remark that this field 
is significant for multiple proposes, most of all: for social benefits.
 The main essence of this methodological procedure, used to profile criminal subjects accor-
ding with their spatial conduct and behaviour, relied on the article presented by McCauley and Mos-
kalenko (2008).  The authors of the mentioned article revealed a number of social mechanisms 
wide-spreading the radicalization of the subjects, leading them in some cases to became terrorists. 
Consequently, the possibility of matching and correlating initial phases of radicalization and types of 
spatial conduct behaviour could provide a key feature, making possible to neutralize those threats in 
our societies.
            
 The analysis of the proposed spatial conduct behaviour patterns might be linked with the 
three levels of aggregation disclosed in the above-mentioned article (Ibid.). In consequence, it shall 
be considered that subjects exposed to radicalization – as any individuals –  would project to the terri-
tory their own conduct profile. In addition, when the radicalization process starts up from a group, the 
leader profile is the one determining the paths and spatial dynamics. This simple fact could enable to 
reverse the radicalization process. By identifying the members of the group, in accordance with their 
spatial movements and behaviour, it could be determined who plays the leader role. The third level of 
aggregation introduced by the authors (Ibid.) is the mass scale. This level of aggregation reveals mul-
tiple disadvantages of correlating spatial conducts with singular profiles. Notwithstanding that fact, 
as it is disclosed in the Section IV of this thesis (see: Chapter 7), it is possible to forecast the mass 
movements in urban areas.    
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3.5. Methodology for commercial security analysis 
3.5.1. Commercial security and public interest
 Recently, since the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as: “USA”) starts to 
share – or to lose – the Weber status, by which this country has the monopoly of use of force and wea-
pons, the significance of private security and non-governmental actors for public interest rises. This 
new political adventure – imported from USA and United Kingdom – is currently observed even in 
the control of critical infrastructures. Nowadays the responsibility for working, deploying and leading 
of the security in critical locations such as airports, main train stations, underground infrastructures 
or even in some suburbs is undertaken – not by governments but – by private companies. This change 
of the guard – from governmental to private one – opens the doors for new opportunities but also for 
new threats.
 This new paradigm of public security, established by a neoliberal political perspective, leads 
us to think from the first hours of fieldwork that it would be required to dedicate chapter to the com-
mercial security within this thesis. It shall be highlighted that we observed (and verified) that urban 
dynamics is influenced directly by commercial security – which constitutes part of private security 
and moreover, a diagnosis of the modern security led by non-state actors. Hence, the commercial 
security is influencing on the public interest.
 In order to investigate deeply the urban dynamics linked with the security issues, we consi-
dered introducing this feature as a single synthetic index. For that purpose we started to track the ratio 
of commercials with direct access to the street level and private security measures. Due to the com-
plex urban morphology we decided to work in multiple scales: macro and micro. In that sense, the 
subdistrict's level constituted the macro scale and the street level - the micro scale. 
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 For the above-mentioned purpose we started to estimate the correlation between the total 
number of commercials properties equipped with any of the following security measures: a) private 
CCTV systems; b) bulletproof glasses and high-end security doors; c) private alarm systems and; d) 
private security employees working inside and/or outside the property.
 Those four features provide us a perfect picture of the demand and needs of commercial 
properties for private security in order to fill the gap which the public security is not able to provide. 
The application of this approach in spatial perspective allows us to determine the security dimension 
of the Central District of Madrid as well as to obtain a perfect image where – socially – the private 
security is welcomed and where is considered as a disadvantage: by its users and owners.
3.5.2 Data collection
 It shall be highlighted that data collection itself constitutes a real challenge. It requires a lot 
of time, attention to detail, dedication and moreover: it may raise suspicions. It is not surprising that 
looking at the behaviour of data collector (in this case the Author of this thesis) from a natural point 
of view, it could be considered as a normal that the owners or other responsible persons – without 
knowing the aim of this research – would became distrustful or even hostile while their security’s 
systems are examined. Undoubtedly, this is the expected – and the most common – conduct of 
persons willing to protect their security and it is perfectly understandable. The less common conduct 
was the curiosity towards the data collector and its actions. During the first 20 hours of fieldwork the 
explanation of the aim and the scope of the research was necessary more than several times – what is 
interesting that some persons not satisfied with explanation were willing to call the police. Even this 
less friendly behaviour is still perfectly understandable and healthy to maintain the system’s security.
 In this point it shall be highlighted that the data collection process started from the contrapo-
sition of the undercover procedure: a big tablet, a DSLR camera with an oversized lens and a note-
book. Above all, the whole process managed by a junior researcher, who was “glued“ to the front 
glass facade of a commercial local, taking notes about security levels. We should recognize that in the
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final outlook all this could be perceived as suspicious. Indeed, the citizens security is all about the 
perception. De facto, exists some kind of security paradox: we take actions in cases in which someone 
or something looks – but it is not – suspicious, we underestimate and do not take any action when 
threat is undercover.
 In result of the above-mentioned experiences, we selected an undercover method of captu-
ring the information. In this point everyday devices became highly useful and successful: we got rid 
of 4 kilograms of unnecessary gadgets by limiting all the equipment to a simple smartphone (i.e.: 
Samsung Galaxy Note 4). This device allowed us to come closer to the various targets: stores, locals 
etc.; and to take all the necessary notes and pictures, to map the information and to create database 
right in the moment. From the moment of the strategy change, all suspicious vanished. Due to the use 
of smartphone, the actions of the data collector were perceived as ordinary phone activities: typing, 
taking photos – the reality was far from that. We made the following observation of the citizens belief 
in the correlation between the used device and threat: as big is the device, the bigger is the threat and 
risk that it causes. In that way we discovered another security paradox: the perception tricks lead us 
to underestimate the real threats.
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3.6. Methodology for counter-terrorist analysis
 Nowadays one of the most incomprehensible processes within the analysis of terrorism is the 
motivation of a subject to commit a suicide attack using an IED. Although the psychological back-
ground is important, we cannot forget that those attacks represent a certain and permanent threat to 
our societies. Due to the above-mentioned, we need to be prepared to understand the way in which 
perpetrators of those acts mentally visualize the environment in order to commit an attack. Despite 
the choice of the target, which will be presented as a separate case study in the Section V of this thesis, 
it is important to know in which area – located close to the target – the implosion can be committed: 
starting with the obvious point that the real target is not always fully approachable.
 In order to comprehend the emotional transfer connected with the suicidal area, which in 
fact, starts the detonation approach, we decide to examine how those actions are conducted. In present 
times, there is plenty of public information provided – not by researchers but – by the radical groups 
standing behind the preparation and development of suicide attacks. In the search for an initial pattern 
we decided to focus on the groups from Iraq. Since the beginning of the war in 2003, there were more 
than 10 years of suicide attacks in multiple locations and targets. This period of time allowed to deve-
lop reliable and mature procedure enabling preparation and execution of such attacks. This aspect is 
highly interesting for our research, taking into account that those that will commit an IED suicide 
attack will be potentially sponsored and supported by international groups.
 Once the scope of our analysis was determined, the next step was to observe the moments 
preceding and following the attacks in order to identify and to extrapolate potential variables. To 
address this issue we used YouTube video channel, where it is easy to find and to classify the informa-
tion based on the preselected criteria. Furthermore, we limited the research to those attacks that took 
place inside of the urban area of Baghdad. In a result we obtain plenty of videos containing multiple 
compilations where it was possible to observe hundreds, if not thousands, of attacks.
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 Once the raw material was extracted, the time has come to work on the geographical parame-
ters applicable to our research as: time of the day, the urban morphology, the typology of target – just 
to name few of them. Remarkably, after the raw data analysis, we began to understand in which parti-
cular moment the subject would activate the explosive device. After analyzing the material, the 
conclusion was that there are significant differences – referring to the exact moment of pressing the 
button. Steps taken in the antecedent moments of pressing the blasting button open almost a world of 
potential human and body behaviour. Finally, we achieved to understand – not only – the typology of 
targets or the selected moments, but also the emotional interactions. It was crucial to discover what is 
the impact of the urban morphology on the subject's emotional status and what is the subject’s role 
into the decision making process. We need to highlight that the suicide act provides social recognition 
to suiciders. Because of that, the psycho-spatial-conduct analysis of the value and the importance of 
the location is vital to provide information allowing to comprehend within micro-second where and 
when the next action will be taken.
 Following the basic comprehension of suicide acts patterns, we devoted to the comparison of 
the suicide terrorist attacks within the European Union (hereinafter referred to as: “EU”) in the last 4 
years. It is important to underline that a suicide action does not necessary involve using of explosives. 
Irrespectively from the IED’s usage, the suicide act becomes public and if possible involves mass 
media attention in order to make the martyr actions immortal.
 After analyzing the cases from Iraq and EU, we came to the conclusion that the modus 
operandi of suicidal acts are the same in both locations. That discovery let us to make a simulation 
using the suicide mentality in order to predict emotional status caused by areas of the Central District 
of Madrid and – afterwards – to foresee which location and buffer areas can influence on pulling the 
trigger of emotional interaction and by that: lead the subject to commit a suicide attack.
 From the each martyr speech which we analyzed, we concluded that the suicide action gives 
in return a magnificent emotional feeling, reaching the maximum status the antecedent moments of 
finalizing the self-sacrifice. The knick point is hidden in the fact that the urban morphology 
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influences directly on the psychological specter. In fact, the urban morphology activates – sooner or 
later – this magnificence of emotions. Consequentially, to achieve their goals: to target the enemy and 
to achieve the supreme martyrdom, the search for an area of maximum correlation between both 
variables: the significant urban space and the highest influence of morphology on the suiciders is 
conducted. We identified that this is the reason of not performing suicidal action on the most strategic 
and hurtful target – even if it would be reachable.
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Figure 3.6.1. Pursuit and comprehend of spatial suicide terrorist attacks.
Source: author, 2017
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 In accordance with that, before we started to work in the Central District of Madrid on this 
topic, we analyzed what could constitute the most hurtful target from the perspective of the groups 
which are planning suicide attacks, taking into account multiple perspectives: international impact, 
social damage, religious, historical, infrastructural damage etc. Once we defined those areas, we 
started to evaluate how – always from the above-mentioned perspective – the urban morphology can 
influence emotionally. Then, we discovered that contrast spaces, corridors or gardens could block this 
magnificence of emotion. In contrast, we observe that transition zones or zone of drastic contrast 
located close to their potential goal could stimulate them to attack by making them feel closer to 
achieve their goal.
 From the moment of designing this working procedure, we started to map it. Due to the inca-
pability to set objective data, we considered as crucial to work with various environments and levels 
that could represent multiple areas. This methodology led to a permanent pursuit of the analysis and 
comprehension of the group dynamics and its applicability into counter- terrorism operations in urban 
areas. Within the proposed procedures we worked out to provide an accurate, pragmatic and reliable 
method , based on contrastable spatial conducts, acquiring knowledge and intelligence, going beyond 
the framework of Heath-Kelly (2013) methodology. Despite of this theoretical target, and because the 
aim was to understand the process – not to neutralize the origin –, the acquired knowledge can be 
extrapolated to other typologies of groups such as organized crime, common criminal groups and 
insurgency groups.
 The first diagram extracted as a result from this section is the following group dynamics 
diagram (see: Figure 3.6.2). That diagram is focused on the operative and survival capabilities of the 
group, not on the sociological nor functional perspective. In order to explore, to survey, to trick, to 
corrupt the local governance and to penetrate into the society, it is required the “exchange” of roles 
between the members of those groups. Otherwise, the targeting and neutralization process will imme-
diately lead to the collapse of all those kind of organizations.
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 As we could observe and diagnose, what frequently happens, especially in places with wide 
cultural differences between the supporter and the sponsored groups, in cases in which local groups 
are supported and financed by third country (Gertz, 2015) – what in technical terms equals to creating 
insurgency local power – that the rise of their power, their radicalization and the acknowledgement of 
that fact for public opinion constitutes a surprise. Indeed, the fact that those groups are becoming radi-
cal is everything besides a surprise: it means that the intelligence analyst did not understand properly 
the survival dynamics of the group. Hence, it might be considered that the national and international 
history of terrorism would be different if an adequate analysis of the group dynamics would be provi-
ded.
 In contrast, most of public research projects searching for the correlation between terrorist 
groups and group dynamics are focused on their tactical capabilities. However, tactical skills of the 
group will not determine its global conduct. Eventually, those skills can influence on trends in terms 
of behavior of notable members of the group. However, the real power: the real influence of a subject 
on the collective, it will not be noticed by this kind of research. Gupta (2005) in a paper entitled: 
“Toward an Integrated Behavioral Framework for Analyzing Terrorism: Individual Motivations to 
Group Dynamics” remarked the conventional approach and proposed to broaden the group dynamics 
analysis by the prism of a human need of belonging to a group. Undoubtedly this motivational layer, 
which is leading the individual to join any group, is indirectly influencing on the type of terrorist 
attack: other actions will be taken by ‘lone wolfs’ and other by people searching for group acceptance. 
In other words: personal motivation is influencing on the choice of potential terrorist to join any 
entity.
 In contrast, since the moment in which one inhabitant crossed the psychological line of a 
conventional subject and decided to be a suicide or terrorist perpetrator, it means that multiple survi-
val phases took place in this decision making process. It is not a day-to-night procedure (Carrión, 
2016). It shall be highlighted that the powerful link between the criminal action and its religious inter-
pretation is made by long and selective path (Juergensmeyer, 2005; Victoroff, 2006; Gupta et al. 
2006).
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 Within collected, visualized and analyzed data, we draw multiple schemes of what we consi-
dered is the survival structure of those groups, based on the operational trends using the attraction as 
the stochastic variable. Starting from the primary group cells, we observed that in entities with mini-
mal group dynamics it is present a clear and well defined image of its leader. The leader is a figure 
connected with the others by the appropriate level of “match” or attraction that creates one to each 
other. Those primary cells are characterized by a clear hierarchical construction and a common goal: 
to target the enemy.
 Meanwhile ambitions of those primary cells are evolving and are becoming more complex: 
their cell structure evolves too. In case that the cell is located in a safe place: on a territory under that 
cell control or controlled by allied cells, the cell evolution is not based on the survival motivation. In 
contrast, in those circumstances when the cell is located in an area, which is not totally or partially 
controlled by the cell: as Europe, North America, East of Asia, the cell evolution is based on the survi-
val motivation. Moreover, the evolution based on the survival motivation is carried in fast and accura-
te manner. Otherwise, slow evolution will not guarantee the achievement of the cell’s goal:
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Figure 3.6.2. Initial group structure in terrorist cells.
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 Despite the potential complexity to identify on the field the nominal subject linked to the 
diagram above-mentioned, there is a parallel path than simplified it. Despite that is not common to 
every insurgency and terrorist organization, it is frequent in some geographical regions where the 
concept of ethnicity play a determinative role. As we observed and evaluate in Somalia (Bailón, 
2012), the concept of tribes and its internal clashes engaged the ongoing dynamics of local and regio-
nal cells (de Terán, 2007). This socio-cultural framework determines not only the internal structure, 
nor the procedures, targets and the methodology under which they do operate.
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 In order to blend both spheres - the survival and the ethnical - we are proposing the following 
scheme:
 In consequence, we propose the shape of the cell structure constructing it on the broad hori-
zon: including in it not only operative ambitions, but also tactical and ideological ones. Moreover, we 
take into consideration the social and cultural background of the cell, which can determine the match 
between the cell’s members as well as the cell’s survival. The aspects, which are frequently ignored, 
but have high impact on the organization chart, are produced by: a) the self-survival of the micro 
cells; b) the local organizational structure which can easily evolve when required; b) the fate – 
success or neutralization – of each cell will not influence on the others.
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 We need to highlight that unfortunately, the way in which governmental organizations are 
understanding and monitoring terrorist cells as well as organized crime cells is not taking into account 
their complex structure. Those organizations are not considering them as sophisticated organisms 
with their own survival needs. Consequently, they do not define those cells as collectivities, which in 
substance they constitute. Consciously or not, this approach is in its essence a direct application of 
Burt (1980) theory.
 According to this author, the functional assessment of profiling is determined by the state-
ment that each member of a society is considered to occupy a position defined by several variables 
correlated with other actors of the society in which the subject is immersed. In this author’s opinion 
the link between two or more subjects is defined by three following variables: a) the subject “posi-
tion”, which is determined by the location of a subject towards the another; b) the “distance”, which 
represents the divergence of two profiles and equals to zero when they are identical; c) the “structural 
equivalent”, which is defined by a positive correlation between occupied position and role-set.
 Those guidelines led to – instead of functional or operational – topological identification of 
the subject. The real issue in identification process was already highlighted by Azarenko (2012): 
“The problem consist in the developing of a procedural understanding of the subject not in metaphy-
sical but in socially-ontological and the same time in anthropological meaning”. This anthropologi-
cal meaning, mentioned by Azarenko, set the path to the survival approach, which was formulated 
after considering that those cells – similarly to every human being – have multiple needs including 
the one to reproduce and survive.
 On the contrary, we observe that instead of applying topological profiles, social and “func-
tional” classification of potential subjects is based on racial and ethnical stereotypes. However, the 
systematic usage of racial stereotypes generates many vulnerabilities. Turning back to terrorism, 
during our research period in the Russian Federation we noticed how Russian police and security 
forces are constantly concentrated on a concrete regional profile: the Caucasian. Performing the 
research in central district of Moscow, we observed that security forces are fixated on this “minority” 
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and overreacting against it, meanwhile are not paying any attention to others. Similar dependence we 
can observe in Madrid, where security forces are focused on those subjects which outlook fix to the 
legendary image of Islamic terrorist. We cannot have any certainty that the Russian or Spanish securi-
ty forces are paying attention only to the above- mentioned subjects, however, during our fieldwork 
it was corroborated that the police in both countries is following imaginary stereotypes. Such procee-
dings of security forces increase the lack of pragmatic security meanwhile sustains the perceptional 
one. The point that we shall highlight as a society is whether do we desire a perceptional security or 
a pragmatic one? Meanwhile security forces are targeting stereotypes and subdistricts with high level 
of stigmatization, but where in reality is low level of criminal actions and potential suspects, due to 
the fact that the real perpetrators operate free and without the required security measures stay unnoti-
ced.
 This behavioral protocols applied on a permanent basis, blended with some others extracted 
during the research – are critical for our security and due to this reason will not be revealed, are 
leading our societies into areas of uncertainty and insecurity. The above-mentioned rules out the 
possibility of objective measurement of risk as well as the judgment of the threat. In such circumstan-
ces terrorist group and organized crime cells proliferate easily. We cannot modify the past nor the 
decisions which were taken, however, taking into account our scientific background it is our duty to 
comprehend the process in order to grant an efficient and effective solution in the present time - not 
in the future - without moral, political nor religious presumptions. In this place, this thesis is placing 
itself on the way of detecting and evaluate threats. Within the next chapters we will explore the major 
existing techniques to trace and neutralize those threats. Despite the above-mentioned, the pursuit for 
the knowledge regarding the way in which our societies are threatened by terrorist groups and organi-
zed crime should be considered as establishing an inflexion point. In order to determine what is, and 
what is not, considered as terrorism – due to the lack of a world-wide accepted definition – we shall 
refer to the work of Schmidt (et al., 1988), where is provided a broad range of 109 terrorist defini-
tions. Schmidt’s work (Ibid.) identified and compared the hierarchical reference terms in those 109 
definitions, providing a clear and consistent perspective of the intellectual community regarding 
terrorism.  
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 Since the moment in which we started to think about conducting this doctoral thesis, there 
were many uncertainties about procedures, capabilities and potential results. The complexity of the 
issue mixed with the current limitation of the doctoral program to 3 years, forced us to work against 
the time. Once the first step was made and the observation how wild and unconquered was the topic, 
the decision to continue with it was made. That wild and unexplored topic forced us to permanently 
worry about the time and legal limitations. Fortunately, a perfect synchronization between the resear-
cher and the thesis director led us to the success. The 3 years of the research allowed us to understand 
how political and personal interest is used within the security concept. We would deny the obvious if 
parallel to that we would not remark the laudable behavior of many people linked to the security. 
Finally, in our international adventure through the security issues we are able to find more lights than 
shadows.
 Summarizing the issue of methodology, its main disadvantage was the technology – as well 
as the way in which it supports the fieldwork. With a reasonable budget the controversy between size 
and functionality is frequently linked with the fact that smaller devices have less battery life, storage 
capabilities or processor power. On the other hand, the oversized ones – with high tech specifications 
– cannot be used for undercover fieldwork purposes. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned dilemma, 
in the end, the proper decision regarding the used devices was taken, providing the satisfying results. 
To sum up, we are more than satisfied and proud of the extraordinary effort made to not limit this 
research to prefabricated data and instead of using any ready-made solutions to create our own CCTV 
census. Without any doubt, it would be more comfortable, easy, safe and cheap to use already existing 
databases or other third party works. However, without proper data collection process the essence of 
this doctoral thesis would be omitted. Through the willingness to collect raw and independent data we 
obtained another asset and we mastered our fieldwork skills, we tested various devices in extreme 
conditions and – what is the most important – we discovered new fields and procedures.
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5.1.When the world started to change
 On the early morning of September 11, 2001, the way, in which we managed and we unders-
tood the world, changed (O’ Connello, 2006). On that particular day a sum of terrorist attacks targeted 
multiple objectives (hereinafter referred to as: “9/11”). Undoubtedly, that happened in an unexpected 
way for all of us. The world biggest power was seriously wounded. The icon of the New York’s Cen-
tral Business District (hereinafter referred to as: “CBD”) was blown up. The headquarters of the USA 
Foreign Policy were destroyed as well (De Goede, 2008) – giving in that way the best evidence for 
their failure (Zegart, 2009). Most of all, focusing strictly on the facts and terrorists modus operandi – 
rather than on the cause-effect consequences – on that unfortunate day nothing peculiar was noticed. 
However, exactly on that day the world dramatically changed its own perception of security. Unques-
tionably, the 9/11 attack became the most famous terrorist success and it had changed into the real and 
the most devastating ‘hit’ presented by terrorists to the democratic system (Sander and Putnam, 
2010). That attack moved the entire world.
 The Western democratic countries were touched especially, because that attack – in its essen-
ce – represented a flagship attack to all of them. On the opposite side: regimes composed of terrorist 
groups – which were previously targeted by those democracies – celebrated that day as David’s 
victory over Goliath. This worldwide reaction led George W. Bush to formulate the concept of “Axis 
of Evil” and present it to joint session of the United State Congress during the State of the Union 
Address on January 29, 2002 (Chesterman, 2005) – to describe by this term those governments which 
are sponsoring terrorism and are searching for means of mass destruction. Five months later, in May 
2002, then Under Secretary of State: John R. Bolton, added to formulated by Bush list of “Axis of 
Evil” – containing already governments of such countries as: Iran, Iraq and North Korea – the 
following: Cuba, Libya and Syria (Axe of evil, 2016).
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 That scenario was purely political and was used by mass media to point a new direction for 
the global security perspective (Grusin, 2010). In those circumstances, the mass media machinery 
started – and mediated – to accelerate the upraising of the new threat. Apparently, it seems that the 
world before the 9/11 did not know the true face of terrorism and its implications.
 At the beginning of the XXI century, the terrorist groups, which were active within EU at the 
end of XX century, ceased to exist due to their ramification to organized crime. The mass media were 
astonished to discover that each and every action of the “new” Islamic terrorism is covered and finan-
ced by organized crime agenda. We could not deny the impact – on human lives and rights – that this 
neo-Islamic terrorism had and certainly will have within the EU borders (Levi and Wall, 2004; 
Boswell, 2007; Givens et al., 2008). However, it will not be objective to claim that the terrorist 
methodology used on the 9/11 neither the entire operation was a new and a previously unseen proce-
dure. The plan of the terrorist attack in which a hijacked aircraft is used was designed already a 
decade before the 9/11: in 1991, when terrorist groups from the Middle East tried to attack the Spani-
sh Royal Palace in the above-mentioned way (Jordan, 2005).
 At this point it shall be highlighted that already on February 28, 1993, the first attempt of 
terrorist attack happened, targeting the heart of CBD: the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre. 
The idea of this trial attempt was consisted of designing the impact from down to top: the explosive 
charge was located in the parking. In result, this methodology turned out to be ineffective and was an 
inspiration for creating a much better attack-scenario: by adding the idea of using a hijacked aircraft 
and consequently, inverting the procedure of attacking the Twin Towers from top to down.
 Despite the above-mentioned, the history of terrorist attacks using hijacked aircrafts goes 
even earlier in time. On February 17,, 1974 a former US soldier stole a US Army helicopter from the 
Fort Meade and crashed it minutes later on the south-east garden of the White House. This action 
echoed in mass media, motivating the next hijacker, Samuel J. Byck, whom after hijacking a airplane 
on February 22, 1974, attempted to crash into the White House, expecting the assassination of the US 
President (Byck, 2016).
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 In other words, it is obvious that the Twin Towers as the target were already selected by 
terrorist groups long before the 9/11. Moreover, the events including hijacking airplanes were the 
pure evidence of efficiency and simplicity of this method apparently underestimated by the American 
counter-intelligence services. In fact, exactly this method, after slight adjustment, was used for the 
9/11 purposes.
 It shall be highlighted that it is undeniable that: (i) the Middle East terrorist groups were 
operating and committing terrorist attacks using similar methodologies since the 80’s on the US soil 
and what is more (ii) the modus operandi of potential attack was known. The 9/11 events constituted 
extremely sad proof for the security failure – or better said – negligence.
 To explain the way in which the 9/11 happened, US intelligence agencies used to claim that 
it happened due to the fact that terrorist were simply lucky – hence, there was not a single word about 
security mistake or failure, implying impenetrability of US security. However, the true light on that 
issue was given by Kleinberg (2003) in speech testimony given during the first public hearing of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on March 31, 2003. Kleinberg 
questioned the worldwide security watchword used by US services claiming that the 9/11 was not a 
consequence of ‘luck’ in the following words (Ibid.):
 The opinion presented by Kleinberg started simultaneously two-side reaction process. On 
the one hand, the first reaction consisted in permanent feeling of vulnerability – where societies, 
citizens and international business felt on daily basis threat of being a potential target. On the other
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lligence agencies have to be right 100% of the time and the terrorist 
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of September 11th, simple on its face, is wrong in its value. Because the 
9/11 terrorist was not just lucky once: they were lucky over and over 
again.”
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hand, the second reaction consisted in admitting – and assuming the responsibility arising out of – the 
failure. That mistake – or negligence as was signalised by Kleinberg – led to overreaction of poli-
cy-makers. 
 Considering the impact of the vulnerability, we shall highlight in advance that without any 
doubt, the way in which the society perceives and understands the security had transformed. In accor-
dance with the above-mentioned fact, authors as Velasco-Fernandez (2010) affirmed the existence of 
an anthropologic constant phenomenon defined as the vulnerability, which is consubstantial for the 
human kind as well as for the permanent pursuit of self-security. This anthropological tenet influen-
ced on the way in which we perceive and evaluate the surrounding threats and risks. In consequence, 
we assign a higher rate of risk in our minds than objectively exists. This emotional and psychological 
process will further lead us to discuss the importance between the perception of security (which can 
lead to the creation of secure feeling against contradictory facts) and the objectivity in security issues. 
In the meanwhile, within this chapter we will explain the way in which the overreactions of poli-
cy-makers led to the development of new era paradigms. 
 Consequently, we observed that it is not a matter in which the threats are more or less capable 
to strike our societies. It is as well about the way of dealing in decisive and serious manner with those 
threats. Moreover, the center of gravity relies on the fact in which the administration – due to negli-
gence behaviours – let those threats to penetrate national security vulnerabilities. The era of the Axe 
of evil, established by the G. W. Bush administration, led to a parallel concept of Good and Bad 
Muslim (Mamdani, 2002). In essence, the political speeches designed and build up a ideological 
construct where the stereotypes overflow the intelligence.       
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5.2. Necessity vs. rationality or in other words: the development of 
new paradigms
 The history of the terrorism does not provide us so many examples of terrorist actions with 
massive worldwide impact as the 9/11 attack. After this horrific event we started to observe how the 
mass media, social media and experts began to publish, edit and construct an extraordinary volume 
of content without any precedence. That effort – with potential political interest in the background – 
fed the perfect machine of fear (Cantor, 2002). Voluntarily or not, consciously or not, the above-men-
tioned efforts were used to nurture over and over again the culture of fear that ended up with the Iraq’s 
and Afghanistan war.
 We cannot forget to highlight that to create and to maintain such culture is required a 
post-traumatic society. Schuster (et al., 2001) developed a national survey research immediately after 
the 9/11 attack to measure and to diagnose the level of stress reactions. The results showed how the 
incubated culture of fear increased stress levels of the society. From all the adult respondents, whom 
answered to this survey, at least 40 percent manifested any kind of substantial stress; 68 percent – 
showed a moderate impact of stress and; 90 percent – was only softly affected by the stress.
 This impacted society, mixed with the traditional US “patriotism” and national feeling of 
failure, supported perfectly the neo-culture of fear and frighten produced by the Islamic terrorism. 
Already half century before the 9/11 (in 1947), one of the persons responsible for the II World War – 
Hermann Göring – explained how the society could be fearful and by so be willing to support or to 
sponsor a war that in other circumstances would not be socially accepted nor supported:
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to the bidding of the leaders. This is easy. All you have to do is tell them 
they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patrio-
tism and for exposing the country to danger. It works the same in every 
country” (Culture of Fear, 2016).
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 What we can clearly observe is that after the 9/11 the same threat: terrorism, was washed, 
reconfigured and sold publicly as a new and lethal risk for our survival. By using a database dedicated 
to terrorist attacks, developed by the University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (hereinafter referred to as: “START”), we could analyze the 
evolution of the number of global terrorist attacks since 1970 till the present days. In result, after 
using START, we know that instead of observing an significant increase of the number of attacks, 
rather a linear decreasing tendency was noticeable. The 9/11 deserves importance only if: a) we isola-
te the 96 percent of global terrorist actions around the world; b) we focus only on those attacks against 
the Western democracies; c) we only have interest in the national security of USA. Hence, only in 
case in which all three above-mentioned conditions were met, we can truly confirm that the fatal day 
of the 9/11 was remarkable in the history of terrorism, otherwise - was not.
 The above-mentioned statement shall not be considered as an underestimation of the threat 
that the terrorism historically represented and moreover nowadays still represents. Undeniably, it is 
one of the most critical hazardous factors for our stability and democracy. Categorically we shall ask 
ourselves – if we are truly interested in decreasing the daily threats that our nations and more impor-
tantly our societies are facing – is what the 9/11 attack had change? In other words: why this attack 
caused such dramatic political and international reactions which were not caused by any other terro-
rist attack? 
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Figure 5.2.1. Evolution of the terrorist attacks world wide.
Source: author, 2017 edited from START, 2016.
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 Subsequently, what are the grounds to push forward a new security paradigm if this attack 
had not been different in its substance from other attacks? We cannot stop to question ourselves whe-
ther the decision process taken by USA to improve their security parameters – which directly influen-
ced on the world population – was based on a rational and logical prerequisites or on the contrary, it 
was founded on the post- traumatic stress. Here the necessity clashes with the rationality over and 
over again.
 Despite the minimal existence of public research dedicated to the influence of distress by 
policy makers after a terrorist attack in the decision-making process, we might highlight the work 
developed by Scott et al. (2013). In this work was presented an analysis of the distress reaction of 
2240 patients after the 9/11, dividing them in multiple categories. By approach presented in this work, 
it was revealed that certain profiles are able to manage the stress, meanwhile other profiles are signifi-
cantly more influenced by it. This simple fact could lead politicians to adopt policies powered by 
emotions instead of preparing policies based on a rational analysis of the situation.  
 Taking into account that at the moment of the first impact on the Twin Towers the time equa-
lled to zero, we can visually describe two paths of reaction following this moment: a) the necessity 
and emotional path or; b) the rationality and analysis trajectory. Below we will analyze the steps 
which need to be taken in order to follow each of those paths. By deciding to take the path based on 
emotions and necessity (i.e.: the necessity and emotional path), we could observe how our first reac-
tion would be to show that we still are the world’s biggest power. We were hit, so we will hit back. 
That would constitute an easy explanation of introducing ‘the axis of evil’ concept in hurry as well as 
to perform the first air strikes already in November 2001 in Afghanistan. The next step, following the 
path of necessity, will be opening of a worldwide war against the terrorism – despite the fact that 
terrorism as an ideology is almost impossible to be blocked. Due to the fact that we cultivate the 
culture of fear within our borders, we would dramatically increase the mass surveillance, duplicating 
the panoptic model (Bentham, 1791). National agencies will have the political connivance and the 
social support to listen, track and observe what every citizen does, with whom and about what talks, 
saving all those data or a potential further criminal record. In the meantime, various military 
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operations led for the purposes of our worldwide war caused the creation of several failed and weak 
states. Consequently, human rights, social security and international law would not constitute any 
obstacle for our actions. Is it possible that without caring for the freedoms and rights we will feel 
more and what is more - be - secure than before? The answer could be synthetically resumed to the 
one following word: not. This answer is negative due to the fact that the same protocols that failed, 
the same procedures that opened security gaps and the same politics that on daily basis create dozens 
of new potential terrorist will be still maintained. Potentially we would be more insecure due to two 
main factors: a.1) our perception was tricked by creating a new fake security; a.2) the number of 
potential enemies increases dramatically. The ultimate consequence is the globalized fear (Pain, 
2009).
 Despite that the detailed analysis of the panoptic model and its consequences in the 
watched-world will be performed within further chapter, we would like to mention some characteris-
tic of it in advance - in accordance with the above-mentioned necessity path. The panoptic model is 
fundamental for the functioning of places like prisons where circular design allows to the guards to 
permanently observe - being located in the centre of this circular design and in the shadow - prisoners 
as well as to observe prisoners each other - creating in this manner another level of constant survei-
llance. Such design in theory shall reduce prisoners motivation - by fear to be caught - to commit any 
criminal activity. However, what will happen if the prisoner will decide to commit criminal activity – 
calculating the risk of being caught – and the theoretical guard that should be monitoring is not 
present there? Then, the prisoner will recognize that despite this model is theoretically perfect – it can 
fail. Subsequently, the effectiveness of this model will be vitiated and the prisoner will be tempted to 
try to commit any action once again. Consequently, the prisoner will be looking for any opportunity 
to challenge the effectiveness of this system over and over again. 
 Due to the linkage of mass surveillance programs with the political administration it is clear 
that the existence and quality of those programs depends on the annual nationals budgets. As we 
could observe the budgets dedicated to defense were significantly reduced in the last years due to the 
economical crisis. Hence, it might happen, sooner than later, that the investment in those programs 
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will be reduced dramatically. In case of such scenario, the surveillance per se will disappear – it will 
be replaced by the surveillance feeling created by the culture of fear. It shall be highlighted that what 
it will be created, it will not be the secure reality, but a fake security status which is easily breakable. 
Once subjects will discover this breakability of security – as a result of massive reduction of survei-
llance programs – the number of attacks and damages caused by them will increase significantly.
 In contrast, following the path b): the rationality and analysis trajectory, the first step to 
execute will be to proceed with detailed diagnosis and analysis. Consequently, we will deeply investi-
gate the following aspects: what failed (in terms of systems, procedures, etc. – in broad perspective 
of security), how critical infrastructure was affected, what we can improve and resolve without preju-
dice to civil and social rights. Then, the next step will be to find and put on a public trial subjects 
responsible for the attack in order to prevent: (i) the creation of any martyr myth and (ii) the reproduc-
tion of attack by any potential copycat. Undoubtedly, in this scenario there will be no place for war. 
Instead of waging war in critical areas – what in longer perspective will be equivalent to the preven-
tion of creating new fail states – we will concentrate our efforts on the intensification of the interna-
tional and national collaboration in order to detect, find and neutralize the threat without destroying 
any – in particular critical – infrastructure. This protocol will allow to maintain the population stable 
and in consequence, significantly will contribute to avoidance of massive flows of irregular migra-
tions. Applying the above-described protocol, potentially within a decade or maximum two, the threat 
could be greatly reduced.
 Regardless of the fact which of the above-mentioned paths could bring better results, fifteen 
years after the 9/11, we can diagnose that the model chosen by USA, based on needs and emotions – 
not on the rational prerequisites – failed as the US’ security failed. That choice constitutes the triumph 
of the geopolitics of the emotions (Moïsi, 2007) and its logics of conflict, which led to the current 
disrupted and chaotic status of our world.
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 To comprehend this clash of emotions and its influence into the US‘ decision and policy 
makers at the beginning of the XXI century, we refer to an article published under the title: “A clash 
of emotion”. The politics of humiliation and political violence in the Middle East (Fattah and Fierke, 
2009). According to this article: “what united the West after 9/11 was the humiliation of the United 
States by al Qaida. What unites Muslims in the post 9/11 geopolitical climate is a collective feeling 
of humiliation” (Ibid., 84). Referring to the path of necessity and emotions, the authors add the 
following:
 Due to the above-mentioned paradox of dividing the West and uniting Arabs and Muslims, 
we will focus within the next pages on the discovery and analysis of the latest and newest paradigms 
of security and how they “theoretically” might influence on our security level. 
5.3.The securitization theory
 The securitization theory was developed in the Copenhagen school of security studies in the 
90’s and mainly was discovered and formulated by Ole Wæver (1993). This theory emphasizes the 
importance of social aspects of security and proposes a tool for practical security analysis. Its creation 
was directly affected by the Critical Security Studies (hereinafter referred to as: “CCS”). The CCS 
encouraged to question the knowledge that is taken for granted (Benesch, 1993). The securitization 
theory was designed: (i) for the identification of security issues: in order to divide those that are 
influencing on the security from those which are not, as well as (ii) to track their evolution from the 
politics to the security field (Escanez, n.d.). As its author stated: “It is by labelling something a that 
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 “The United States’ response to 11 September 2001 has created 
new wounds and reinforced the sense of humiliation to the extent that 
Islamists across the board are becoming more radical. While Al Qaida 
has divided the Muslim world, and united the West, the US ’War on 
Terrorism has divided the West, and united Arabs and Muslims” (Ibid., 
83).
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 The lack of explicit moral and ethics standards blended with the capability to exclude the 
politics – as well as public and social representatives – from this process is one of the most criticized 
aspects of this theory. Aradau (2001) points out that due to the incapability of the analyst to be neutral 
and objective in security researches, there is a direct or indirect policy- making process included in 
security analysis.
 
 On the other hand, Balzacq (2001:1) assures that: “Securitization theory elaborates the 
insight that no issue is essentially a menace. Something becomes a security problem through discursi-
ve politics”. Despite the above-mentioned, depending on what perspective will be adopted to exami-
ne it, that will determine the way in which this theory will be perceived. From a philosophical pers-
pective it will be synthesised as a conventional procedure; meanwhile, from a sociological perspecti-
ve will be highlighted as strategic choice and its implications.
 Independently from the perspective adopted, there are two crucial points within this theory. 
The first one is that the security is a (illocutionary) speech act (Taureck, 2006:3) and with those words 
refer to the philosophical idea that by saying something – something is done (something labelled as a 
threat becomes a threat). The second consideration is based on the psychological sphere, where 
Taureck affirms:
 This blend of driving forces pushed Wæver (1998:29 in Taureck, 2006:3) to consider that 
“the security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics”. Once 
we defined the aim and functionality of the securitization theory, it is required to evaluate its direct 
and collateral impact on this thesis. Taking into account that the deductive methodological approach 
was adopted as a methodology base for this thesis, the theoretical framework was not taken from the 
securitization theory, nor any other. However, the reader could find multiple correlations between this 
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 “For security this means that it no longer has any given 
(pre-existing) meaning, but that it can be anything a securitizing actor 
says it is. Security is a social and intersubjective construction” (Ibid.).
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thesis and the securitization theory. The linking point for both - this thesis and the securitization 
theory - is the anthropological value. The necessity to explore, evaluate, formulate and find a rational 
answer to the question what is or not a security issue is essential for human beings. 
 Immediately after the 9/11, as a direct consequence of the above-mentioned politics of humi-
liation and political violence in the Middle East (Fattah, 2009), a massive application of the securiti-
zation theory started in USA and Europe. That process covered each and every issue that the actor – 
in this case the policy-makers – wanted to deal with and did so by using the tool of defining some-
thing as a matter of security. This intersubjective approach hid from the conventional politics – and 
by so from the public domain – the political counter-measures addressed to fight against the threat. 
That unconscious – and emotional – turnabout to the secret policy-making process or in terms of the 
securitization theory: the use of emergency politics, resulted in fading of social and constitutional 
rights. All that turnabout was sold as a step to preserve “security” and “democracy” privileges of the 
citizens. 
 In consequence, such application of the securitization theory opened the door to the massive 
surveillance operations carried on citizens, which were conducted beyond the limits of political juris-
diction, where all the metadata: including even raw data (email, PC storage, social profiles, calls, 
messages; an endless list) is recorded, saved and stored for a potential analysis when needed (in closer 
or more distant future). It is unquestionable that this structure has multiple benefits for the security 
proposes. We shall highlight the accuracy of the question posed by Wæver (1993): what does security 
do? Consequently, we shall ask ourselves whether the global security is so valuable that it compensa-
tes the elimination of the social and constitutional rights?
 We shall point out that the process defined as dataveillance - the systematic monitoring of 
people’s actions or communications through the application of information technology (Clarke, 
1988) - emerged decades before the 9/11 (Hall, n.d.), however en mass was applied after it (van Dick, 
2014). That practice, regardless whether is covered or not by the “emergency politics”, must be consi-
dered as unlawful. Most of all, such practice is common for the underground world (Ibid.).
III. THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY
95
 However, starting from the hypothesis that the dataveillance is crucial for our security, first 
of all we shall define - not conceptually, but physically - its own limitations. The dataveillance as 
conceptually defined by Clarke, is based on the subtraction of people’s action and communication 
collected through technology. For its existence is necessary that masses will use technology as well 
as transfer of electronic data will be used for communications purposes. Without the engagement of 
technology, it is impossible to apply the dataveillance massively. Without the above-mentioned prere-
quisites, the dataveillance will not be omnipresent neither will be possible to capture data from 
various applications and technological devices. Consequently once those two conditions were deter-
mined: i.e. the massive use and the transfer of electronic data, the next step is to analyze some of the 
most common activities that support the dataveillance nowadays.
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6.1. The concept of traceability and its capabilities
 The securitization theory – applied for the contemporary security for the purposes of the war 
on terrorism – is permanently focused on acquiring the knowledge about the following: who, what, 
where, when, why, which are the most commonly formulated questions within it. Despite the fact that 
the essence of this theory is perceived by most of its detractors as a constant surveillance, this theory 
constitutes a ground for the existence of the match point in terms of pragmatic security and defense: 
traceability.
 The traceability can be understood as the ability to track back – in correlation to any 
described variable – a specific object, subject or entity: in physical, electronic, or incorporeal form. 
The definition of it changes depending on the field of interest. Despite the potential heterogeneous 
approaches, we can distinguish the same common frames. To start with the review of definitions, we 
will examine the definition provided by the International Standardization Organization (hereinafter 
referred to as: “ISO”) in ISO 8402 (formulated in 1994), which was described by Olsen (2013:143) 
as old but practical – in accordance with the above-mentioned standard the traceability is: “the ability 
to trace the history, application or location of any entity by means of recorded identifications”.
 It shall be mentioned that Olsen was focused on food and products traceability (Ibid.), howe-
ver what is important: this author considers that the above-mentioned definition covers the tree essen-
tial steps: finding, following and identifying. By investigating further the following ISO standards: 
9000 and 22005 (formulated in 2000) it is easy to notice a difference in traceability approach, in parti-
cular the following words: “by means of recorded identifications” were replaced by: “of that which is 
under consideration” (Ibid.). That change opened the doors for the application of this concept in other 
fields and directly influenced on its applicability into the security technology field. Nonetheless the 
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 Nonetheless the above-mentioned, the suggestion to adopt a wider approach to the traceabili-
ty issue appeared earlier: was proposed by Gotel (et al., 1994:1) to apply it from industrial perspecti-
ve. In accordance with the above-mentioned suggestion: “the main problems reported [...] are attri-
buted to an inadequate problem analysis”. In order to solve the lack of analysis, the above-mentioned 
authors suggest:
 By approaching to the security field, we endeavor to discover how the traceability concept in 
cryptographic terms is focused on the capability – and ability – to extract identifying data where 
conventional procedures already failed. Going one step further: Bellare (et al., 2003) proposed a 
foundational working scheme to reveal a full-anonymous and full-traceable subjects or groups from 
pre-set of encrypted parameters. 
 Subsequently, two key elements which were not mentioned by the above-mentioned authors: 
the traceability and the signature were correlated by Kiayias (et al., 2004). Coaxial for the ability to 
go back in time and space (to specific occurrence happened in particular day in determined location) 
is the capability to observe and distinguish the signature of an element, subject or group as well as to 
track it back in time and space. Furthermore, subject or group cannot be traced without finding and 
identifying the traces left on the path – regardless of the environment. Consequently, we shall ask a 
question: how it possible to design a traceability plan without including in it the signature element, 
which will allow to follow subject or group? Moreover, how we can define the signature parameters 
for wider security proposes? In this point the pursuit for the traceability application in the urban secu-
rity framework begins.
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 “a) requirements of traceability refers to the ability to describe 
and follow the life of requirement, in both a forwards and backwards 
direction; b) Pre-RS traceability refers to those aspects of a require-
ment’s life prior to inclusion in the RS; Post-RS traceability refers to 
those aspects of a requirement’s life that result from inclusion in the 
RS.” (Ibid.).
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 Focusing on the signature element: in our everyday life we are leaving hundreds of signatu-
res in conscious and unconscious manner, that can correlate our identity with our actions. Conse-
quently, those signatures are building our trace in time and space. Some of those signatures can be 
used for traceability purposes while others are becoming insignificant in the global context. To ensure 
the proper differentiation between those signatures which are relevant and those which are irrelevant 
(and are increasing significantly the level of noise provided by irrelevant data) an intelligence 
research process is necessary (Andrew, 1985; Jeffery, 1987).
 Currently, this type of analysis is not a standard procedure used by security groups nor by 
groups fighting against criminality (Ratcliffe, 2009). Despite that the spatial analysis, the signature 
and the traceability are – and were – common tools used by some of those intelligence units, what is 
surprising is that those tools are not used by all of them. 
 The level of their usability reveals how the concepts of intelligence, traceability, spatial 
analysis and signature can be adopted in a different manner than the expected one. After inspecting 
their working flow, we can observe that their essence consist in a standard statistical analysis, in the 
best case scenario used with simple Geographical Information System (hereinafter referred to: 
“GIS”) in order to make a spatial reference to events.
 What is obvious, such procedure has nothing in common with intelligence analysis of any 
kind. Few of those intelligence units applied a standard description procedure, developed under the 
code of intelligence. Within this procedure the questions why, how and when are barely asked and 
even less resolved. This ineffective working flow is by far one of the driving forces that does not 
allow the direct neutralization of criminality in urban areas. What is linked with the above-mentioned 
problematic, we need to highlight that the use – or in pragmatic terms: the abuse – of Big Data is 
“contributing” to generate intelligence and spatial acknowledge. This new trend has become popular 
in the “scientific” world, developed in parallel to the securitization theory. The connection between 
the both: Big Data and securitization theory was established in the following manner: meanwhile the 
securitization theory was intentionally used by politicians to push the population to feel insecure – in 
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order to provide them a solution –, the national security agencies fight the “threats” covering the 
entire spectre of communication and personal data, collected by those agencies as a Big Data. The 
result is the reverse to the one provided by the intelligence. What Big Data is providing it is a noise, 
where the relevant and the irrelevant data are indistinguishable. The Big Data, due to its own origins 
in the environment defined as “intelligence community”, was immediately adopted by the “scientific” 
community without a deep and pragmatic evaluation nor reflexion regarding the quality, the contribu-
tion nor the relevance of the data acquisition procedures. Consequently, the Big Data – which is 
synonymous with quantity, not quality – invaded the reality of academic research. It is undeniable 
that currently the amount of accessible data is significantly higher than years ago. However, the 
essence of a real and genuine intelligence analysis consists of capability to answer with accuracy the 
following questions: i) What liability have this data?; ii) Which procedure was used to collect data?; 
iii) Who was responsible for collecting data?; iv) Which are the purposes to collect data?; v) Is there 
any sponsor hidden behind the research or data? By using the Big Data, most of the above mentioned 
questions do not have even a chance to be answered. Consequently, when Big Data are entering into 
“scientific” consumption by loading data into any server, this consumption covers only a partial infor-
mation: in some cases a raw data, in other cases data designed to appear as raw but not being raw at 
all. Hence, data originating from Big Data are further processed without the certainty of the nature nor 
quality of the data. In this point we shall highlight that the hosting of such volume of data has a econo-
mical cost, a cost that needs to be covered: by private or public funds. By determining the above-men-
tioned issues, the suspicions about the ethereal value of the data can be solved.
 
            Within the approach presented herein we aim to highlight the limitations of the Big Data use, 
not to cancel nor erase them from “scientific” world. We consider that the Big Data is a powerful and 
useful tool for intelligence analysis on the condition that the analyst responsible for the analysis is 
perfectly aware of the limitations that are connected with this source. Within this thesis we will set 
new procedures and protocols in order to systematically improve the efficiency of traceability from a 
security perspective. The goal of taking this step shall not be considered as a willing to underestimate 
the work, effort and sacrifice that security units implement on daily basis. In those terms it shall be 
highlighted that it is admired the call of duty presented by them to serve to their governments and 
societies.      
III. THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY
100
  The above-mentioned step is not in contradiction with the willingness to improve, support 
and transfer to them the knowledge supported and broaden by this research. Within the methodology 
chapter (see: Section II, Chapter 3) it was already highlighted that this research extends beyond the 
frames of the academic world – or at least in that way was designed. The knowledge presented herein 
has the aim to serve to the society – without differentiating nations, cultures or classes – in order to 
fulfill those security gaps that were discovered during this research. The traceability is one of such 
discoveries.
 Surprisingly, and as subsequently we will notice, many technologies and protocols already 
exist, which can be used in order to provide georeference data from devices, for biometrical identifi-
cation of a subject or to track transfers and movements using wireless cards. However, those systems 
fail without GPS signal, in other words – are ineffective in case of lack or weak signal. During the 
shooting of Hollywood production titled Body of Lies (2008, directed by Ridley Scott), in which Rus-
sell Crowe played the role of a CIA analyst named Ed Hoffman, in a scene representing a meeting of 
a head analyst with a potential political representative Crowe said:
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 “Our enemy has realized that they are fighting guys from the 
future. Now, ahem, it is brilliant as it is infuriating. If you live like it’s 
the past, and you behave like it’s the past then guys from the future find 
it very hard to see you. If you throw away your cell phone, shut down 
your e-mail, pass all your instructions face-to-face, hand-to-hand, turn 
your back on technology and just disappear into the crowd. No flags. No 
uniforms. You got your basic grunts on the ground there. They’re going 
looking: “Who is it we’re fighting?” In a situation like this, your friend 
dress just like your enemies and your enemies dress like your friends. 
What I need you to fully understand is that these people, they do not 
wanna negotiate. No at all” (Body of Lies, source: Wikipedia).
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 Despite that the above-mentioned words originated from a movie scene; they highlight the 
main weak point of securitization theory and dataveillance programs which are currently applied. 
Those tools are efficient only in case when are linked (or attached) to any signal transmitting device. 
In consequence, those devices are potentially under inspection. However, how can be inspected com-
munication which is beyond those devices? Even in case that we would consider that signal transmit-
ting devices are indispensable in XXI century, we know that is possible to live without having any 
such devices nor having access to Internet, moreover those devices nor Internet is not needed to 
prepare and to commit a crime. Consequently, everything which is beyond the range of such devices 
is out of the security record. Reproducing the words of Ed Hoffman “it is brilliant and infuriating” 
how those programs become useless when a subject turns back to the analogue world.
 In other words, those systems are useful to track and monitorize 99,9 percent of the targeted 
population. Surprisingly, this is the percentage of population without criminal tendencies, moreover 
not representing a threat to national or international security. Hence, why we should use the system 
which is easy to be switched off when its functioning is required? What is the real utility and applica-
bility of it? Certainly, the final goal of this system, which is easy to be obviated by potential perpetra-
tors, cannot be our security, otherwise the method, structure and procedure would be radically diffe-
rent and designed in a way, which includes (not excludes) the above-mentioned shadows areas.
6.1.1. The spatial traceability definition proposal
 In contrast to the above-mentioned understanding of traceability, our aim is to construct a 
traceability concept focused on the security of inhabitants and exclusively on it. Because of that, it is 
required to adopt the traceability as an omnipresent concept not as a stochastic variable with high 
dependency on other variables nor technology. Bauman (2013) defined the concept of liquid survei-
llance and its consequences (Bauman et al., 2014) as a continuum dataveillance, where technology 
snaps frames of our lives to create a global interconnected frame. Despite the fact that Bauman’s 
concept foresights the present and future of the surveillance as it is understood and applied by govern-
ments it not useful for our purpose due to its dependence on technology.
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  In fact, the traceability as a concept covers a wide range of sciences and fields. Taking into 
account the connection of the traceability with our goal: the security, moreover in urban areas, we can 
propose its following definition: the ability, capability and knowledge to identify and follow the trace 
– in relation with two or more variables – of any certain subject, object or entity using the signature 
left by this subject, object or entity – expressed in any form – used without any kind of procedure 
directly or indirectly depending on human and technological information tools.
 Applying the above-mentioned definition proposal, we will continue this thesis with an over-
view of the most common technologies in use for purpose of geolocalization of potential subjects. 
Due to the fact that the list of those technologies seems endless, we will focus on three categories, 
which represent the most useful and pragmatic ones from this research perspective and it includes 
following: a) mobile phone traceability; b) biometric technology traceability; c) CCTV systems 
traceability. 
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6.2.Mobile phone traceability: data transfer and geo-localization process
 From the appearance of commercial mobile phones – we are not taking into consideration 
satellite phones, which represent a different category in commercial and functional terms due to their 
dependence to the Low-Earth-Orbit satellites (hereinafter referred to as: “LEOs”) and the fact that 
they are not commonly used – in the late 80s’, however the first call made from hand- held cellular 
was made in 1973, their global distribution indicates a permanent increasing tendency. Taking into 
account the increasing popularity of those phones - which strictly depend on LEOs network -, we 
shall revise the evolution of spatial coverage provided by them. Moreover, given the fact that the 
benefits of the dataveillance are based on the usage of mobile phones and world coverage provided 
by them. 
 
 Although the world’s mobile phone distribution provides a reference starting point, to deter-
mine the real coverage provided by phones, it is necessary to analyze it country by country, starting 
from a global market going to the regional scale.
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  In order to proceed with the above- mentioned analysis, we will look at a research developed 
by Poushter (2015), which determines the percentage of the level of penetration and the mobile 
phones usage. Below we can examine the map with the results.
 This statistical and spatial approach, visible on the map above, indicates the level of penetra-
tion and usage of the mobile phones worldwide. The crucial aspect of the potential capabilities of the 
dataveillance programs resides in Global System for Mobile Communications (hereinafter referred to 
as: “GSM”). Currently, 80 percent of the mobile market uses GSM network in more than 212 coun-
tries, having estimated around 3 billion of users (Steenbrugeen  et al., 2013).
 Within the last years, the real-time location-based analysis provided by mobile phones beco-
mes more frequent. Despite the above-mentioned, the focus point of many projects is the understan-
ding of the individual dynamics in urban areas rather than the obtainment of nominal data (Calabrese, 
2006). For this understanding purposes frequently acquired information are the following elements: 
a) Cell Phone (hereinafter referred to as: “Cell ID”); b) Angle of Arrival
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Figure 6.2.2. Percentage of adults who reported to have a phonet
Source: author, 2017 edited from Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey. Q71 & Q72. Pew Research Center
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(hereinafter referred to as: “AOA”); c) Timing Advance (hereinafter referred to as: “TA”); d) Recei-
ved Signal Strength (hereinafter referred to as: “RSS”) (Ibid.). Above all, this analysis with the Cell 
ID, AOA, TA and RSS can be used for social and tourist research as well as for citizen espionage. 
Calabrese (Ibid.) executed landmark analysis in Rome, in which highlighted that by using the Cell ID 
and the IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) we can easily differentiate tourists from 
visitors or in other words: autochthonous from foreigners. That information could lead subsequently 
to the nominal identification of the subject registered with a certain Cell ID by obtaining further data 
from the mobile service provider. It shall be mentioned that nominal identification does not equal to 
the obtainment of the user data – data of the one who in reality is responsible for using or displacing 
the device. To verify the real identity of the particular device user it will be required to proceed with 
further dataveillance methodologies – some of them will be discussed further.
 Nonetheless the above-mentioned, the main advantage of the solution based on information 
technologies utilizing the spatial analysis is the capability to monitorize potential criminal actions as 
well as to provide judicial evidence for criminal records. On the other hand, the concept of permanent 
surveillance assumes also several risks. First of all, considering that the nominal titular of the Cell ID 
is not the same that the final user, this concept assumes that is the same. Secondly, it assumes that the 
device is permanently with the subject, what allows to track its movements. The third risk assumption 
is that each and every user filled the owner’s registration process and mobile provider has all data 
necessary for its identification.
 Indeed, the policy-makers play a vital role for the last assumption. Analyzing it from the 
European framework perspective, we shall focus on DIRECTIVE 2006/24/EC OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (Official Journal of the 
European Union from April 13, 2006, pp. L 105/54-63, hereinafter referred to as: “Data Retention 
Directive”).
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  The aim of the Data Retention Directive is to harmonize provisions concerning the obliga-
tions of the providers of publicly available electronic communications services or of public commu-
nications networks with respect to the retention of certain data which are generated or processed by 
them, in order to ensure that the data are available for the purpose of the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law (Article 1 p. 1 of 
the Data Retention Directive). This directive establishes the frame for saving and storage of data 
generated within a communication process by using public networks or those provided by communi-
cation networks.
 The above-mentioned could lead us to think that all the requirements are already set – at least 
within the EU borders. However, we shall remember that directive as a EU legislation measure is 
used to set minimum standard, which shall be applied at national level, but member states are free to 
apply more stringent national measures, provided these do not conflict with free movement and free 
market rules. The way of implementing the Data Retention Directive constitutes perfect example of 
it. According to the proper legislation in Spain regarding data retention: LEY 25/2007, de 18 de octu-
bre, de conservación de datos relativos a las comunicaciones electrónicas y a las redes públicas de 
comunicaciones (BOE n. 251 from October 19, 2007, pp.: 42517 – 42523) the nominative registration 
of the physical or juridical entity who acquires the services or terminal is required. The above-mentio-
ned is not a common procedure within the EU and moreover: outside from it. Consequently, two 
terminals obtained in countries where the local legislation does not require the nominal identification 
of the buyers of prepaid services, can lead to maintain unidentified communications, which by default 
represents the main security failure of this dataveillance protocol.
 In summary, we can observe that the massive dataveillance protocol is successful only in 
case that certain critical requirements are met. Moreover, during planning or designing of a criminal 
action by potential perpetrator it is an easy task to avoid any traceability. In consequence, the entire 
dataveillance infrastructure is used to monitor citizens that by default will not play a role of an active 
perpetrator. In contrast, those citizens that take or desire to commit any criminal action – will do it 
without leaving any digital evidence nor trace.
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6.3. Geolocalization by biometric technology
 Continuing with the pursuit of dataveillance procedures directly influencing on the neutrali-
zation of criminal conducts we need to mention the biometric technology. Historically, the term of 
biometrics or biometry was referred to statistical and mathematical methods used in biological scien-
ces. Its origins are dated at the beginning of the XX century and since its beginning it was focused on 
the fields as: a) comparison of varieties; b) human clinical trials testing new therapies; c) environmen-
tal researches; and d) pandemic process, just to name few of them.
 Additionally, taking into account the securitization theory and the massive implementation 
of technologies for security purposes, biometric technologies are also on our way of the subject iden-
tification pursuit by comparing or analyzing biological traits and evidences. The ISO/IEC 2382-37 of 
Information technology provides following information regarding biometrics: “Biometrics covers a 
variety of technologies in which unique identifiable attributes of people are used for identification 
and authentication” (Biometric Institute, 2016).
 Focusing on those biological traits we shall synthetically mention the following: a) DNA 
matching; b) ear recognition; c) eyes – iris recognition; d) face recognition; e) fingerprint recognition; 
f) finger geometrics recognition; g) gait - behavioural recognition; h) hand geometric recognition; i) 
odour recognition; j) signature recognition; k) typing recognition; l) vein recognition; m) 
voice-speaker recognition (Ibid.). From all of the above-mentioned typologies, we have special inte-
rest in those, which can be linked or associated with a geolocalization process. For the purpose of this 
research it does not matter whether this linkage is direct or indirect: those aspects will constitute a part 
of a separate research project. In the subsequent part of the thesis we will examine DNA matching, 
ear recognition, face recognition, fingerprint recognition, gait - behavioural recognition and we will 
introduce CCTV systems capabilities.
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6.3.1. DNA matching
 Independently of our will and knowledge, we are permanently leaving DNA traces. Almost 
every activity is associated with the loss of biological tissues. All of those tissues possess DNA struc-
ture. Such simple and everyday actions as: touching our hair; scratching our skin; drinking from a 
cap; or using a handkerchief; leave a DNA trace. In theory – and moreover in practice – we are cons-
tantly leaving evidence where we have been, what we have been consuming or with whom we were 
in contact. This process is unnoticeable for most of the people, while for some others – i.e.: forensic 
analyst – provides vital information.
 Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, the DNA matching correlated to spatial analysis in 
the field of forensics it is not exclusive for humans. Indeed, it can be applied to track the trace of each 
being with whom the victim or perpetrator could be in contact. Furthermore, some of those beings are 
characterized by geographical endemic peculiarities – an issue that geographers and especially those 
ones dedicated to the biogeography can fully understand and a feature that enables time-space 
tracking. The possibilities presented by biometrics are wide, what shows the palynology test used by 
Grantham et al. (2015) as an alternative method to identify the geographic origin of dust samples – 
without using DNA. It shall be highlighted that this kind of research could directly link a perpetrator 
with a crime scene (Wiltshire, 2016). We consider that the above-mentioned capabilities of this 
methodology and its ability to resolve criminal procedures by increasing the pragmatic and percep-
tual security made it worth to mention in this thesis.
 Despite the slight differences between DNA structure of people, modern genetics can distin-
guish the differences in nucleotide chain of each person, providing the sequence consisting of 
following: A (for adenine), C (for cytosine), G (for guanine), T (for thymine), which in result is an 
unique combination for each individual (Hill, 2011). This technique could constitute a potentially 
perfect method for traceability, which could be used in forensics evidence search (Pfeifer, 2016). 
Notwithstanding this fact, DNA test for humans - in contrast with other beings due to the existing 
databases - requires a DNA sample and in consequence without possessing reference data becomes 
useless (Hill, 2011).
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  The first reference about forensic applications of DNA test was made by Gill (et al., 1985). 
Within the next decade DNA testing evolved, including the method and technology, going from Res-
triction Fragment Length Polymorphism (hereinafter referred to as: “RFLP”) to Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (hereinafter referred to as: “PCR”) through Short Tandem Repeat (hereinafter referred to as: 
“STR”).
 Focusing on the first one of the above-mentioned methods: the RFLP - it demands a large 
and undegraded DNA sequence. However, looking from the perspective of time-space traceability, 
the RFLP does not suit perfectly to those scenarios where the evidences are old or with limited 
volume of DNA. What needs to be taken into consideration in terms of geographical forecasting 
within the pursuit for time-space evidences is the DNA degradation – which increases significantly in 
tropical and subtropical regions.
 In contrast to the RFLP, the PCR testing demands less volume of DNA samples, having this 
advantage that DNA sequences with intermediate level of degradation can be used in it. However, the 
main disadvantage of this method resides in the fact that it requires the perfect handling procedure of 
acquiring and processing the sample. The PCR sensibility is higher than the RFLP and in this method 
there is bigger risk to contaminate DNA material directly or indirectly. Notwithstanding the 
above-mentioned, nowadays the PCR becomes trendier than the RFLP as a basic test due to the 
time-cost-sensitivity ratio.
 The third method: the STR is currently used as one of the most frequently DNA matching 
test. Its simplicity blended with the cost-effectiveness and the increase of accuracy, locates this tech-
nique on the leading position. The STR test is focused on DNA repeating sequences of any based 
DNA component (the above-mentioned sequence of A, C, G, T in nucleotide chain) and to distinguish 
one DNA sample from another. The outcomes of the above-mentioned methods can be following: a) 
exclusion result – when there is no match between suspect and evidence; b) non-exclusion result – 
when there is a probable match or inclusion result; c) inconclusive result – frequently linked with 
DNA handling process and DNA degradation natural process. 
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 Those three outcomes allow to determine in a single based DNA test – in case that DNA 
comes directly from the subject – or in referred based DNA tests – when the DNA is provided by third 
being – the time and location of a subject: whether it is a victim or perpetrator. 
 Despite the multiple inconveniences of DNA denaturalization process under specific climate 
environments, DNA testing is a responsive procedure for dataveillance purposes. One of the biggest 
disadvantages of this technique is that it requires to have a contrastable sample for nominal identifica-
tion of a subject. This issue was tried to be resolved in the past by introducing national DNA databa-
ses programs – in 1995 in the United Kingdom; in 1998 in the USA; in 2001 in Australia – but those 
programs and databases are still incomplete. It shall be highlighted that such databases always will be 
incomplete: taking into account that the perpetrator could have its origin in third countries – especia-
lly in cases of undeveloped ones – there are no expectations of database records to be contrasted. In 
order to solve this inconvenience and to obtain objective capabilities of the currently existing databa-
ses, the following figure obtained from the FBI Laboratory CODIS Unit was created, which is presen-
ted hereafter.
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6.3.2. Ear recognition
 Following the inference from DNA for traceability purposes, we are taking step forward to 
the ear recognition. Due to the genetics specification, each inhabitant has significant differences in 
the morphology and shape of the external ear structure. However this technique requires using other 
tools to obtain the samples. The CCTV systems due to their presence in public and private areas, 
became the best provider of samples for criminal or forensic purposes. In contrast to the new 3D scan-
ner techniques, which applicability is limited to very few areas, the videosurveillance tools provide a 
wider and higher spectrum of data for ear recognition purposes.
 The usefulness of this biometric technique is much higher than the others: it allows to obtain 
data without noticing this fact by the subject. The differences between the ear recognition and other 
biometric protocols can be synthetically resumed to the following: a) the ear recognition is non-inva-
sive in contrast with DNA test and in consequence does not require the subject’s consent; b) the ear 
recognition is not affected by micro-emotional status in contrast with the facial recognition; c) for the 
ear recognition is not required a whole image, just a detailed
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Figure 6.3.1.2. Distribution of DNA country databases worldwide 2016.
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image of one of the ear is sufficient; d) the ear recognition is not affected by post-emotional symp-
toms in contrast with other techniques such as iris or facial recognition (Yuan, 2011). All the 
above-mentioned theoretical advantages are further complemented by real-case security procedures. 
It might be considered that ear shape is that part of body, which morphology is duplicated the less, 
even taking into account common use of masks. The ear recognition method has another advantage: 
is not considered as one of possible recognition processes and what is more their structure change 
little with age. The ear uniqueness was already pointed out by Iannarelli (1989), who through 38 years 
of research did not find two ears which were identical. It shall be highlighted that criminals and poten-
tial perpetrators consider that their recognition process is based on three main assets: DNA, finger-
print and facial recognition (Frejlichowski, 2011) – there is no doubt about the fact that the ear shape 
could effectively correlate a subject with multiple locations. Sánchez (2008) conducted research 
focused on the ear snakes – concept introduced by Kass et al. (1987) – and in particular how them can 
help to identify the subject.
 The conclusion provided by Sánchez about the use of ear biometric analysis in terms of secu-
rity can be resumed in three following points: a) ears are that part of the body, which is almost perma-
nently visible; b) it is possible to obtain or capture a ear snapshot even without the consent or the 
knowledge of the subject; c) whatever is the focal length, in terms of the optical zoom of the used 
camera, the capability to catch a ear snapshot in order to compare image with ear of the subject and 
the possibility to receive a positive match is close to 100 percent.
 In contrast with Sánchez’s method, Basit et al. (2014) proposed a technique based on ear 
curvelet transform. This method consists in the application of concept called as Fast Discrete Curvelet 
Transform, which is relying on setting the ear resulting image under two curvelet coefficients. The 
first coefficient serves as a main driver, the second – as a coarsest curve of eight distinguishable 
angles. The result of this method is the map using the statistical Nearest Neighbour (hereinafter refe-
rred to as: “k-NN”) to classify the images. The profitability of this method is significantly high using 
database samples – in 97,77 percent of cases gives the positive match (Ibid.).
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 Continuing with the topic, Choras (2009) underlined how effective biometrics features are in 
terms of subject’s identification, much more than traditional procedures. This author highlights the 
advantages of the passive protocol:
 Inside of the present scenario, we can deeply encourage the massive and systematic use of 
2D biometric tools more than 3D based techniques. The surface – so in consequence the number of 
subjects – covered by 2D tools is significantly higher than those which could be provided by 3D 
version.
 What shall be highlighted is that the perfection of those methods is achieved in laboratory 
conditions where their efficiency reaches rate close to 100 percent (Basit, 2014). Hence, the fieldwork 
and everyday conditions suggest a certain room for technical and procedural improvement which is 
determined by the geography: delimitating the capabilities of massive applicability of those technolo-
gies. Using those methods we need to be aware of environment conditions which are influencing on 
the applicability of those methods too: those regions with low or high temperatures or where weather 
conditions force the use of cloths complements – hats, scarves, umbrellas, et cetera – the applicability 
will be reduced. Consequently, we need to take into consideration those regions that, due to cultural 
or sociological issues, society is used to cover partially or totally their face and in result: the ear’s 
shape is not visible. The above-mentioned aspects are determining and limiting the usability of the ear 
recognition method. Moreover, according with those geographical determinative driving forces, the 
application of this biometric tool might be taken into analysis based on: a) forecasted weather and 
climate conditions; b) sociocultural aspects; c) coverage of third party tools; d) range of the target – 
expressed in volume of subjects.
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 “More importantly, such methods could be passive, which 
means that the subject does not have to take active part in the whole 
process or, in fact, would not even know that the process of identifica-
tion takes place”.
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6.3.3 Facial recognition
 The facial recognition is one of the most improved biometric techniques, the most dedicated 
to – and the most commonly used for – security issues within the last decade. The current criminal 
threats blended with the need to secure critical infrastructures establish a base for research projects 
within this field. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, the history of face recognition started early 
around 60’s with the use of basic geometric protocols (Wayman, 2008). Some of the elements 
previously limiting this method such as illumination and variation of pose were resolved within the 
next decade. However, some other elements such as face expression still constitute an intractable 
issue. At the end of 80’s Sirovich (1987 in Wayman, 2008) introduced the Principal Component 
Analysis (hereinafter referred to as: “PCA”) consisting of the XX century mathematical technique. In 
the XXI century this process was fully automated in contrast with the early stages where eyes or other 
facial “local” features needed to be located manually. Despite the notorious improvements introduced 
during the last decade by using Elastic Bunch Graph Matching (hereinafter referred to as: “EBGM”), 
the recognition in uncontrolled environments – especially in live mode – requires introduction of a 
defragmentation process named “segmentation”.
 The aim of that process is to extract the face from the background – independently of the 
focal plane where the face – or faces – is – or are – located. This subtraction technique is based on 
two main assets: a) colour imagery; b) face morphology. The colour imaginary defends the theory that 
any human face is composed of a combination of red, green and blue colours (Ibid.). However, inde-
pendently of the above-mentioned affirmation, the ethnical variety forces the evaluation of multi-to-
nal facial colours. This aspect can directly influence on the recognition capabilities in cosmopolitan 
regions where the spectre of skin tones is significantly higher. In consequence, the exclusive usage of 
this technique might create blind samples where the targets would not be extracted by the software.
The above-mentioned scenario becomes plausible when the resolution of the CCTV is low – which is 
a frequent issue as we diagnosed it within our fieldwork. The potential limitations of this systems 
were highlighted by Wayman (2008) in the following words:
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  Additionally, it is required to stress the eventual convenience of colour image usage. For 
security purposes, the ability to select attributes by colour gradient can increase significantly the 
chances to observe a single subject within a crowded area. It can be complicated that feature will be 
dealt in practice by software: it requires that subject will be monitored by experienced physical obser-
vers. In contrast with those technical disadvantages, techniques based on recognition of face morpho-
logy – when the sensor resolution allows it – can provide accurate results. However, the final result is 
based on the quality of the snapshot taken and the way it is processed. Ohzeki (et al., 2016) proposed 
a new minimum variance method to increase the effectiveness of facial recognition. In order to 
improve it the following protocol was proposed: extracting a snapshot after subject is frontally facing 
camera at least for 0,27 second. Despite of the fact that the above- mentioned protocol has high poten-
tial applicability, Nikan and Ahmadi (2014) developed an integral research to determine the effective-
ness of each algorithm.
 After mentioning many advantages of the facial recognition technique, it is time to mention 
its potential failures or disadvantages. We must admit that the spectre of potential inconveniences of 
facial recognition for dataveillance purposes is large in case when the subjects have a minimum 
knowledge of the biometric recognition techniques and their capabilities.
 In this point we shall focus on facial masks, which represent a real challenge as well as for 
software - directly influencing on PCA and EBGM - as well as for humans to detect them. The threat 
posed by facial masks is higher than we might think: a good facial mask can look more convincing 
than a true face of a subject. Glodwert (2010) reported one of the most significant cases involving 
facial masks, which took place in the USA.  In the above mentioned case the realistic facial mask used 
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 “if background colors are too similar to skin tones, or eyes 
cannot be found, or the lighting is stark or of an unnatural color, the 
system can fail to find faces in the image. Face-like objects also can be 
incorrectly segmented to be faces” (Ibid., 3).
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by a white subject caused that the entire police department in Tampa (Texas) believed that the suspect 
was an African-American as it was described by Lt. Michael Mathis: “the suspect seen in the survei-
llance photographs and that we were looking for, we believed to be an African-American male”. In 
reality, the suspect was actually a white male, who was ‘simply’ wearing an elaborate disguise – 
including facial mask. Moreover, those masks are commonly used in the cinematographic business 
and are easy and completely legal to buy with a price – around 800 US dollars – which cannot be 
perceived as to high for someone who wants to commit a crime and does not want to be noticed.
 Taking into account the above-mentioned we can image a scenario in which a subject is crea-
ting multiple-characters using facial masks without revealing the real identity – in such case the face 
recognition technique will not help us to resolve this identity mystery. However, having the CCTV 
footage with that subject we can analyze the whole range of characteristic. This footage create a trace 
– regardless of face recognition – that can be further analyzed. During the development of the 
research presented herein we had observed: (i) how the CCTV technology had evolved and in this 
way became an extraordinary tool for traceability purposes and (ii) how this technology in security 
terms is underestimated and its usefulness is perceived below human features – that fact cannot be 
understood from the researcher and analyst perspective taking into account the CCTV advantages 
which will be discussed below (see: chapter 6.4).
6.3.4. Fingerprint recognition
 All the dataveillance technologies presented above have more disadvantages than advanta-
ges, what excludes the option of using them for a massive and global collection of data and shows that 
our societies are not under permanent panoptic observation. To the list of the technologies presented 
herein we shall add the fingerprint recognition, which is an effective method (Makrushin, 2013). 
Unconsciously, we are leaving our fingerprints with almost every of our daily actions. Fingerprints 
are left almost on every surface. Consequently, fingerprint recognition is one the most accurate proce-
dures to track in time and space a subject without having direct inference into the behaviour nor 
biometry.
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 This dataveillance feature is already inserted in everyday life (Carrillo et al., 2015), to be 
more specific is noticeable in: smartphones (de Zhi, 2015), smart houses (Victoria Moreno, et al., 
2015), business world (Widlok, 2015), governmental access. Moreover, we randomly leave our 
fingerprint on third company’s products to unlock our private systems, or devices. Paradoxically, in 
the global village (McLuhan, 1962; 1964) citizens – including sceptics of the panoptic model – provi-
de their personal distinguish data: fingerprints without further worries or suspicious.
 Additionally, as we could observe in the previous sections, the existence of an extensive 
contrastable database including almost every inhabitant is not common. In such case, we can observe 
a duality of databases: a) the governmental and; b) private sector. This duality enhances the contro-
versy – or the tendency – of private actors irrupting the national security framework (Jordan Enamo-
rado et al., 2011). Unfortunately, in undeveloped countries there is still noticeable lack of fingerprint 
records. That issue has double-way influence: a) lack of official census; b) lack of traceability within 
the country and abroad. This difficulties to identify a person and determine its nationality is one of the 
most challenging process during border controls when comes to irregular migration (Broeders, 2007).
 Since the moment that an inhabitant is born, starts its dataveillance registration process (birth 
register), which continues with inhabitant’s life. Contemporary, we can notice that depending on the 
country in this protocol we can find DNA samples, fingerprints and iris scanner samples. In conse-
quence, such wide registration process allows for instant verification of identity for forensic and 
criminal purposes. Independently of the technical capabilities, the general use of those data is under 
permanent evaluation. Without a doubt, proper legal and ethical structure is required for an adequate 
social acceptance and usage of such data (Jain et al., 2006). Conventionally to criminal minds and 
status, the evolution of their tricks and capabilities lead them to replicate or duplicate fingerprints to 
avoid nominal identification or to implicate intentionally third citizens – a matter which needs to be 
permanently taken into consideration in certain criminal actions. Kiltz (et al., 2011) developed a 
contrastable research evaluation in order to provide the capability to identify printable fingerprints for 
forensics purposes. Within the same path, Ghouzali (et al., 2016) evaluated the attacks against biome-
tric mobile applications.
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  In resume, fingerprint recognition is one of the most accurate methodologies to verify the 
identification of a subject, to trace its actions and locations, a feature that enables the construction of 
linear schemes in time. This biometric technology is barely disrupted by the location or cultural speci-
fications. Hence, except for cold regions, there are not social endeavours that force the permanent of 
partial covering of the fingers. Despite the permanent efforts of professional criminals, as we could 
observe, there are counter-methods to identify when a trace was forced by printed or unnatural finger-
prints. Consequently, the only limitations for the dataveillance of fingerprints are time (Archer, 2004; 
Richmond-Aylor, 2007), and surface materials (Barton, 1968; Zheng, 2002; Ricci et al., 2007).
6.3.5. Gait - behavioural recognition
 The concept of gait analysis started before the applicability of modern biometrics technolo-
gies. In contrast with the previously discussed techniques, we might find its origins in Aristotle 
(2004) in a discussion titled De Motu Animalium. The essence of this technique consists in the analy-
sis and comprehension of the locomotive engine of any animal, with special interest in the human 
being. The structure of the locomotive engine in every being forces a distinguishable way to move: a 
special articulation of the body with visual effects. The contemporary technology blended with 
modern software biometrics technologies facilitates the chances to characterize a subject by its gait 
(Nikolaos et al., 2005; Goffredo, 2010). However, when this protocol is combined with face recogni-
tion, the results obtained show a significantly higher rate of success (Geng et al., 2008). In compari-
son with previous techniques, this technique is working even under hard external variables (Saman-
gooei, 2010; Wilson, 2012).
 Despite that external variables are influencing on the subject, the gait analysis is focused on 
at least nine features defining the movement of a subject: a) the step length – a variable highly 
influenced by the physical terrain and soil composition; b) stride length; c) cadence – directly influen-
ced by the environmental circumstances; d) speed – potentially one of the most stochastic parameters; 
e) dynamic base; f) progression line; g) foot angle; h) hip angle; i) squat performance.
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  The difference between technique and real world is all about how to perform with any of 
those techniques, especially taking into account that those techniques in which we have special inte-
rest are hard to be applied in not isolated environments (O’Rourke, 1980; Akita, 1984). This thesis is 
focused by default on urban area as a geographical region. Consequently, the applicability of this 
method as a general concept, and in particular in the cities, could be challenging. Urban areas blend 
most of the external influencers in gait analysis; with special emphasis on the physical terrain. Moreo-
ver, the frequent high density of urban population disables the monitoring systems to extract positive 
sample of pre-selected individuals.
 Despite the disadvantages of those projects, approach proposed by Nixon (2016) could lead 
to the future of gait analysis. This future can be based on the solution proposed by this author, whom 
relayed on third party tools: in particular on the installed CCTV systems. The usability of those 
systems is determined by the knowledge of a person whom is operating them and by the manner in 
which they are operated, what we will discuss herein.
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6.4. CCTV systems for urban traceability
6.4.1. Citizen “K” and the beginning of a new era
 Meanwhile most of the techniques presented and reviewed herein are widely accepted by our 
societies – and moreover their usability for traceability purposes is -, the CCTV systems, or any 
systems that stipulate, imply, imitate or even suggest a permanent watch or visual surveillance, is 
generally not welcomed. The social controversy towards those systems was growing and evolving 
parallel to their application for private, but mostly, for public purposes.
 However, the social reaction towards this technology started before the massive application 
of it. The movie “Citizen Kane” (directed by Welles, 1941) was mostly responsible for that reaction. 
Although, as we mentioned before, the concept of the permanent surveillance was designed by Ben-
tham to be applied in penitentiary centers, the reality showed that it can be applied in everyday life. 
In terms of social control, the public mass was psychologically influenced by Welles movie (Kane, 
2003); that dynamic evolved and influenced current trends in social sphere (Muir, 2014). It shall be 
highlighted that the first attempt of modern photography usage for surveillance purposes is dated on 
1913 and it was recorded in the Holloway Prison (vintech.com, 2011). The further evidence of this 
usage is dated on one year before the Welles movie, to be more precise: in 1940 the US military tested 
this technology with the aim to observe their atomic test programs from a safe location (covertvideo.-
com, 2016).
 The next trace of this technology usage is dated on 1942, when German engineer Walter 
Bruch installed the first remote television cameras in the V-2 rockets in order to control and monitor 
their launching from a safe location (Longdin, 2014). In 1956 in the German city of Hamburg was 
supposedly tested the first installation of CCTV systems on the public street (vintech.com, 2011). 
Within more than forty years of evolution, the main asset of this surveillance tool was the increase of 
the security of the observer. In those terms we shall consider that the origin of CCTV application were 
prevention purposes.
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 Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, by developing the concept proposed by Welles, the 
CCTV preventive usage was transformed with the time into a proactive tool. It happened in Hannover 
three years later: in 1959, when the first implementation of CCTV for social and public control took 
place – having in its basis a security purpose. The main goal of that CCTV first surveillance act was 
the control of the increased city traffic connected with the annual industrial fair. It did not take a lot 
of time to police to make use of it. Shortly after the above- mentioned, one year later: in 1960, in the 
city of Frankfurt am Main, a “camera system” to investigate violations of regulations of the traffic 
was used.
 Despite the fact the Germany was a pioneer in the design and usage of CCTV, soon the 
United Kingdom acquired the technology with a new objective: the control of crowds and society. It 
did not take a lot of time when the first usage of CCTV took place in the UK. It happened on Trafalgar 
Square, in 1960, when the London Metropolitan Police installed two - removable - CCTV cameras in 
order to monitor the visitors of the Thailand Royal Family (Woodhouse, 2016). A year later, in 1961, 
the London Rail Transport followed the Metropolitan Police and installed CCTV cameras - in this 
case permanently - along their network system (Ibid.). When it comes to the private usage, it was in 
1969, when Marie Van Brittan Brown designed the first prototype of domestic CCTV system (Van 
Brittan, 1969). The UK was still on the path of the CCTV implementation for public use in the decade 
of 1970. In 1974 the first CCTV systems were used to monitor the traffic on the avenues outside 
London (Woodhouse, 2016). At that time, the CCTV provided a new and disruptive perspective for 
security purposes. 
 The effectiveness of the results, combined with the constant cost and infrastructure reduc-
tion, influenced on significant rise of permanently systems installed in the public domain. However, 
this technology required several years to be adopted for commercial purposes since Welles presented 
its concept in the “Citizen Kane” movie. That time was required due to the limited technological 
capabilities at that time, which were evolving through the years. In primitive CCTV systems it was 
not possible to record the footage, what implied the visualization of image in real time. This CCTV 
modus operandi implied another requirement: an observer, who was constantly controlling the
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recording. That connection between the CCTV system and the observer was feeding the social imagi-
nation of the permanent observer. As soon as the technology evolved and the VCR’s (Video Cassette-
Recordings) were in daily use, the existence of a permanent observer was not longer required. Notwi-
thstanding the above-mentioned, the society linked the image of the permanent observer with the 
CCTV technology, attributing to this technology social fear of being under permanent watch. This 
social notion is still present nowadays.
6.4.2.The modern CCTV analysis
 Meanwhile the CCTV evolution took several decades, since the moment in which was 
applied for the first time for public purposes, its systematic worldwide expansion started. In order to 
understand the grounds that supported and influenced on significant rise of CCTV implementation 
worldwide, we shall examine the driving forces which determined the direction of this road. In 1970 
it was noticeable an inflection point in the history of the European terrorism (Dechesne, 2012) in the 
form of massive number of terrorist attacks – what will be examined in the following chapter of this 
thesis (see: Section IV).
 Parallel to the terrorist phenomenon, the economical crisis and its consequence: the rise of 
common criminality as well as the emergence of new social movements – what was not welcomed by 
governments (Kriesi et al., 1992; Tarrow, 1994) – influenced on the CCTV usage, forcing its imple-
mentation together with other multiple security tools (Black, 2009).
 In contrast to global tendency, the CCTV expansion was significantly visible in the UK since 
the mid-90’s (Sutton, 2002). At the end of the XX century, there were more than 530 towns in the UK 
with CCTV systems operating within their downtown areas (Williams et al., 2000). On the opposite 
side of the CCTV implementation continuum and contrary to UK, in Australia in 2002 there were 
registered only 33 operating CCTV urban systems (Sutton, 2002). This evolution was developing 
differently in various regions and resulted in currently differentiated coverage of CCTV systems in 
public spaces.
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 The Urbaneye (2004) project analyzed the CCTV coverage in the following six cities: 
London, Oslo, Copenhagen, Budapest, Berlin and Vienna. The results revealed that meanwhile in 
London the coverage in publicly accessible spaces amounts to 40 percent, in the Austrian capital
decreased to 18 percent. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, the divergence is deeper in terms of 
public infrastructures. Meanwhile in UK there were more than 500 systems monitoring public infras-
tructure, in Denmark and Austria not single public street monitoring system was registered (Norris et 
al., 2004). The authors (Ibid.) made a comprehensive review of the evolution and implementation of 
the CCTV. From the above-mentioned examination resulted that the starting point of CCTV ‘popula-
rity’ is dated on the late 80’s and that ‘popularity’ was rising till the first decade of the XXI century.
 On the map below, we can investigate the evolution of the CCTV implementation presented 
in a short summary form. That map was prepared by the author and is based on the data pointed out 
by Norris et al.
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Figure 6.4.2. Evolution of the implementation of CCTV
Source: author, 2017 
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 The presented above map shows graphically the evolution of the surveillance as a tool for 
spatial control and monitoring. The fact that the world is not flat (Freedman, 2005) supports the natu-
ral spatial dissimilarities within application of any technology. The cultural differences, social attitu-
des combined with the local security features are influencing on wide spreading (or not) of those 
systems. After reviewing the existing literature about CCTV, we came to the conclusion that within 
present analysis there is lack of understanding of the real potential hidden in it. During the research 
we observed common patterns regarding public spaces and we discovered also lack of proper unders-
tanding of this issue.
 Our aim is to grasp all the ‘colors of the CCTV surveillance rainbow’, in particular to descri-
be its capabilities to control, monitor, inspect a specific area for counter criminal actions or social 
purposes. In order to perceive the current deficits in the spatial analysis of the surveillance tools, we 
are proceeding with the review of Spanish contemporary literature of this topic. Beyond our review 
will be literature focused on: legal issues, technical features, philosophical approaches and derivates. 
Such decision is dictated by our objective: finding literature dedicated to the surveillance tools – whe-
ther it supports or criticizes their usage –, providing a spatial analysis of the topic. This step allows us 
to reduce the amount of irrelevant literature and to concentrate on the relevant.
 It was a shocking discovery which we made during the analysis of the selected literature that 
the general attitude presented by researching teams towards research was lack of performing of any 
fieldwork. Presumably each and every of the case studies presented in the analyzed literature is based 
on data (databases, et cetera.) provided by third authors. In consequence, the work of those authors is 
based on data which is obsolete – or better said: outdated. Although updating data in progressing case 
studies is not required, it shall be considered nothing less than recommendation for those interested 
in reliable research. Another recommendation will be for the readers: to ask themselves whether the 
methodologies and objectives of published papers are fixing to the methods applied by those who 
perform the fieldwork. A highly probable answer to the above-mentioned question will be a negative 
one.
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 Starting from an article published by Domínguez (2010) in the Andalusian Interuniversitary 
Institute of Criminology, in which the influence of CCTV systems in the city of Malaga as preventive 
tool for crime reduction is analyzed, we identified the following deficiencies in it: a) lack of 
spatial-graphical representation of the area of analysis; b) lack of identification of the CCTV systems 
typology; c) lack of analysis of the coverage and the suitability in terms of location and adequacy of 
the CCTV systems installed. The conclusion achieved by the author is that after a year passing from 
the installation of the surveillance tools, there is a lack of noticeable or significant reduction of crime 
actions. This conclusion highlighted an important deficit in the fieldwork and the understanding of 
the surveillance dynamics.
 We shall stress that without any information regarding the status and capabilities of the insta-
lled systems, it is almost impossible to determine the real reasons standing behind lack of crime 
reduction - always considering that the surveillance systems are functional and used to monitor the 
area. We shall remark that the simple existence of a CCTV system it is not a objectionable cause to 
neutralize crime actions, nor even to prevent them. Without reliable tools is more than hard to decrypt 
whether the lack of crime reduction is a consequence of the incapability of the systems or improper 
criteria in the choosing their location or specifications of the installed systems.
 Furthermore, the article “CCTV in Spain: An empirical account of the deployment of 
video-surveillance in Southern-European country” presented by Clavell (2012) reveals that deficit of 
field understanding. The methodology of that paper is structured in the following parts: a) “a review 
of the relevant academic literature”; b) “a review of the legal framework”; c) “semi- structured inter-
views with actors involved”; d) “a review of the archives of one of the regional bodies responsible” 
and; e) “media analysis” (Galdon Clavell 2012:58). None of the methodological points is connected 
with fieldwork or any aspect linked to it. The research presented in the above-mentioned article seems 
to be fully ethereal: in its essence is a desktop research. We shall ask ourselves whether we can 
understand the world remotely and whether is it possible and plausible to comprehend the minor 
effects and the sub-effects of the space by observing the area of analysis represented in a database?
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 The above-mentioned approaches are making the world flat. They are based on statistics and 
numerical approaches as geomatics is. It shall be found as incredible the discovery of complete lack 
of understanding of the CCTV typology, lack of analysis of the essence of this technology, its features 
and the way in which it interacts with the space. It would be surprising for most of those authors to 
observe that the myth of the surveillance can collapse or emerge in case of proceeding with the field-
work: performing streets observation, analyzing each CCTV camera (its location, height, angle), 
advantages and disadvantages of CCTV systems.
 Taking into account that we are geographers, it is expected that within our analysis we use 
reliable tools and proceed with scientific methodologies able to be contrastable. Otherwise, the kind 
of research that can result from the above-mentioned approach cannot be sustained nor from the theo-
retical nor from the pragmatic point of view.
 Similar to the previous one is the article presented by AGUSTINA and CLAVELL (2011). 
The title of this article: “The impact of CCTV on fundamental rights and crime prevention strategies: 
the case of the Catalan Control Commission of Video surveillance Devices” contains a promise of a 
reliable review of video surveillance devices. Within this article we can find a short review of the 
literature identifying the location of five public CCTV cameras in the old area of Barcelona between 
2001 and 2003. What cannot be found is a further, deeper and reliable fieldwork that would sustain 
the title chosen by the above-mentioned authors. Sadly, “fieldwork” of those authors is reduced to the 
following maps.
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Figure 6.4.2. CCTV in Barcelona Source: Agustina and Clavell (2011)
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 In contrast with the above-mentioned, we can observe how CHASCO (2014) in an article 
titled “Videovigilancia en el centro de Madrid ¿Hacia el panóptico electrónico?” is criticizing the 
existence of the CCTV systems in one of the most stigmatic areas of the Central District of Madrid: 
the subdistrict of Lavapies. Despite the ideology and the social approach behind that analysis, this 
article is remarkable due to the fact that is one of few articles that contains a more or less detailed map 
with the location of the CCTV systems in the area of study. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned 
fact, the cartographic used in this article is coming from a third source, so consequently also in this 
case there is no extensive fieldwork that would support the thesis of the author.
 An example of similar analysis provided by AGUSTINA and CLAVELL for Barcelona in 
terms of procedures and fieldwork is the article “Practicas distintivas y control urbano como meca-
nismo de gestión de las conductas: el caso de Lavapiés (Madrid)” wrote by Sequera (2010). In this 
article focused also on the subdistrict Lavapies of Madrid, its title reveals the attitude towards CCTV 
systems: presenting them as a modern and hard powers, which are influencing on the social conduct 
- by control and surveillance of it -, perceiving CCTV as a coercive tool. Within this article, similarly 
to Agustina and Clavell, Sequera is not providing mapping of systems to which is referring to. Moreo-
ver, what is more common for the above-mentioned authors, is that they consider that CCTV systems 
as a singular entities, which are “lost” in space.
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Figure 6.4.3. CCTV systems in the subdistrict of Lavapies (Madrid) Source: Chasco (2014:326)
 
 Our research project led us to publish an article titled: “Spatial analysis of video surveillance 
as a tactical response to terrorism and organized crime trends: case of study Madrid” (Bailón, 2015). 
In the above-mentioned article it was presented an unprecedented approach towartds the analysis of 
the CCTV systems: involving space variables and blending them with technology specification and 
usability. In contrast with other kinds of approach, it was adopted an integral perspective, taking into 
account the influence between camera and space for traceability purposes.
 This perspective allowed to measure and to judge the functionality of systems. It shall be 
highlighted that it is not possible to determine whether a technological tool can be useful or not to 
prevent crime conducts, to mitigate undesirable social conducts, neither to minimize security threats 
when there is lack of full understanding of how that tool can interact and obtain information from the 
environment where it is located. In consequence, by publishing the above-mentioned article in the 
Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies - the most reliable think-tank existing in Spain, we revealed that 
there was and still is maintained an absolute misunderstanding of the functionally and capabilities of 
the CCTV systems within Spanish research community. We achieved that conclusion after enriching 
our analysis in three new points – which were not taken into consideration by other authors dealing 
with CCTV topic: a) performing fieldwork of the area of study; b) comprehend analysis of the CCTV 
functionality; c) applying global and geographical perspective. This new approach led to the addition 
of new functionality for the existing CCTV systems: the tactical usability; with a specific application: 
the counter terrorism and organized crime actions.
6.4.3. Disadvantages of the CCTV system for traceability purposes in urban environments
 The modern traceability that involved the usage of CCTV systems is directly linked to 
software applications. It can seem that the conventional analytical skills are becoming obsolete. What 
can confirm the above-mentioned, that is existing software based on an Artificial Intelligence 
(hereinafter referred to as: “AI”), which is capable to distinguish colors, shapes, forms, and prepro-
grammed contexts (DADASHI et al., 2013) and that leads the path to the “future”. Moreover, those 
AI solutions allow to: detect human intrusion (Dastidar and Biswas, 2015), movements and 
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trajectories of vehicles (Suppatoomsin and  Srikaew, 2013) as well as to track in live-mode multiple 
objects (Yang et al., 2008). However, all the above-mentioned is possible when the system works 
properly or is not target of direct or indirect sabotage. The capabilities of those applications, or better 
said: those which will be characteristic for future ones, open the door for a world from Minority 
Report movie (directed by Spielberg, 2002), where liquid surveillance rules and there is almost not a 
way to get out from it (Bauman, 2013). Although, the capabilities of current CCTV systems – of those 
publicly released till December 2016 -, the ones that directly influence on our security status, are not 
as overwhelming as we might believe they are. It is irrefutable that the implementation of CCTV 
systems collaterally impacted on direct and live mode usability of the previously reviewed biometric 
technologies. However, the disadvantages of the current usage of this technology are many, and are 
not just technical. It shall be highlighted that what is working against the usage of this technology, is 
not the technology itself, it is rather the way in which is used.
 We live in a world where technology is permanently replacing old-fashioned analyst, who 
uses analogical tools, and where society seems to believe that statistical use of a machine could resol-
ve threats better, faster and more accurate than a expert in the field. It is noticeable the current security 
trend of displacing conventional geopolitical analysis and analyst with the geomatics. The same 
applies to GIS and multi-criteria evaluation software. It is not our aim to evaluate all pluses and minu-
ses of the above-mentioned tools – we know that they are useful due to the fact that they were applied 
in some parts of this research. Our objective is constructive critics of those systems and the trend of 
limiting the analysis process to simple application of those tools. It may seem that within current 
trend GIS and multi-criteria systems are juggled in every analysis what leads to lack of understanding 
of spatial processes. Consequently, the use of those tools is taking place despite the fact – which 
seems to be forgotten by those in charge – that they are very useful, but they are still only tools. It 
shall be added to the above-mentioned that the GIS and multi-criteria tools can provide a formidable 
base (Delgado and Sendra, 2004) for macro geopolitical analysis as well as for security issues. Howe-
ver, when it comes to micro scale or operational one, those systems produce flat results, which lead 
analysis a step back to where theoretically it should be. Moreover, this scenario shows more discre-
pancies when the matter is linked with security and surveillance issues.
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 This “technological progress” is reaching its own culmination point by blending 3D analysis 
with the GIS systems. Another technological solution used for 3D modeling is CityGML – providing 
a standard model and mechanism for the description of 3D objects, which includes specific variables, 
i.e.: topology, geometry etc. In those terms we shall direct our attention to study cases presented by 
Ming (et al., 2002) and Löwner (et al., 2013), where the CCTV visual field is represented by 3D 
CityGML building models. Consequently, we include below screenshots of MING’s models research 
in order to compare them with what is considered a normal street junction parameters obtained from 
our fieldwork in the city of Warsaw.
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Figure 6.4.3.A.  CCTV field view on 3D City model Source: Ming et al., (2011)
 
Figure 6.4.3.B. Photography of the Central District of Warsaw Source: author (2016)
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 After the comparison of the above-presented images (Figure 6.4.3.A versus Figure 6.4.3.B) 
we can observe that the number of distinguishable urban elements is significantly higher on the real 
photography (Figure 6.4.3.B) than visible on 3D models (Figure 6.4.3.A). That difference leads to 
serious consequences: the misinterpretation of the real field of view of the CCTV systems, which 
limits security analysis. The apparent area of coverage – achieved by Ming’s methodology – is radica-
lly different to the practical one, which can be extracted from a real CCTV footage after the installa-
tion of CCTV. It is remarkable that the theoretical area of coverage will be always reduced in compa-
rison with the real one. The divergence between those areas (apparent and practical one) is a conse-
quence of the lack of geographical thinking during the installation process. It shall be highlighted that 
the theoretical coverage will be similar to the practical one if the presented below factors will be taken 
under consideration: including 1) seasonal, 2) human, 3) infrastructural factors. Starting with the first 
group of factors mentioned above (i.e.: 1; seasonal factors), those are influenced by:
 a) Weather conditions: geographical location directly influences on the weather that the 
surveillance tools might be facing all year round – without differencing whether they are permanent 
or transitional in their nature. With northern latitudes longer winter period is connected, bringing 
snow and foggy days meanwhile for desert areas dust and sand storms are influencing on CCTV 
systems making them inoperative. Under the above-mentioned conditions the visibility of the CCTV 
as well as the Unmanned Airborne Data Acquisition System (hereinafter referred to as: “ADAS”) is 
highly limited (Carroll, 2002). Those conditions are equally reducing the usability of any of the 
previously reviewed biometric technologies (see figures: 6.4.3.C-D-E).
 b) Plant growth cycles: the presence of vegetation within the urban areas (i.e.: the presence 
of plant foliage) is one of the main factors determining the coverage of a surveillance tool. Depending 
on the season and the species, the field of view might be significantly reduced. In the image extracted 
from a real CCTV system installed in the Central District of Warsaw (see figure: 6.4.3.F below), the 
vegetation is not reducing the observation capabilities of the installed camera. We can clearly state 
that lack of foliage is increasing the field of view of one camera coverage comparing it
with other one which could be influenced by wild vegetation.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY
133
Going to the second group of factors (i.e.: 2; human factors), those are influenced by:
 a) Social events: installed CCTV systems and subsidiary technologies have currently the aim 
to control and observe social conducts in publicly accessible areas. However, even adding to the 
above-mentioned tools AI solutions to track selected subjects in case of massive social event the 
system created in such manner can easily collapse. In consequence of the above-mentioned, any 
monitoring capabilities of systems are excluded. Regardless whether this massive social process is 
spontaneous or organized (demonstration, riots, sport and cultural events) it constitutes the challenge 
verifying the system’s endurance. It shall be highlighted that when the publicly space is becoming 
crowded the chance to track and follow a subject in real time is decreasing radically. Mix of shapes, 
colors and contrasts increase the riskiness of a system failure. Under the above-described circumstan-
ces the previously presented biometric solutions are tactically useless. Moreover, as Grommé (2016) 
highlighted that those social events can lead to resistance movement against surveillance in public 
spaces (see figure 6.4.3.G).
 b) Day cycle: one of the key factors indispensable to understand the dynamics of urban secu-
rity is hidden in the fact of the multidimensional behaviour noticeable in one area within twenty-four 
hours allows us to notice significant difference in behavior patterns within day and night. Undoubted-
ly, the change of light is influencing directly on social conduct (Farias et al., 2014). It shall be stated 
that in those areas where high traffic is noticed within day hours, are becoming isolated during the 
night and vice-versa (SEROK, 2015). Those differences in spatial conduct constitute direct conse-
quence of the ratio between the offer and the demand designed for the citizens - the consumers. This 
light cycle influences on social profiles and economical offer. In consequence, CCTV systems shall 
be adapted to cover the area of interest for 24/7 to catch those differences (see figure 6.4.3.H).
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Figure 6.4.3.C. Snapshot of a CCTV installed in the Central District of Warsaw. Source: www.lookr.com
 
Going to the last group of factors (i.e.: 3; infrastructural factors), those are influenced by:
 a) Urban renovations: urban ecosystems are in permanent evolution. Each city is characteri-
zed by multiple renovations processes which are taking place on daily basis and are covering totally 
or partially the field of view of the installed CCTV. This aspect shall be specially take under conside-
ration when public CCTV systems are involved. During our research, in different case studies, we 
noticed that the surveillance tools are becoming inoperative due to architectonic works within the 
building or surroundings (see figure 6.4.3.I).
 b) Technology update: in case of planning global security surveillance strategy the first step 
which needs to be taken is the evaluation of the quality and status of existing CCTV systems. Within 
the research developed for this thesis purposes, we discovered that installed CCTV systems are 
characterized by heterogenic specter of features. Some systems presented modern technical specifica-
tion, meanwhile the average of the systems shall be assessed as standard quality range. However, 
some systems presented extreme low quality. From those low quality systems it can be only extracted 
impure footage – what authors as Henderson (et al., 2015) confirmed (see figure 6.4.3.J).
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Figure 6.4.3.D. Snapshot of a CCTV installed in the Central District of Warsaw. 
Source: www.lookr.com
 
Figure 6.4.3.D. Photography of two CCTV system installed in the Central District of Madrid. 
Source: author, 2016
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Figure 6.4.3.F. Public CCTV system installed in the Central District of  Madrid 
Source: author, 2016
 
Figure 6.4.3.G. Photography of a CCTV system installed in the Central District of Madrid
Source: author, 2016
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Figure 6.4.3.H. Photography of a CCTV system installed in the Central District of Warsaw
Source: author, 2016
 
Figure 6.4.3.I. Photography of a CCTV system installed in the Central District of Madrid
Source: author, 2016
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Figure 6.4.3.J. Photography of a CCTV system installed in the Central District of Madrid
Source: author, 2016
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6.5 The true myth of traceability
 Within the previous chapter we reviewed the contemporary concept of traceability and 
discovered that it resides in perception skills rather than in pragmatic ones. The securitization theory, 
potentially not well interpreted from the political perspective, created one of the most fake myths in 
the history of security. It sold the ability to trace the threats impacting our societies from the destina-
tion in which they originate. However, by detecting those threats we are not eliminating them from 
our lives – they are coexisting with us. At this point we shall be questioning the contemporary securi-
ty theories and what is more – their usage made by politicians. This thesis uncovers that the real and 
operative capabilities of current systems to track a subject are minimal in the best cases, to not descri-
be them as nonexistent in most of the cases.
 Moreover, we can confirm that if the contemporary surveillance structure is designed ultima-
tely to neutralize main threats, its effectiveness might be described as reduced to zero. In contrast, we 
observe that control and inspection of the society is increasing significantly. The aim of the 
above-mentioned statement is not to set a position against the importance of the surveillance or secu-
rity, rather to diagnose capabilities of current system. Within this diagnose we discover that nowadays 
it is almost impossible to track or to identify the subject. The difference between those subjects that 
leave traces and those that do not it is the professionalism they represent in their actions.
 In a robotic world tendency, tracking skills are based on the interaction and dependence crea-
ted between the human and the machine. Technological device constitutes a basis for almost 
everything. Starting with communications: we use smartphones and computers, going through 
payments: payments with mobile phones and smart watches are becoming more common, meanwhile 
cash transitions start to be limited (Viaña, November 30, 2016). The smart home rules itself in our 
home – “domotics” controls functioning of our houses: security alarms, heating systems, fridge 
management (Chase, October 10, 2016). Moreover, the implementation of private surveillance 
systems create a “public” view of our personal life. At this point we shall ask ourselves in what way 
all the above-mentioned aspects are influencing on our real security?
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 Another question we shall pose is the following: why we feel safer when we are choosing to 
be permanently tracked? Probably our most important doubt shall regard the following: which are the 
tools guaranteeing that only authorized entities have access to our data and how governments are 
dealing with this issue?
 Contrary to this global tendency, we observed that when subjects decide to take a criminal 
action or to pursue with professional status, they avoid any linkage with “conventional” technology. 
Is really meaningful the fact that criminals take step backwards in the ‘smart’ world. They take 
precautions and care to throw out phone, to make use of banknotes with random serial numbers, to 
cover – at least – partially their face, not to leave any DNA trace. Moreover, they are applying a long 
list of preventive procedures. All the above-mentioned is making their trace almost inexistent. Stone 
(2013:ix) in the preface of a book entitled: “Expecting Armageddon” makes a reminder of recovering 
saying of the Romans “the fear of death is worse than death”. That aspect led us automatically to 
Festinger (1981) and to the human nature analysis. Finally, we understand the sociological compo-
nent of the current security praxis fake myth. With a high probability, our system – and by default our 
societies – would collapse if we would be conscious of the fact that security forces representing us are 
not capable to work against criminality. Moreover, it is not publicly debated the existing – but hided 
– correlation between the contemporary surveillance and the survival requirements created to cohabit 
any urban space (Mitchell and Heynen, 2009).  In the best case scenario regional and national agen-
cies are prepared to minimize – what is far from neutralizing – common criminality. International 
threats, plots, foreign and national insurgencies, terrorist groups and professional organized crime 
groups seem to be beyond their capabilities not due to the lack of their willing, but due to the fake 
security myth created by them.
 Activities such as drug traffic, terrorist actions, organized irregular migration process, 
corruption activities, money laundering, cyber-espionage, to name few of them, are happening on 
daily basis inside of our nations, inside of our cities, inside of our district and neighborhoods. It seems 
that this is permanent process. Moreover, it seems that there is no much hope to advance in this field. 
The grounds of that statement are based on simple but demolishing principle: the security that we and 
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consume is based on a perceptual but well calculated psychological effect of how we – as individual 
collective – feel towards the upcoming threats not how they really are. Consequently, after this frigh-
tening diagnosis of the security process status guo, and – moreover – after acquiring the knowledge 
showing how fragile and insecure is the contemporary security, we are even more motivated to contri-
bute – by our scientific achievements – to improve this system and to correct those patterns that – 
intentionally or not – are spoiling the good functioning of the entire society. In order to reach the 
above-mentioned goal, we considered as proper to start with analysis: from a global to local perspec-
tive, focused on main security driving forces. This step should allows us – at the end of this thesis – 
to provide: i) in the best scenario: a solution; ii) in the most probable scenario: an improvement of 
current situation, beneficial for the society. Although we are aware of limitations of this thesis, we 
have no doubt that the geography – connected with the spatial analysis as a procedure of our research 
– is able to resolve most of the ongoing security issues and to identify security driving forces. In our 
opinion, the potential reason of currently poor security status is lack of the complex approach – as the 
one proposed above – leading to application of narrow and limited solutions instead of searching for 
those interdisciplinary, broad and complex ones.
 In this point we desire to emphasize that the geographical analysis it does not equal to the 
simple use of a tool named GIS or Multi-criteria solutions. Undoubtedly, limiting the geographical 
analysis to the exclusive usage of the above-mentioned tools and the construction of solutions based 
only on them, resulted in terms of analysis to the current inadequate security scenario. While applying 
any automated analysis, it is required the supervision and evaluation of automated generated solu-
tions by an expert. By forgetting about this human intelligence element, the system will trick our 
results, as it is deceiving us the contemporary security.
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 In the XXI century the global population has moved from rural to urban residence (UN, 
2009). The importance of the proper management of urban areas as a development challenge of new 
century was highlighted by Wilmoth(2014: www.un.org), who also stressed that: “Our success or 
failure in building sustainable [and secure] cities will be major factor of the post-2015 UN develop-
ment agenda”. Undoubtedly, this is a hard fact that urban areas play critical and transcendental role 
in the current century. Furthermore, data provided by report of the United Nations, showing evolution 
of urban population, which we can observe below, constitutes additional confirmation of the 
above-mentioned.
 It shall be highlighted that despite the fact that the world population is generally moving to 
urban areas, the increment of population was not and is not a homogenous process. The local realities 
play also a role in this development and reconfiguration process (Santos, 1996). 
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 Moreover, the above-mentioned is blending with the history of a particular space and by so 
is creating the urban planimetric: a feature that is demonstrating that those spaces are differing. We 
can examine the urban planimetric starting from external urban areas: by observing external areas we 
can see the general planimetric structure. This step provides a general overview of the way in which 
the city is designed (Ruano, 1999) and at the same time is highlighting which could be the firsts criti-
cal zones (Ezequiel, 2014; Owusu et al., 2016; Coelho, 2016; Paydar et al., 2017). From that initial 
image we can delimitate the first areas of common security interest. Those areas are defined by their 
iconic importance (Arteaga-Botello, 2015), their political-military value (Keegan, 2013) and their 
social impact (Pérez, 2004). This logical approach leads us to consider that each and every city 
demands a specific spatial analysis: a tailor-made one.
 This tailor-made analysis starts from the examination of the access to the above- mentioned 
areas of security interest, due to the fact that access to those locations from the pedestrian perspective 
reveals a complex psychoanalytical system. If it is used by a collectivity, we could consider that the 
street by itself represents an iconic element and is not only a simple infrastructure used to transfer 
purposes or to connect different points. Under tthese circumstances we might consider that the street 
by itself could represent a priority as a security objective (Horgan et al., 2006). In opposite condi-
tions, if the street is used by disaggregated individuals or by small collectives, where the existence of 
a leader is clear, the translocation choice is based on: a) turning points (hidden in the mass, access to 
certain objectives, counter police tactics, etc.) or b) psycho-profiling of the subject or the leader. In 
the second scenario, the street is just a mean providing infrastructure necessary for translocation of 
individuals.
 According to the observations developed in the last four years, a social tracking might be 
possible after the proper understanding of the following combination: city morphology, local junctu-
res and conduct profiling. In those situations in which exists a social act, the general conduct will be 
fixed to the environment. That opens the door to foresight where and how urban riots might happen, 
behave and evolve. During our observations we deduced that a group will develop adaptive spatial 
patterns adjusted to the morphology of city.
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 The development of such socio-spatial patterns adds its maximum value to the analysis as a 
proactive variable, in terms of prospective behavior, in case of the proper identification of individual 
and collective subjects. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned issues, while focusing on the urban 
morphology and social behavior, it is crucial to not commit the mistake to consider that the urban area 
is an isotropic space – on the contrary, urban areas shall be rather described as anisotropic. In fact, the 
last word shall be used to characterize the potential routes, paths and spatial conduct chosen by each 
collective and individual during their transit.
 After discussing the way in which an individual or collective is choosing a path or route to 
reach specific location (the target), it is vital to consider that the route by itself represent a notorious 
element of the transit between locations. Nevertheless, the real issue of this transit is the location. The 
physical target located in specific location constitutes – at the end – the iconic value. We must take 
into account that the targets represent the maximum value inside their spatial imaginary and due to 
that the threat as well as the manner in which individual or collective will approach to their target and 
which routes will be chosen – will be defined by the temporal circumstances and the sociological 
variant previously discussed. It shall be highlighted that all those routes will be chosen with one goal: 
the achievement of the target. In accordance with this strategic thinking, it is possible to design proac-
tive methodologies in order to monitor routes which allow to approach to locations of national securi-
ty interest. In those terms, we shall consider as adequate to evaluate not only the strict perimeter of 
the location under surveillance, but also all the potential access routes having several perimeters with 
different levels of monitoring. This will certainly increase the capability to foreseen any threat as well 
as to neutralize it before it will achieve the target. This solution will be defined as the Monitoring 
Ring System (hereinafter referred to as: “M.R.S”). The M.R.S is composed from at least four preven-
tive perimeters and another: emergency one, classified from the farthest to the closest to the target: a) 
evaluative perimeter; b) action perimeter; c) blocking perimeter; d) evacuation perimeter. Focusing 
on the iconic value of the targets, we have chosen the following cities to develop a preventive analysis 
of the spatial conduct: a) Washington (USA); b) Ciudad de la Plata (Argentina); c) Jaipur (India); d) 
Palmanova (Italy); e) Moscow (Russian Federation).
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 Within the pre-identification of the potential targets, it is important to mention that their 
choice it is not randomly made in almost the totality of the cases, it is strategically made to achieve 
the objectives of the organization that is developing the attack. Due to that each location – within an 
area of analysis – represents multiple levels of exposure according to the relative interest of each 
group. This prospective analysis, introduced with the M.S.R., lead us to dismiss the traditional securi-
ty planning in which it was common to select a certain number of location with higher risk, conside-
ring that the rest is out of the scope of the threat. The sophisticate approach will show for each loca-
tion, within the area of analysis, the origin of the threat as well as the risk and the potential circum-
stance and consequences. This approach reduces the area of uncertainty developing a dynamic image 
of the area.
 The intra-urban security is a decisive element to guarantee the stability as well as the first 
target for those who try to destroy it, such as criminal or terrorist organizations. In those cities where 
did not exist a proper urban planning we can observe high levels of contrast (social, economical, 
cultural, et cetera.), which is pushing up the trend of the sparky cities. That rigidity within the internal 
sociological borders increases the chance of emerging ghettos, areas of exclusion or exclusives 
subverts – in other words: features that are connected with the route typology, urban morphology, 
kind of infrastructures, sociological habits are defining the disconnected micro-world. This discon-
nection constitutes the first step of creating the criminal niche and is defining the environments where 
those criminal action will proliferate or not. Those blends of micro-worlds are representing the first 
threat to the concept of integral security. The proximity between those areas increases the chance of 
conflict between them. Simultaneously, that proximity increases the common criminality and is crea-
ting the environment which represents the perfect ecosystem for those who want to radicalize. 
 The existence of transversal elements inside the urban environment had deployed multiple 
roles among the history of the cities. Initially, those transversal elements represented a border 
element, characterized by a clear defensive perspective. Meanwhile urban areas were adapting their 
morphology from defensive to economical roles, the existence of a hill or river became negative 
aspect more than the positive that represented in the past.
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 Within the European perspective, rivers were the perfect defensive tool from the medieval 
age till the first and second World Wars. Its importance was highlighted in the 90’s during the Balkans 
war, with emblematic case of destroying the bridge over the river Neretzva in the city of Mostar. From 
a psycho- analytical perspective, the presence of those physical borders plays a strategic role to 
increase the subject’s feeling and perception about the existence of a functional island. This aspect 
will influence on individuals or collectives to find alternative routes to get away. From a tactical point 
of view it represents a strategic tool for control and track the entrance or evacuation of individuals and 
collectives.
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Figure 7.B. City of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Source: author, 2017
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7.1. Washington (United States of America)
 In this location we had considered that exists a theoretical high number of potential targets 
due to their political, social or cultural impact. After that pre-identification, the next step was to define 
the potential access routes that the subject could think to take, considering that this theoreti- cal 
subject requires to take magnificent actions and in consequence will choose avenues or wider roads. 
Simultaneously, we selected an undefined number of links between the preselected targets. Currently, 
in case of multiple attacks the presently security perimeter is not sufficient to protect or block the 
threat. It shall be highlighted that strategy based on the MRS will reduce the chance of the success of 
the attack by increasing the capability of rapid response.
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7.2. Ciudad de la Plata (Argentina)
 In this satellite image is reproduced a model of approach to a priority objective using the 
intra-urban structure. The passive mass will move in a disaggregate structure till the first city ring, 
where appears to be a change in the urban morphology. This location results to be vital in order to 
block the mass if it will be necessary. Simultaneously, the same change in morphology behaves as a 
collector, allowing the mass to get through roads of higher rank. We shall remark that in terms of 
perception, that collector represents an intangible border, that once it will be passed, it will increase 
the feeling of collectivity, empowering the social mass to continue moving.
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Source: Author 2016; Source of image: GEOEYE November 15th, 2011
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7.3. Palmanova (Italy)
 In case of this Italian city, we can observe how the urban morphology determines the spatial 
conduct by directing theoretical social approach to the city center. Every medieval city – including 
Palmanova – has in common a wall, which was designed to protect the inside from the outside area. 
This wall constitutes not only a physical, but rather a mental, barrier (Fernández, 2016). The city 
concentric structure increases the feeling of approaching to the center. During our observation, we 
noticed that this emotional phenomenon can have multiple manifestations. To name some of them, it 
can: a) increase of the walking speed; b) contribute to the exponential reduction of the ‘z` move-
ment’s; c) increase of body expressions.
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Source: Author 2016; Source of image: DIGITAL GLOBE April 28th, 2006
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 The implementation and use of the security protocols without the presence of conventional 
physical barriers demands an exhaustive analysis of the urban structure combined with the social 
dynamics. In some locations, such as Jaipur (India), the internal entropy observed in the planime- tric 
structures of the neighbourhoods increase the difficulty of tracking any selected subject by using 
exclusively visual technologies. It is under those circumstances where is recommended to implement 
closed control systems in order to – afterwards – evaluate the area deeply. The clear disadvantage of 
those subverts is the high level of connectivity between the residences increasing the chance of a 
potential lost of visual contact.
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Source: Author 2016; Source of image: GEOEYE November 13th, 2011
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7.5. Moscow (Russian Federation)
 The city of Moscow represents the perfect example of the way in which a geographical inci-
dent: a river, could have multiple strategic application. In the southern side of the city, there are 16 
multi-proposes bridges (train, automobile, pedestrian). Those bridges represent a constellation of 
strategic elements able to block concentric areas of the city. In the satellite image below, we can reali-
ze the size of the external area delimited by a summary of bridges and roads – marked on the map 
with green color. In a darker tone, we find on the map the first morphological brake, clearly differen-
tiated from the previous area by the existence of a radial avenue. This morphological struc- ture is 
used to define two new areas painted on the map with orange and red - the last one is the perimeter of 
the Kremlin.
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Source: Author 2016; Source of image: NASA September 25th, 2010
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 Since the start of EU integration process in 1958 till present time, this process is defined by 
permanent territorial expansion, with the exception of question mark posed by Brexit. The official 
borders have been constantly changing and within those variations there was - and still is - a perma-
nent adaptation to new geographical realities.
 This adaptation process includes multiple needs, i.e.: political, military, social, legal, econo-
mical, logistical et cetera. All those needs are connected and can be summarized in a single expres-
sion: security concept. Despite the fact that we could consider the security in this scheme as a basis 
or a result, in praxis the security is the main axe of gravity defining the entire EU structure.
 Subsequently, the security of EU shall not be exclusively understood as the defense of 
geographical borders – which is also crucial – but as a much broader issue. This security is emerging 
from a global geopolitical representation, resulting in the common objectives of the EU members - in 
contrast with the non-members of EU. However, this “new” territory - created by EU integration - 
cannot be considered as a flat area. We cannot forget that territorial internal divergences are still exis-
ting - being a consequence of the diverse neighbors affecting on borders - what is creating substantial 
differences in the internal politics of each member state of EU. The result of this asymmetric configu-
ration, where each EU member is still responsible - and sovereign within - for its own traditional 
borders, is a multi European core of security system. 
 It shall be highlighted that the threats to this core system originated traditionally - and 
currently this tendency is still noticeable in the same spatial conducts from the peripheries of the 
primigenius EU members. Those threats can be synthetically summarized in the following driving 
forces: a) irregular migration; b) drug trafficking; c) military hostilities; d) borders wars; e) terrorism; 
f) organized crime; g) secessionist movements.
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8.1. Distribution of the European Population (status for 2012)
 
 One of the most significant divergences presented by the EU members is the way in which 
national populations are distributed within their territories. The general population’s dynamics, 
judging on the basis what was reviewed in the previous chapters, is one of the most influential assets 
for security purposes. In those circumstances, following perceptual and pragmatic criteria, we might 
consider that areas with higher density present bigger risk and exposure than uninhabited ones.
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Map 8.1. Number of residentials per square kilometer 
Source: author, 2016; Source of data:  EUROSTAT Population Grid 2012.
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8.2. Distribution of the number of police officers by country
 
 In order to continue with the security analysis we choose the distribution and evolution of the 
police officers within the EU borders. Data concerning the above-mentioned distribution, can be 
considered as an indicator and are highlighting the three following aspects: a) the level of threats 
affecting on each society; b) the historical police-state connection; c) the distribution of threats 
among the EU borders.
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Map 8.2.1. Number of police officers (absolute value)
Source: author 2016; Source of Data: EUROSTAT 2016.
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 Starting from the first above-mentioned aspect: the level of threats affecting each society, it 
might be considered that number of police officers is proportional to the level of threats. Consequent-
ly, it shall be considered that in those EU member states with a higher absolute number of officers - 
due to this officers ratio - the level of threats they need to fight can be significantly higher in compari-
son with those states with reduced number of officers. 
 The second mentioned aspect is the historical recollection of those countries, which for a 
certain period of time of the contemporary history have had military or police governance. The 
above-mentioned feature is influencing directly on the actual number of officers.  
 The third mentioned point is the spatial distribution of the threats within the EU member 
states and EU borders. Within the examination of the presented maps - where we can compare data 
for the following years: 1999; 2004 and 2009 - it is discernible how the spatial patterns, in terms of 
number of officers which are maintained during the above-mentioned period, are covering a specific 
area: the southern arc of the Mediterranean shore. The density of officer’s number is gradually redu-
cing while we are moving to northern latitudes, where the EU core countries are isolated from the 
out-borders security threats.    
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 When the same indicator is changing from an absolute to a relative variable, the spatial 
configuration is changing too. However, those changes do not disrupt the main sequence of the Nor-
th-South progression. Despite the fact that the differences are less noticeable, are still  maintained and 
are still visible in the density of police officers in absolute and relative terms in the southern countries. 
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Strings of geostrategic contingence defined by european core countries 
Map 8.3.1. Ratio of police officers by each 100.000 citizens
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: EUROSTAT 2016.
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  The above-mentioned spatial features set the basis of geostrategic strings. Those strings are 
connected with the EU core. In those circumstances we observe how inside of the EU borders exist a 
non-declared consecutive border system which prevent the deep core members from the out-border 
threats. Focusing on the barriers separating the EU from the external threats we shall mention that 
there are two observable barriers exposed to them: the first one is composed in the South side by: 
Spain, Italy and Greece, meanwhile in the East side: by the ex-soviet republics and Greece as well. 
The most of the security threats driving forces are directed to those border countries and their closest 
neighbors. In consequence, the main entrance for drug trafficking, irregular migration process and 
terrorist actions is located in those countries. It is a geostrategic way to defense the in-core countries, 
which are composed mostly by UK, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and the non-EU 
member, but a state of geostrategic importance: Switzerland. 
 The countries which are situated in the most convenient geographical location, far from the 
conventional out-border threats are following: Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. This geostrate-
gic convenience is confirmed by the ratio of police officer per each inhabitant and the rate of criminal 
offenders per each inhabitant (Eurostat, 2016). The above-mentioned results are increasing signifi-
cantly in those - exposed to threat - peripheral locations of the EU. 
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Map 8.4.1. European narcotics route map:
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8.4. Distribution of the European narcotics routes
 
 The presented map of European narcotics routes constitutes a synthetic analysis of the drug 
trafficking within the EU borders and is showing points of their origin. Within the above-mentioned 
map we blended the four following variables: a) the population density (expressed with the blue raster 
layer in the background); b) the areas with geopolitical conflictive situations; c) volume of drug 
confiscated by security forces; d) consumption of synthetic drugs.   
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 Taking into account that the population density and its distribution was already commented, 
we shall take into consideration that areas with higher density of population are characterized by the 
higher number of potential consumers - considering that the range of the social profiles of the consu-
mers is broader too.  When it comes to the areas of geopolitical conflictive situations we shall diffe-
rence two typologies: a) those with open conflict;  b) those in which the government has not plenty 
control of the territory but there the conflict is not officially declared. The examples of the first men-
tioned case are emerging from Ukraine, Syria and Libya. The examples of the second mentioned case 
are emerging from Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Moldavia and Belarus. The - total or partial - lack of 
control increases the gap for organized crime operations. In consequence, those countries constitute 
perfect corridors for introduction of  narcotics to the EU members, especially for their biggest consu-
mers.   
 The third aspect to be mentioned is the volume of drugs seizure by security forces. That 
aspect is represented on the commented map by squares with different colours, being each colour 
referred to a particular type of substance. It is distinguishable that the number of drug seizures is 
higher in the southern EU border in contrast with the northern border. The EU southern border consti-
tutes a natural entrance for narcotic substances and that had determined partially the regional context 
and coaxial security driving forces influencing on it. That leads us to another conclusion that the 
production of those substances is taking place outside of the EU border zone. As we can observe on 
the presented map, most of those substances are subjected to the process of intercontinental transloca-
tion, which is happening since the moment of their production till the consumption phase inside of 
Europe. Despite the above-mentioned, it shall be highlighted that synthetic drugs have a different 
spatial pattern. Due to their nature they can be produced in almost every place. In consequence, 
synthetic drugs are designed and elaborated in - artisanal or professional - laboratories within the 
borders of EU. Their consumption level is reflected on the presented map: we can see them marked 
as black circles. In order to determine the consumption rate of those substances the analysis of local 
water is used. It is one of the most widely used methods and it allows to detect substances consumed 
by societies. The analysis of the seizures by typology of narcotic substance allows to see differences 
in the spatial patterns of drug consumption within EU. 
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 By examining the cocaine seizures within EU we can observe that the patterns are similar to 
the already commented: the volume of seizures is higher in the southern countries than in the northern 
ones. Focusing on the seizure of cocaine we can notice that in Spain the number is at least 100 times 
bigger than in Denmark. This provides point of reference for divergences in substances consumption 
and trafficking.  In contrast to the cocaine spiked horizon of trafficking, the pattern presented by trade 
of marihuana is homogeneous. Minimal differences are noticeable in  Holland and Greece - there is 
an equality in the seizures and by default an expected homogenized consumption. The spatial pattern 
of resin seizures and consumption are similar to the one presented by the cocaine.
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 8.5. Distribution of the irregular migration routes
 
 The social and economical dissimilarities between EU members were - and still are - the 
reason of a permanent migration process. However, this process through the EU agreements became 
natural and regular within the EU borders - in accordance with the free movement and residence of 
the citizens granted by law. Conversely, the divergence between inside and outside of EU area is 
significantly higher. That leads to the abysmally push up of a migration process, which cannot take 
place by regular procedures and corridors and due to that it continues by clandestine ones.t
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Map 8.5.1. Irregular immigrant routes map: 
Source: author, 2016; Source of data:  EUROSTAT 2016.
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 Under those circumstances the migratory pressure towards Europe has been a top issue since 
the end of the 80’s and beginning of the 90’s.  The current geopolitical instability of the regions outsi-
de EU border, is forcing a significant increase of the irregular migration process. Undefined volume 
of population from Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Egypt (due to the wars happening there) is ready to risk 
a priceless asset - life - in order to escape from their native context. Under those circumstances the 
EU geostrategic strings are once again in the game. The biggest social impact of this irregular process 
is directed towards the EU periphery countries. Hence, countries as Spain, Italy and Greece - due to 
their geographical location and proximity to those countries, in which people are ready to risk their 
lives to pass the Mediterranean Sea - constitute the main entrance for irregular migrants. The post-dis-
tribution process of migrants is -when possible - heterogenenous. The northern countries are hosting 
proportionally smaller percentage of irregular migrants than their economy could allow. The current 
geopolitical crisis in Syria sets a new paradigm in terms of security and migration after the massive 
refugee’s exodus. Undoubtedly, the situation of migrants is dramatic, however, some of them are 
entering into EU without laudable intentions. Moreover, those migrants represent a population with 
fresh combat and insurgency procedures experience, which was exposed for a long period to the 
horrors of war, and now this population is present in EU, what generally is not welcomed within EU 
borders. 
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8.6. Terror distribution 1970 - 2015
 Unquestionably modern and contemporary terrorism is one of the most significant threats 
that Europe is facing. Its history and origins are perfectly covered by Gónzalez-Calleja (2012) and 
Burleigh (2013). Despite the above-mentioned, our aim is to look at the contemporary terrorism from 
an unseen and undiscovered perspective: the spatial pattern analysis. We are conscious that the 
above-mentioned topic exceeds the scope of this thesis. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, by 
commenting the spatial pattern analysis, we are wishing to set the basis for further research about this 
topic. It shall be highlighted that this topic is vastly unexplored – especially in the Spanish literature. 
In the English literature we shall remark the figure of Oslender (2008), who proposed the concept of 
“geographies of terror”. Nevertheless, a true spatial pattern and analysis is still waiting to be exami-
ned.
 Within the following pages we will reveal part of the ongoing analysis on the topic prepared 
by the author. Investigating it initially from an European perspective, we defined three main guideli-
nes, which will allow to comprehend the spatial dynamics of this phenomenon: a) the national distri-
bution; b) the typology of attacks; c) the targets of those attacks. The information used for this analy-
sis was collected from the world prestigious database Global Terrorism Database (hereinafter referred 
to as: “GTD”). We have chosen the GDT as a source - not a national source - due to the following 
grounds: a) the world coverage provided by GTD; b) the time and quality of the presented data in 
GTD; c) the political impartiality of the presented data in GTD; and d) the free access provided by 
GTD. . 
 The spatial conducts of terrorist actions have significantly evolved in the last four decades. 
Within this period several terrorist trends with divergence ideologies and purposes were coexisting: 
from secessionist groups in the 80’s, 90’s and at the beginning of the XXI century till Islamic radicals 
groups in the last decade of XX century. Despite the fact that mass media is visualizing the “histori-
cal” scheme of terrorism, the objective true about it is exceptionally  different. 
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 By observing the graphic presented above (see: Figure 8.6.a), several terrorism phases 
within the last four decades can be differentiated. On the graphic we can observe the evolution of two 
main lines throughout years. The line on the top represents the number of attacks per year; the down 
line represents the fatalities linked with each terrorist attack. On this graphic the fluctuation of the two 
above-mentioned variables within the decades is noticeable – with the emphasis on the objective 
reduction of the number of attacks in the last decade. The apogee of the number of attacks was achie-
ved in the 70’s with over 1100 attacks per year and that number was decreasing till the beginning of 
the XXI century with less than 50 attacks per year.
 Despite that from statistical point of view the tendency is showing a decrease of both varia-
bles: i.e. number of attacks and fatalities, this tendency is not an indicator of the extinction of terro-
rism phenomenon. The modern virulence is that the numbers provoked by terrorist actions are equal 
- if not higher - to those provoked by attacks in the past (especially in 70’s and 80’s). Hence, the 
conclusion is that the terrorist threat is far from disappearing and is residing deeply in ours societies.    
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Source: author 2016; Source of data: GTD 2015
Figure 8.6.1. Evolution of terrorist actions and fatalities (1970 - 2012)
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8.6.1. Distribution of the terror by attacks: 1970 - 2015
Map 8.6.1.1. Distribution of the terrorist attacks by country (1970 - 2015)
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2016)
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8.6.3. Distribution of the terror by typology of attack by target: 1970 - 2015
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 By analyzing the distribution of the terror attacks within 1970-2015 period (see: Figure 
8.6.1), we can extract answers to: where, how and to whom the recent acts of terrorism are directed 
to. The contemporary terrorism – with clear spatial patterns – is far from an illogical phenomenon, it 
is a well calculated and meditated political tool. The ratio of higher density of attacks represents those 
regions with traditional secessionist ambitions. It shall be highlighted that the contemporary terrorism 
was and still is a state of war in the psychological perception of the EU inhabitants. Conversely, we 
might remark the existence of analysis presenting a global perspective towards terrorism patterns – 
specifically focused on suicide factor. The special attention shall be dedicated to the work developed 
by Satinfort-Jordan and Sandler (2014).  
 Despite the fact that the conventional terrorism within the EU might be understood as natio-
nal threat with international repercussions (Bailón, 2012), the modern Islamic terrorism is an interna-
tional threat with national consequences. The terrorist activities developed in the last years within the 
EU territory, signed by Islamic terrorist groups, have its origin in the political and social reaction to 
what they are considering as a direct attack from the EU members to their interest.  
 Under those new circumstances, the targeting process from those groups is focused on maxi-
mization of the impact of their action - not on achieving a final political goal as it was and it is the aim 
of the secessionist’s terrorist groups - in particular on causing the suffering of civilian population. The 
above constitutes the explanation for the recent terrorist attacks, which took place within 2015 and 
2016. Despite of the above-mentioned and the divergence in the terrorists modus operandi, we are 
facing a new era of terrorism with spatial conducts equal to the historical ones. In consequence, the 
neutralization of the threat starts from the understanding of the way in which it operates.  
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Figure 8.6.4.1. Types of terrorist attack (1970 - 2015)
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8.6.4 Graphical distribution of the attack’s typology: 1970 - 2015
 
 Meanwhile the spatial analysis provides us a full understanding of the way in which terrorist 
phenomenon have been deployed within the territory; it was designed to provide the comprehension 
of the impact of each attack typology. In consequence, we can directly link the usage of explosives 
with lethal consequences and we can state that an attack, in which any type of explosives is used, 
constitutes the most frequent type of attack. The number two in our ranking of attack typologies are 
attacks catalogued as assassinations. However, this type of attack presents a low ratio of fatalities - 
comparing it with total number including attempts of assassination. In other words - this type does not 
provide the achievement of the terrorist aim. On the other hand, armed assaults provide higher ‘suc-
cess’ ratio - a similar number of attacks is generating similar number of fatalities. 
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8.6.5. Graphical distribution of the typology of target: 1970 - 2015
 
 Applying the same procedure to the target’s typology, a dual distribution of targets is obser-
vable. Within the first sector we can distinguish the three following targets from all the targets listed 
on the map: Military, Business and Private Citizens targets. Within this sector is visible a proportional 
ratio of attacks and fatalities. In fact, this is the sector with the highest number of attacks and fatalities 
registered. The second sector is composed by the rest of the target’s attributes: Airport/Aircraft; Edu-
cational Institution; Maritime; Police; NGO; Abortion Related; Food or Water Supply; Government; 
Diplomatic; Journalist; Religious Figures; Telecommunication; Terrorists; Unknown; Utilities; 
Violent Political Party; Tourist; Transportation. From all the targets from the second sector the 
following two shall be highlighted: Government and Police.
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 The above-mentioned two targets are characterized by significantly higher ratio between the 
number of attacks and the fatalities generated than any other target qualified to the second sector. Des-
pite that from statistical perspective the tendency is showing a decrease of both variables - number of 
attacks and fatalities - it cannot be treated as an indicator of the extinction of the terrorism phenome-
non. The modern virulence is that the terrorism achieved equal, if not higher, results to the ones 
presented by historical attacks. The threat is far from disappearing -indeed is deeply anchored in ours 
societies.    
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 Meanwhile in the previous chapter we focused on the topics defining the main EU driving 
forces for macro security purposes, within this lines we will dedicate our attention to several issues 
which - despite the fact they are not considered as a geostrategic threats - their nature shall be conside-
red as a top priority for any security analysis. Unfortunately, mass media are working against focu-
sing on other than geostrategic threats by underlining the above-mentioned threats much more often 
than they should be highlighted. As a result, those threats with higher social implication - but less 
publicity - are covered in extremely shallow matter.  The first issue which we will cover within this 
chapter are criminal actions. Criminal actions usually have a price - the price of someone’s life. 
However, this price is not publicly well known. Neither the following fact does not constitute part of 
common knowledge: in some EU countries the number of fatalities caused by homicides and murders 
per year is significantly higher than the number of fatalities caused by terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, 
those facts are hidden quietly behind the public scene. Those criminal actions - which are leaving a 
blood trace behind - are treated by the local society as a natural feature or not depending on and deter-
mined by the spatial and social context where those actions are taking place. The second aspect 
deeply linked with the social peace status is the gender violence and the sexual violence. We establi-
shed as a goal within this thesis to cover the above-mentioned issue of violence and to enlighten this 
issue from the perspective of spatial analysis. In the Author’s opinion, the sexual violence together 
with the terrorism could constitute the most sensible topics in terms of security that societies need to 
manage. In our analysis - beside criminal actions leading to fatalities, gender and sexual violence - we 
cannot forget the common criminality. This kind of criminality has less social impact, but still consti-
tutes a security driving force. The force provided by actions of the common criminality is - potentially 
- one of the most invisible security threats. However, this force is influencing the most on societies 
and is causing a lot of suffering. Furthermore, the underestimation of the potential of this force and 
its consequences can lead to chaos and disorder – and even in the worst case scenario to failed states. 
In consequence, we consider that an adequate traceability tool shall be equally focused on the 
macro-geostrategic threats as well as on those affecting and influencing on singular citizens. 
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9.1. Spatial distribution of the homicides 
 
 
 The above-presented map covers the ratio of spatial distribution of homicides in the EU 
members by NUTS 2 region. The spatial divergence shows that a tendency of homicides rates is 
higher in the eastern than in the western side. Similar pattern is differentiable between the shore and 
inland regions: the number of homicides is higher in the regions located on the shores than in the 
regions located inland. 
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Map 9.1. Ratio of homicides per each 100.000 citizens (2010)
Source: author 2016; Source of data: UNODC 2011
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9.2. Spatial distribution of the intentional homicides 
 Space and time are the two main factors defining a pattern. Hence, by analyzing space and 
time within EU framework we can distinguish a pattern within distribution of the intentional homici-
des and we can state that there is a stable spatial trajectory of this variable within the EU members. 
Within the analyzed period: 2009 – 2014 are noticeable only small changes on the level of national 
statistics. However, within the same period there are noticeable significant divergences between EU 
members. In particular, in Iceland the minimum rate of this variable is noticeable (in 2009-2013 
between 0-10 homicides, in 2014 – no data), meanwhile in France the higher rate is constantly present 
(2009-2014 between 700-2090 homicides). Similarly, the relative stable high rate is distinguishable 
in central Europe. The analysis presented herein is based on data extracted from EUROSTAT (2016). 
This European Statistical source was chosen in order to avoid the extraction of statistics from every 
EU member separately. National legislations and reports contain many differences which easily lead 
to dramatic differences between data and in final result data from different countries could not be 
compared. Hence, this strategic decision of choosing EUROSTAT data was taken due to the goal of 
providing comparative data. 
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9.3. Spatial distribution of the sexual violence
 Unfortunately, the spatial distribution of the sexual violence is highly connected with the 
previously reviewed topic of intentional homicide. It shall be highlighted that a significant rate of the 
acts of the sexual violence ends with someone’s death. This degenerated social conduct has direct 
impact not only on the life of the victim, but also on victim’s surrounding. By developing a true 
traceability - what constitutes the goal already stated within this thesis - a real and pragmatic response 
to this kind of security threats can be provided. However, the security resources are frequently focu-
sed on those risks - without the underestimation of the real threat that those risks are representing - 
that have a lower ratio of spatial and time recurrence. Comparing data relating to the sexual violence 
with the homicides data, we can notice that there is spatial correlation between the both threats as well 
as that numbers are highest in France and Germany. Moreover, such authors as for example Pain 
(2014) do correlate the domestic violence with the global terrorism phenomenon. In our opinion, this 
link shall be understood as a pre-index value rather than a coaxial one.
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9.4. Spatial distribution of robberies
 As previously it was mentioned, the common criminality is the security threat that is affec-
ting on our societies the most. Robberies - which can be distinguished within acts of common crimi-
nality - are frequently happening on daily basis and what is more: there is lack of political interest to 
decrease or neutralize this phenomenon. The above-mentioned shall not be surprising - after all, 
robberies are creating a parallel economy. Moreover, most of the robberies are in certain manner 
connected with organized crime. It shall be mentioned that robberies activities are heterogeneous: the 
level of their sophistication is changing according to the target. Undoubtedly, this criminal activity 
involves highly qualified professionals from multiple sectors. Since the economical crisis hit the EU 
economy, the rates of robberies within EU states have been increasing. By examining robberies trends 
within EU between 2000 and 2014 we can observe that within the European context a general incre-
ment of this type of activity is noticeable.
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9.5. The multispectral approach
 After investigating the maps presented above and evaluating the ongoing scenario within the 
EU borders, we shall ask the following questions:  how the currently used security paradigm can stop 
the risks which the EU is facing? And what security forces are doing to neutralize those risks? Moreo-
ver, taking into account that we are living in the times of advanced technology: why the surveillance 
technology is not systematically used to eliminate the above-mentioned threats from our societies?  
Answers to the above-posed questions are complex. It shall be highlighted that for the status quo is 
potentially responsible a coalescence of factors and variables. From all of the factors and variable we 
shall remark the national geopolitical interest - which unfortunately a priori is against the social bene-
fit -; the economical interest and in the third - but not less important - position is the acknowledge-
ment that the modern technology - publicly presented as able to monitor, observe as well as to defense 
our societies from the whole spectre of macro-micro threats - is a perfect perceptual myth. This 
acknowledgement constitutes a first step towards the sequence of a true traceability for social purpo-
ses, which will be focused on the increase of the social peace and social wealth. 
 Contrary to the above-mentioned aim, we can observe that: four decades of terrorism brou-
ght more than 6.000 of fatalities and unknown number of citizens affected by terrorist acts. Moreover, 
migrants looking for better life can rely on organized crime groups to access to the EU members. In 
this migratory Machiavellian life-cycle the irregular migrants are left near to 12 nautical miles from 
their coast of origin with the expectation that they will be collected by European Non Governmental 
Organizations (hereinafter referred to as: “NGO”), meanwhile the payment was made to criminals. 
This modus operandi provides feedback of our governments and NGO’s, guaranteeing that the migra-
tory life-cycle and economical exploitation of desperate humans will continue. 
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 In the meantime, while governmental surveillance is focused on the humanitarian crisis - 
intentionally designed - the same organizations responsible for migrant business are crossing borders 
with tons of narcotics. These substances will invade our cities and ultimately will deteriorate the 
health of our inhabitants. Collateral to that social damage, the consumption of those substances will 
significantly increase the ratio of homicides and robberies and so will create unstable societies, where 
the sexual violence will explode out of control. We are aware of the limitation of this thesis, and 
perhaps the effects or consequences of the above-mentioned process will be less noticeable, however 
we are hoping that the further lines of this thesis will constitute the commencement for the true tracea-
bility process. 
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  By reviewing European security threats and driving forces we are forging a general context 
of the size and level of permanent risks assumed by our societies. Parallel to that, we exposed the way 
in which those vulnerabilities are used and exploited by illegal groups and organizations due to the 
lack of political willing to establish a common front to cope with those issues. After exposing this 
fact, we shall focus on the next level of security analysis: the national frame
 It would be eligible to analyze the security driving forces of all EU members. Nevertheless, 
the limited dimension of this thesis does not allow for it, even though the two case studies will be 
provided, respectively for the capital city of Spain and of Poland. The national framework for Poland 
as well as for other EU members will be left for further projects. Hence, the national frame of the 
security driving forces for Spain will be included herein. 
 Following the above-mentioned, within this chapter we will focus on the irregular migration, 
terrorism, organized crime and other secondary security threats, which can be found on daily basis 
within the Spanish territory. Taking into account the limitations of the research, the thematic will be 
synthesized in a series of cartographic examples, in which the above-mentioned issues will be repre-
sented.
 Before we will continue, we need to highlight the outstanding work of employees of security 
forces with special emphasis on the Spanish Military forces, the National Police Force (hereinafter 
referred to as: “CNP” - by its Spanish acronym), the Guardia Civil (hereinafter referred to as: “GC”), 
who are dedicated to the call of their duty and what is leading to the unnecessary sacrifice of their 
lives as a result of the governmental negligence.
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Map 10. 1.1. Net migrant balance (2011) per thousand inhabitants 
! ! ! ! ! ! !
10.1. Spain: two sides of one nationt
 The geographic aspect is coaxial to the presented traceability review. Spain is the country, 
which has two sides: one side is the European one, clearly visible on the Spanish territory within 
Europe; the second side is transitional one, visible on the Spanish territory in Africa. This aspect is 
fundamental for understanding of the spatial conduct of the security driving forces that are existing 
on the Spanish territory. Spain by its geographical features - in particular being located close to 
Gibraltar Strait and possessing territory on African soil - provides a connection between Europe and 
Africa. Consequently, this Spanish geographical location is creating a flow and connectivity between 
the European and African world. Taking into account the unfavorable social, economical and political 
situation in the African world and other divergences setting the European world as more safe and 
secure, is not surprising that this location - providing the bridge between those both worlds - is one of 
the most demanding security hot spot within the EU borders.
 Meanwhile the EU internal migration process - despite the economical crisis - is still actively 
populating the East shore of the Spanish territory, there is an institutional willing to block this option 
for irregular migrants, who are escaping from the geopolitical situation within their countries of 
origin. It is shocking that parallel to the above-mentioned, non-EU citizens having proper funds are 
populating the same Spanish coast that is inhabited by EU citizens, while is blocked for irregular 
migrants. 
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10.2. At the other side: Ceuta
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Antiterrorist Operations
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 It shall be highlighted that the migratory process can be used by various individuals to enter 
the EU zone: including those without harmful intentions as well as those who are applying for the 
refugee status having intentions not connected at all with humanitarian needs. Within the second 
above-mentioned group frequently can be found criminals or convicts – especially this trend is noti-
ceable since the 90’s, when this modus operandi was started to be used in order to threat and strike 
the hosting country. Undoubtedly, the contemporary terrorist groups do not hesitate to use any possi-
ble way to insert their people into – what they do consider as – the territory of enemy. This observa-
tion does not make from any refugee or ex-convict a potential terrorist. This harsh reality shall force 
EU countries to proceed in adequate manner to the assumed risks.
10.4. Black sheep’s
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10.5. The jihadist: spatial profiling
 We shall remember that the modern history of the terrorism started decades before the 70’s - 
far before the beginning of the collection of corresponding statistical data. Within this history of terror 
and horror there have been existing multiple factions and groups. Regardless of this multiplicity of 
factions and groups, all of them have been characterized by one common aim: sanguinary killings and 
attempting to take the lives of unfaithful: innocent civil population. Nevertheless, most of them is 
already non-existing and their relicts are subjected to the process of disarming. 
 On the other hand, we shall highlight that the terrorism signed by Islamic groups since the 
80’s is evolving and rising in power in the great and unprecedented scale. Since the day of 11th March 
of 2004 - bombing of trains in Madrid - the Islamic threat is permanently challenging our security, 
trying to force us to live in permanent fear of another attack. This threat posed by Islamic groups is 
relatively new, however is detecting and exploiting - far better than any other previously active group 
– the vulnerabilities of the society, the government and the system by itself. Their modus operandi is 
imported directly from Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria or Libya. Their main tactic could be resumed as crea-
ting the permanent state of psychological terror and threat. A fact that drew the academic attention 
years ago, was perfectly highlighted in the paper prepared by Lynch (2013), where the comprehensive 
analysis of that issue is presented. Due to the social and cultural divergences between European and 
Islamic world, the tactic and the modus operandi of Islamic groups is constantly adjusted to the Euro-
pean surrounding. Furthermore, we can distinguish significant differences between the ideological 
speech – which is presented and pronounced publicly as a permanent pursuit of the Islam core faith 
located in the Arab Peninsula – and the involved fighters’ country of origin, developing an emotional 
divergence between good and bad Muslims (Mamdani, 2002). The true structure of the subjects role 
in the jihad war paradoxically is not constructed on the recruits originating from the geographical 
core of Islam, rather this structure is based on the ongoing expansionist process. The above-mentio-
ned conclusion is confirmed by data: as we can observe on the map presented below, those subjects 
are recruited globally. Consequently, there is a dissonance between the purity of the ideology and the 
praxis of the war. This dissonance is showing the ethnical structure of the war. 
IV. A CARTOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE MAIN SECURITY DRIVING FORCES
187
10.5.1. Ratio between operations and arrested suspects
 
 
    
IV. A CARTOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE MAIN SECURITY DRIVING FORCES
0 150 km N
0 200 km N
1 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 100 >100
1 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 100 >100
188
10.5.2. The origin of the jihadist
 Taking into account that above it was presented the set of maps analyzing the spatial distribu-
tion of the counter-terrorist operations that took place within the Spanish territory between 2005 and  
2016, the time has come to present maps focusing on the country of origin of arrested suspects. Con-
sequently, on the map presented below, we can observe the distribution of nationalities of arrested 
suspects. This is the first step towards the analysis of the country of origin and the role of suspect 
within the jihad in Spain (on the following pages there is map dedicated to jihadist role profiling - 
point 10.5.3 of the thesis). Within the analysis of country of origin it shall be remarked the high level 
of heterogeneity of the involved nationalities. By observing the mentioned map we can clearly see 
patterns of spatial distribution: it is noticeable areas with higher presence of jihadists as well as a 
correlation between the jihadist’ country of origin and the chosen area of residence within Spain. The 
map presented herein provides information indispensable to upgrade the level of our knowledge 
regarding the locations where those individuals are living and interacting.
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  In order to make the spatial patterns within nationalities of arrested suspects we are presen-
ting herein map dedicated to the world context. From this perspective we can properly notice that the 
extraordinary complexity of terrorist networks operating within Spanish territory, and what is more - 
those networks possess their ramifications all over the world (including inter alia: Russia, Cuba, 
Palestine, Morocco, Argentina). It is striking that – outside of the imaginary context produced by the 
mass media and adopted by the society – within participating individuals in those terrorist networks 
there are individuals originating from South America (in particular from: Argentina, Paraguay, Cuba, 
Brazil, Chile). When it comes to the participation of individuals from Middle East and Asia, we can 
observe more or less what we could expect: individuals are originating from Syria, Palestine, Pakis-
tan, Tunisia, Turkey. Focusing more on Africa – in particular on the Mediterranean shore – beside that 
individuals are originating from Morocco and Algeria, there are singular individuals from Ghana and 
Angola. The commented map provides us the full portrait of country of origin. Nevertheless, this 
portrait cannot be complete without an adequate analysis of the role – and spatial patterns within role 
- that those individuals play in the terrorist network’ global context.
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10.5.3. The jihadist role profiling
 The analysis of the spatial conduct will be purposeless without performing the task of role 
profiling. It shall be highlighted that not all the individuals play equal roles within the terrorist cell, 
hence their location is important and is helping to place them within the cell structure. By relying on 
data from GESI (GESI 2005 – 2016: Operaciones contra el terrorismo yihadista en España) we obtai-
ned information regarding the spatial-role profiling of the subjects accused of terrorism. Due to the 
fact that every individual has different role within the cell, it is indispensable to investigate why and 
where an individual is in specific location. The above-mentioned source allowed us to investigate that 
issue. The results are presented on the graphic below, where we can identify and correlate the nationa-
lity, the place of residence and the role that each individual play in the terrorist structure.
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10.6. Organize Crime: a deep mole
 
 The groups operating within organized crime are permanently penetrating our societies and 
governmental structures and by so creating security threats, which – potentially – can lead to the 
social-governmental coaxial collapse (De la Corte-Ibañez, 2010). Those organized crime groups are 
transforming the world (Naím, 2006) and are intimately linked with terrorist groups (Napoleoni, 
2004). By examining the presence of organized crime groups within the territory of Spain, we can 
notice that their activity is definitely high and, what is more, – is including many provinces. Undoub-
tedly, the Spanish geographical and socio-cultural background constitute one of the reasons standing 
behind this harsh reality. On the above presented map we can distinguish areas, which are preferred 
by those groups and are chosen to live in and operate within. It is easy to observe that organized crime 
hot spots are located: i) in central part of Spain: in Madrid and ii) on the East coast: with special 
emphasis on the territory of the Autonomous Province of Cataluña and Valencia.
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10.7. Crimes and misdemeanors (2015)
 
 
 In modern times the interaction between space and criminality was perfectly examined and 
defined by Sanz (2001). It shall be highlighted that Sanz described the above-mentioned geographical 
approach, which denominated the guidelines of the comprehensive analysis, where the space – despi-
te being considered by others as a inert surface – is considered as a factor influencing on possible 
criminal activities, which can take place within it. Consequently, this approach is focused on the inte-
raction between type of space and type of noticed delinquency – which is emerging or disappearing 
where the territory and social conditions allowed for it. On the above-presented map, covering 
number of crimes registered within 2015, we can identify the spatial patterns of criminality. The 
highest numbers of criminality can be noticed on the South coast, the East coast and the central part 
of Spain. Within those areas we can equally observe the presence of terrorist cells, organized crime 
groups and common criminality activities. This coalescence suggests a potential spatial and functio-
nal network between all the above-mentioned variables. This potential coaxial interactions between 
all those networks have its own consequences influencing on multi-dimensional spheres.
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10.8. Murders and homicides (2015)
 
 
 
 We shall remark that one of the unquestionable and inevitable consequences of activities of 
terrorist cells and organized crime groups is the systematic increase of the number, from one side: of 
direct and indirect victims caused by those activities and; from the other side: of perpetrators respon-
sible for those activities and victims. We shall also remember that each of the two above-mentioned 
groups is creating many problems for the other one: internal threats, economical conflict of interest, 
the possibility of internal convulsion process, what frequently leads to the wide spreading of murders 
and homicides. The most common reason of the clash between those two groups is the willingness to 
control the territory. This willingness is the main driving force of conflicts between those groups, 
because the control of territory equals to the control of its governance - and what is connected with it: 
control of money. 
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 On the above presented map is presented the distribution of homicides. By comparing the 
previous map (crimes: see Map 10.7) and the map presented herein we can observe that spatial distri-
bution in terms of density of the criminal phenomenon is equal and moreover we can notice that 
crimes and homicide phenomenon is parallel and is coaxially existing.  
10.9. Robberies with use of violence (2015)
 General criminality and homicides are not exhausting the repertoire of threats. The multidi-
mensional spheres of our lives are not affected exclusively by internal conflicts between terrorist cells 
and organized crime groups. Together with the presence of crime and homicide we can notice the 
presence of robberies with use of violence. Undoubtedly, within the regions where the number of 
those robberies is high – citizens are more vulnerable to be attacked. We need to remember that the 
members of criminal groups posses the permanent need of acquiring goods and the same trend can be 
spotted within those people who are under criminal influence or having any connections with crimi-
nal world. 
 The perfect example of the above-mentioned are effects and consequences of the consump-
tion of narcotics, which are creating a common criminal conduct from the side of their sellers and 
buyers. Despite the fact that those subjects frequently proceed with action in case of detecting a 
vulnerable target, a high profit can encourage them to target objectives which a priori seems to be 
beyond their capabilities. Under the above-mentioned circumstances the society becomes the first and 
main target. 
 Furthermore, the principle problem regarding the analysis of the spatial conduct of the 
robberies with use of violence is their blended profile, what indicates that this type of criminal activi-
ty is undertaken by various subjects: ‘regular’ citizens as well as the members of criminal organiza-
tions. The above-mentioned characteristic distinguish violent robberies from crimes and homicides, 
which are mostly undertaken by terrorist cells and organized crime groups. 
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SECTION V
ANALYSIS OF THE 
SECURITY DRIVING 
FORCES BASED ON  
TWO CASES OF STUDY
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  Among this thesis we have been analyzing the interaction between the security and the terri-
tory. In-between those two factors, there is a third and determinative variable: the society. This terzet-
to (security, territory and society) constitutes the main corpus of each and every issue reviewed 
herein. By using a multi-scale approach we investigated the way in which most of the driving forces 
- interacting directly or indirectly with this terzetto - behave in time and space. However, till this 
chapter, every topic presented herein was designed and created from a theoretical point of view. 
 Within the previous sections, especially in the section dedicated to the state of art (see: Chap-
ter 5 and 6), we disclosed the shadows of contemporary security: starting from the analysis of the way 
in which is publicly presented, by stating that constitutes part of that machinery where the perception 
acquires more importance than the profitability of the system. We discovered that the contemporary 
security is its essence an artificial security, relying on the fact that the society - as well as individual 
- needs the guidance of the mass media to deal with its vulnerabilities. This modus operandi corres-
ponds to an architectonic structure where the external appearance is required - even though the inter-
nal appearance is disappointing. It seems that the contemporary security is such architectonic structu-
re: magnificent from outside, empty and disappointing inside. This structure is used to hide the empti-
ness of contemporary security - the true security currently in use - in order to prevent devastating 
effects of this truth: a potential total chaos. In contrast to the above, during the research period perfor-
med for this thesis, we gained the knowledge allowing us to observe the global security panorama, 
what provided us an equidistant perspective with respect to the point of view of mass media and in 
consequence, we have been able to evaluate, analyze and provide a basis for security diagnosis, foun-
ded on contrastable data: not on perceptual archetypes. In order to reinforce the already made effort 
by performing the fieldwork by ourselves. That step was necessary to verify status quo and have the 
certainty about the true status of security. Having the above-mentioned principles in mind, the idea of 
examining case studies was born.  
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 Once the contemporary security myth was overthrow, a true face of it was discovered: a 
social trick. Together with this discovery the time to create a trustable security design has come - a 
design on which the whole society can rely. In order to achieve this goal, we pre-set a series of condi-
tions, mentioned and explained in the chapter dedicated to the methodology (see: Chapter 3). As it 
was already mentioned, we consider that to start from a scratch is frequently a better solution than to 
reconfigure a system permanently falling into meaningless loops. The surprising and terrifying point 
is that, apparently - and we desire to highlight that word - that system was designed to be and operated 
how it is. The social discrepancies within true security protocols are sustaining the doubtful status quo 
by confusing advances with frequent steps backwards. 
 That clash, far from what it can appear, is rolling into a deep conflict of paradigms regarding 
social and system’s control. An intellectual - and billionaire - war of interest between the machine and 
the human. Those who support the machine’s sphere, trust actively - or at least they are expecting that 
the society will trust currently - in a technology that in practice is inefficient, plenty of gaps, and - as 
we can diagnose - in the initial phase of development. In contrast, those avoiding the implementation 
of the machine, are relying on a social and group’s control. Moreover, are considering that the perso-
nal rights are above any global and social improvement and by so - are deleting any kind of capability 
to trace and provide evidence in case of need. 
 In consequence, we cannot adopt any of those streams or lines of thinking for the purposes 
of this thesis. The reason to not accept any of the above-mentioned -  independently of the fact, which 
one will be adopted - is the fact that such choice would lead to the equally unsatisfactory result: a 
security approach, which will not be trustable nor reliable. Once we decided to develop - and design 
of - a comprehend fieldwork to pursuit the desired result, we started the reconnaissance of the areas 
to be included within the research. We searched for the areas in order to: firstly, analyze and further  
to apply the potential models and acquired knowledge. By reviewing the urban morphology typolo-
gies (Capel, 2004) we identified the three main following configurations: a) orthogonal urban typolo-
gy; b) circular urban typology; and c) mixed urban typology. 
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 The above discovery led us to plan three study cases - covering the three above mentioned 
urban typologies - in order to extrapolate the research conclusions to any other type of urban area. For 
this reason - after the assessment of various cities (see: Chapter 7), which initially were taken into 
considerations - we selected the final following candidates: a) Warsaw; b) Moscow; c) Madrid. Theo-
retically, by covering three different urban typologies within this research the blend of those three 
case studies will be created, what could open the door for the worldwide application of this new mul-
tispectral security approach. 
 Nevertheless, only two case studies will be included herein: Madrid and Warsaw. Finally, 
Moscow will not be included herein. The reason for that is the direct consequence of the following 
two main factors: a) Russian Federation is not one of the EU member states and in consequence the 
time and the stay of foreigners in this country is not only limited, but also supervised; b) the initial 
visits in the Russian Federation were formally in status of tourist for a limited period of less than 30 
days, in result any other kind of activity performed within this period and with status will be against 
the law. 
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FIRST CASE OF STUDY
Spatial analysis and security  
prognosis in the
Central District of Madrid
202
11.1 A security contextualization of the Central District of Madrid
 Being conscious of the essence and responsibility assumed with the topic, we desired to start 
the present analysis of the case study with a short review of the facts connected with the territory of 
the Central District of Madrid in order to provide information needed for the security contextualiza-
tion. It shall be mentioned that the Central District of Madrid is one of the twenty-one administrative 
and political territorial units that are forming the municipality of Madrid. 
 This district (marked on the map below as Centro) is located in the center of the municipality 
and its surface is significantly smaller: 5,23 hectares in comparison with the other units; the munici-
pality of Madrid is occupying total area of 60,430 hectares (IESTADIS, 2009). Nevertheless, the 
comparatively smaller territory of this unit is not limiting or blocking its functional diligence. In prac-
tice, this - limited in size - quasi functional entity represents the core of the Spanish nation: all the 
critical infrastructure for the state functioning is located in this area.  
 It shall be mentioned that the headquarters of each of the three powers, on which the Spanish 
constitution is based, are located inside of this administrative unit. Despite that the census of inhabi-
tants is indicating a small number of population: below 143.000, the level of the density in this area 
is specified as 275 habitants per hectare (Ibid.), which constitutes statistically much smaller number 
in comparison with - far below the average numbers presented in - the contiguous units. Nonetheless, 
the daily inhabitants as well as the society in transit, makes from the Central District - taking into 
account it reduced size - one of the most dense areas in the whole Spanish territory.   
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 Those functional aspects of this district have their negative consequences in terms of security 
risks and vulnerabilities, which will be discussed herein. Unfortunately, in most of the cases, those 
risks and vulnerabilities are existing without being detected and are growing as a serious threat to the 
society and the system. This statement is reinforced by statistic data, which are presenting a clear 
spatial configuration of the district’s insecure spots. All statistical data presented herein is based on 
public and official reports - we excluded any possibility of including third party reports due to the fact 
that they are based on opaque methodologies or unverifiable data procedures. As a starting point in 
order to sketch the extent of the possible risks and vulnerabilities we have chosen to procure the 
number of police interventions in the Central District of Madrid - that data would allow us to set the 
reference frame which shallowly, but efficiently, would provide a portrait image of the spatial distri-
bution of the risk and vulnerabilities.  
 The above-mentioned goal was impossible to achieve due to the lack of collaboration from 
authorities side: after official contact with the CNP and Madrid’s Municipal Police we did not obtain 
any answer to our request. Consequently and unfortunately we did not get access to the raw data 
collected by the above-mentioned forces. From the point of this thesis we would like to strongly 
encourage Spanish forces to cooperate with academia - following third countries models where exists 
a trustable and efficient collaboration between the academic environment and security forces. This 
research project constitutes perfect and clear evidence of the long and spiky path that still needs to be 
taken - and discovered - in terms of institutional collaboration in Spain. Despite the above-mentioned 
obstacles, we got to the statistical data regarding the number of police interventions for the municipa-
lity of Madrid, which is published by the Statistical Municipality Webpage of Madrid (see: www.ma-
drid.es). 
 However, this source does not allow for any data segregation neither provide option to adopt 
any filter. We are convinced that the total number of police interventions - by definition - is not provi-
ding any relevant information about threat to the society or the system. Despite the fact that we did 
not have the possibility to eliminate the noisy data from the context, neither to establish the percenta-
ge that this noise represents, overall this data is grasping regions with higher security demands and 
those with lower insecurity profiles. 
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  It shall be highlighted that beside a fix image of police interventions in 2014 in municipality 
of Madrid - presented on the map above, in the Author’s opinion an evolution context could provide 
more significant space-time information about the security - or being more precise: insecurity areas - 
in the municipality of Madrid. Hence, the Author prepared a sequence of maps showing the tenden-
cies in police interventions in Madrid from 2006 to 2013, based on data obtained from the 
above-mentioned source.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
0 5 km
0 - 250 251 - 500 501 - 1.000 1.001 - 2.000 2.001 - 3.000 3.001 - 5.000
Figure 11.1.c Distribution of the police interventions (2014)
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
206
     
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
2006 2007 2008
2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
0 5 km
Figure 11.1.d. Number of policial 
interventions with result of
arrested or criminal penalty
by District
Source: author 2016;
Source of data: www.madrid.es
1.001 - 2.000 2.001 - 3.000
3.001 - 5.000
0 - 250 251 - 500 501 - 1.000
207
 The above-presented sequence of maps reveals the existence of multi-nodal hot spots in 
Madrid, where a high number of interventions have become a routine. Furthermore, the overview 
above is showing a dynamic increasing tendency of the number of police interventions, which ended 
with the arrest of any subject and criminal penalties. The causes which are behind the tendency of this 
variable could be summarized in the tree following main factors: a) an increase of the social conflicts; 
b) a significant rise of the number of criminal activities; c) a relative increment of the police presence 
and its efficiency. The combination of those three variables provides the growing number of interven-
tions, what is reflected in the statistical data. 
 It shall be highlighted that a year to year analysis, performed on the basis of the above-men-
tioned sequence of maps, reveals macro tendencies of criminal process. Despite that those maps 
provide a general picture of criminal activities, they do not open the door to comprehend the manner 
in which the criminal activities are interacting with - and are occurring within - the territory. In order 
to cover the above-mentioned issue it is required to perform a sequence of multi-time analysis for a 
particular geographical spot. Although we desired to cover fully this issue, the accessible data 
allowed us to do it for the last published year: i.e. 2014. Consequently, to put more light on the discus-
sed issue, we prepared a month to month analysis, showing the dynamics of the same phenomenon. 
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Figure 11.1.e Number of police interventions  with result of arrested or criminal penalty by Districts
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
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 After comparing details of above presented sequences of maps, we can clearly identify that 
in case of both sequences – providing yearly (2014 and 2009-2013) and monthly (for 2014) perspecti-
ve – the Central District of Madrid plays a critical role for the security of the city. We can notice that 
within contiguous districts the criminal patterns are temporal. That fact that is mostly determined by 
the combination between weather and social interaction. Furthermore, the high density of police 
interventions is much more visible in the Southern districts than in the Northern ones. Meanwhile 
police interventions are permanently noticeable in the South side of the city – with seasonal variations 
of the total number, in the North they occur eventually. 
 Consequently, we are foreseeing two types of security problems: a) based on specific events; 
b) based on a functional operating structure.  In order to complete the structural security analysis, we 
will add to our investigation the following variables: a) traumatism and poisoning; b) fire interven-
tions; c) traffic accidents.  The details of the above-mentioned will be presented on the following 
pages. 
 However, the security concerns towards events, could lead to reveal some structural raw 
weak points on the main urban security spectre. Because of the potential correlation between both 
axes, it is required to comprehend the urban security as a continuum, where the inputs on the system 
force the existence of an output – frequently visible in a subsequence of variables - not in the form of 
direct correlation with the input. This fact leads us to question the impact and number of accidents 
(fire, poisoning, traumatism, etcetera), which indeed are planned and designed to appear as accidents. 
Despite that the publicly available statistics do not allow to perform this typology of analysis; we are 
concerned about the existence of them. By referring to press reports we can notice the importance of 
the matter, as well as the current incapability to identify and trace them (Barroso, 2014).
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Figure 11.1.1.a. Number of fatalities by poisoning and external traumatism by Districts
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 Poisoning and external traumatism are two 
main indicators of death under violent 
circumstances. Those indicators are frequently 
linked with organized crime or clash of criminal 
groups and are providing a potential overview 
where those organizations have their own natural 
enemies and/or targets. Despite that some of those 
deaths may appear as accidents, in fact they 
probably constitute undercover hitman operations. 
On the maps we can see the tendencies of poisoning 
and external traumatism between 2010 and 2007 – it 
is clear that the higher numbers of incidents is 
located in the peripheral districts of Madrid. In 
particular: the district of Latina, Carabanchel, 
Puente de Vallecas and Fuencarral-El Pardo present 
the number above the average – there rate of 
violence is constantly high within the observing 
period. Despite the fact that the global tendency of 
violence is decreasing, the spatial patterns in those 
districts maintain stable, what is tantamount to 
conclusion that what is representative for those 
districts is the percentage of deaths based on not 
natural neither accidental cause. 
Figure 11.1.1.b. Number of fatalities by 
poisoning and external traumatism 
by Districts (2007 - 2009)
Source: Author, 2016
Source of Data: www.madrid.es
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11.1.2 Fire interventions
Figure 11.1.2.a. Number of fire interventions by District
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
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 By analyzing the fire interventions between 2011 and 2015, presented on the maps above, we 
can notice that the general tendencies are similar to already commented. The number of interventions 
is lower in the North and South side of the city. It shall be highlighted that this number is also high 
for the Central District of Madrid.  
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11.1.3 Traffic accidents 
Figure 11.1.1.a. Number of fatalities by poisoning and external traumatism by Districts
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
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"
  Urban areas and transport consitute an 
entire system with its own dynamics and require-
ments. Undoubtedly, one of the urban characteris-
tics - due to morphological configuration of urban 
areas, density of traffic and stochastic variables 
(Eugenio, n.d.) - is the high number of accidents 
and is significantly higher than in other areas. 
Although, the aim of the current research is not 
determine the social and geographical reasons of 
this status quo, the traceability of those accidents 
is one of the issues bothering the author. As we 
can observe in the presented sequence of maps, 
the threat posed by traffic accidents is stable in 
time and location. Consequently, the application 
of the true traceability procedures would lead to 
its neutralization 
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Figure 11.1.3.b. Evolution of the traffic 
accidents by District (2012 - 2014)
Source: Author, 2016
Source of Data: www.madrid.es
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 Looking through the time sequence of the accidents, we can difference clear patterns, what 
will lead us into a stronger comprehend of the accidents’ dynamics and ultimately into the design the 
coercive methods to prevent them. It shall be highlighted that this analysis would be more complete 
if public institutions would provide data regarding location and typology of the accidents. In the 
Author’s opinion a detailed analysis of the time sequence combined with the day of the week, the 
number of accidents: per hour and per day and the hour of the day will allow to determine critical 
periods in which the probability of the accident is higher. The following diagram reflects those varia-
bles for 2015 in the municipality of Madrid. The conclusion is that drivers in Madrid shall preserve 
special precautions on Wednesday between 7 – 8 a.m. and on Fridays between 15 – 16 p. m.
 Despite the fact that within this diagram we inserted data regarding days and hours, what 
provides an overview of the accidents scenario, a portrait of accident factors could be more complete. 
In order to comprehend better the internal dynamics of the traffic accidents, we proceed with a more 
deep time sequence analysis. By adding the monthly configuration of accidents for 2015 we can 
observe on the sequence of the diagrams presented below that seasons change play an important role 
in the traffic accidents distribution. The Author considers that access to the raw data would allow to 
prepare policies to reduce significantly the number of accidents and in consequence the number of 
fatalities linked with this variable. 
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Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
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 The general overview of the security dynamics in the municipality of Madrid, with special 
interest in the Central District of Madrid, presents a space filled with vulnerabilities and risk - a scena-
rio in which threats constitute daily routine. Madrid is indeed a regular urban area with complex 
factors influencing on it - especially on the Central District. Consequently, the awareness of this 
status quo shall encourage to prepare pragmatic policies in order to be applied for the reduction of 
criminal conducts, acts of terrorism, common criminality or eventual common social and natural 
disasters. The diversity of all those potential risks and threats exceeds the nature and essence of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, within the following pages, we will discuss those that with certainty represent 
the main challenges for the security in urban areas. 
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Figure 11.1.3.d. Monthly resume of traffic accidents (2015)
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
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11.2. Security characterization of the Central District of Madrid: a prior analysis for 
safeness diligences
 It shall be highlighted that it remains complicated to reconfigure the tendencies integrated in 
a territory without a proper comprehension of the space itself, the social profiles and the historical 
interactions. The security, which is a coaxial variable in contrast of the previous ones, is based on the 
type and level of interaction of the above-mentioned variables. That security is reflecting one or other 
parameters: commonly transformed in perceptual sphere and identified by individuals as safe or 
unsafe areas. In those circumstances, urban areas are permuting constantly: from dusk till dawn, in 
every place. In particular, a single spot can have multiple security aspects depending on a day, week, 
month or year. Consequently, the observable and measurable security is – so far – neither flat nor 
uniform component. In those terms, the permanent interaction of all those variables defines and 
designs the configuration of the space, the manner in which it is used and by whom it is transformed. 
That polarization leads to creating of borders: invisible, but perceptive ones, where urban areas or 
public spaces are controlled by certain groups, frequently, with criminal intentions.  
 Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, divergences between the administrative division and 
the functional characterization of the space are revealed every day. Meanwhile, the administrative 
division is rather constant and fixed, the functional one is modified slightly within short periods of 
time and by various social profiles. This clash between administrative and functional approach leads 
to a securitization policy instead of preparation and introduction of a safe policy procedure. Although 
we are aware that the legal structure limits the functional competences of those in charge to monitor 
and inspect the conflict spaces, in our opinion the legal structure shall be used for the enhancement of 
the security instead of creating security fallacies. Within our fieldwork developed within the city of 
Madrid - with special attention to the Central District - we noticed an administrative approach 
towards threats rather than a pragmatic one. This approach is tantamount to deploy security forces 
within administrative areas instead of deploying them in functional or operative ones. Expressed in 
other words, this solution focused on the virtuosity of the political-administrative areas is creating an 
insecurity loop which can crack in terms of security and the social safeness.   
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 When we started to collect data within the Central District of Madrid we noticed that the 
security field is shared and governed by following groups: a) CNP; b) Guardia Civil; c) Military 
Force;  d) Municipal police; e) Agents of mobility; f) Private security; g) Organized crime security 
members; h) Violent urban tribes. The first three listed groups are governmental security forces. 
When it comes to the fourth group: the Municipal police, its functioning depends of the authorities of 
the city and is by definition related to the municipal administrative borders. The corpus defined as 
“Agents of mobility” is a peculiar unit that in appearance seems to be similar to police but in legal 
practice is not: this unit essentially deals with traffic and mobility issues inside of the municipal peri-
meter. At this point it shall be highlighted that there is constant conflict between all those organiza-
tions at the level of the institutional interest and clashes of power. A relatively new trend is the surpri-
singly increasing popularity of the private security services - imitating formula adopted in US: model 
of private contractors covering areas of critical security such as airports security control, under-
grounds, main stations, critical infrastructures, and other location with high profile in terms of securi-
ty interest - which meets with the government support and opens the door for a billionaire business. 
A fact perfectly highlighted in the paper presented by Bosch (et al., 2004) where is described the 
connections between the public and private security in Spain.
 The next listed operative “security” corpus are by definition illegal. Organized crime groups 
have no authority despite the pragmatic and realistic control of the area where they operate. Contrary 
to what we could expect, those territorial guards are operating in the Central District of Madrid. They 
task is to control their business: prostitution, drug dealing, weapon dealing, mendicity, et cetera.; and 
they do that by using violence and intimidation in order that the business will work how it should. The 
last “security” corpus is also an unofficial one. Nonetheless, violent urban tribes by using signs and 
marks are trying to establish and control a territory (Martín et al., 2009). Frequently, the violence is 
used to solve problems within those groups as a way to resolve clan clashes, rather  than to threaten 
to society.    
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 Summarizing our fieldwork, we discovered that there are at least eight “security” corpuses 
operating within the 5,23 hectares that the Central District of Madrid is composed of. All of them 
have the same aim: to control the territory under their sovereignty. It shall be highlighted that the 
governmental units have the state legitimacy - what is not equal to the social support - and organized 
crime and urban tribes groups are pursuing to neutralize them.
  
Despite that initially it could be hard to understand how there is room for criminal acts within the 
above-mentioned density of security forces operating in a reduced surface of the Central District of 
Madrid, within the following security analysis we will reveal the reasons and the factors of that 
process. Essentially, this configuration is an outcome of territorial functionalities and iconographies, 
where the space – in this case the Central District of Madrid – became the target and the icon of multi-
ple groups that established their ecosystem within administrative borders of this district, but their area 
of influence is not limited and extends to thousands of kilometers.  
 The above-mentioned demonstrates that the distribution of security system in Madrid failed: 
allowing to crack and be blocked into a unprecedented loop, where the ability to trace criminal 
actions is minimal. Due to the fact that most of threats shall be considered as permanent, the security 
policies shall be in accordance with the level of demand and typology of the insecurity issues – not 
limited to administrative borders. With the latter statement we would like to highlight the potential 
path for improvement not to point those who are guilty of status quo. 
 Once the general security characterization of the Central District was covered, we can 
proceed with the diagnostics of the area. In order to achieve a general and, simultaneously, detailed 
overview of the security driving forces in the area of the case study, we divided in multiple sections 
of assets the entire picture. We will start from: a) the commercial security; then we will proceed with: 
b) the video-surveillance analysis and its derivates; c) the hidden routes and; d) Artificial Neuronal 
Spatial Networks. Furthermore, the diagnostics path will be paved with: e) the psycho-spatial conduct 
and;  f) an analysis of the potential targets of the terrorism.  
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11.3. Commercial security in the Central District of Madrid
 From a geographical perspective, the commercial activity was and is one of the most singular 
driving forces for local and regional economies. In consequence, its analysis and diagnosis could 
reveal the state of work, not only from the economical point of view, but also for the social profiling 
and counter-criminal activities. By identifying commercial activities, we have not been only focused 
on acquiring the knowledge regarding locations of stores with higher profitability, which are 
frequently easy targets for criminals, but we have been concentrated on a bigger picture. In the upper 
lines of this thesis we diagnosed that one of the new security trends is to deploy operating forces 
provided by the private sector: companies are offering services to secure the transport of goods, the 
custody of information or infrastructures or simply the protection by alarm setting of the commercial 
spaces at the street level.
  It is not surprising due to the fact that commercial activity is a source of supply in easy and 
quick goods or benefits for organized crime groups and common criminals. The heterogeneity of 
existing goods is allowing for the uncomplicated and relatively safe ‘reselling’ of them: within our 
borders as well as beyond them. According with that, it might be expected the adoption of a general 
policy of proper security measures in order to protect commercial locals and avoid criminals or orga-
nized groups attacks on them. Taking into account the above-mentioned, we could imagine that 
within this area it would be noticeable significant number of private contractors working for the 
private commercials or at least - the presence of physical security measures. 
 The diagnose obtained from our fieldwork, in which we classified each and every commer-
cial activity located at the street level in all the publicly accessible streets within the Central District 
of Madrid, confirmed that those expectations and predictions are falling. We segregated the collected 
information regarding the commercial locals into three levels, showing: a) census tracks; b) square; 
c) street. Hence, by dividing the information into three levels, we protect the integrity of commercial 
locals, providing a general overview with details, what would not jeopardize any private interest. 
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 Continuing with commercial security, we focus on the census track of commercial locals 
with private security. The map presented below emphasizes the existence of three main domains of 
those locals. The first one is defined on the map with green color, which identifies those areas with a 
percentage between 75 and 100 of commercial locals. The second domain is defined on the map with 
a variation of colors: from yellow through orange to red, which covers the percentage of commercial 
locals from 75 to 0. The third domain - represented on the map with blue color - sets areas, where 
commercial activities are not present. 
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Extremly low (0-25) Low (26 - 50) Medium (51 - 75) Acceptable (76 - 100) No  commercials
Figure 11.3.a. Percentage of commercials with private security by census tracks
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
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 Immediately after observing the spatial divergence shown of the map above, we questioned 
ourselves what are the grounds of lack of the implementation of any kind of measures that will 
guarantee the stability and safeness of the investment within the specific areas of the Central District. 
We found there are three following main answers the above question, explaining the current situation: 
a) social surveillance; b) social profiles; c) crime profitability. Already a security approach presented 
by the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (hereinafter referred to as: “CPTED”) 
highlighted that the existence of a passive social surveillance might be even more efficient that the 
presence of coercive counter criminal measures. 
 The internal urban dynamics of those areas present quasi permanent activities at the street 
level. In addition, the level of social surveillance observed during the fieldwork inside of those areas 
is significantly higher than the presence of security forces. The permanent presence of potential 
witnesses is a factor deterring criminal actions. 
 The second factor, observed during our fieldwork, is corresponding with the social profile of 
the inhabitants. In those terms we might highlight that the social ideology of the residences of the 
discussed area presents clear preference towards conventional security measures. Their social ideolo-
gy, what is supporting the above-mentioned argument, leads to spend their time and resources within 
the immediate area of residence. This fact is reinforcing the social surveillance within this district. 
The third issue - not less important - standing behind lack of application of specific security measures 
in the discussed area is the criminal profitability in the North and South perimeter of the district. 
 We understand that profitability as the result of the equation composed of the following 
variables: c.1) risk; c.2) gross benefit; c.3) nett benefit; c.4) hidden market trade level; c.5) goods 
traceability; c.6) level of skills and logistic required. All those six component determine -in our judg-
ment - the interest in committing - or not - a criminal activity. After a brief evaluation of the profitabi-
lity of the commerce existing within the areas defined on the map as possessing low level of private 
security, we discovered that it is matching to extreme low level of criminal profitability.   
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 Applying the same procedure for the areas covered on the map with green color we discove-
red that: in those areas there is not a social surveillance, in contrast, the space users rotate with high 
frequency without further interaction with the space than just causal access to facilities or within esta-
blished spatial patterns. Moreover, in those areas the social profiles are becoming more varied and 
heterogeneous and that does not allow to clearly distinguish urban tribes and social typologies. 
Furthermore, in those areas the spatial criminal profitability is increasing significantly - commercial 
profile is higher, hence, criminals are attracted by those areas and commercial locals present there are 
being the object of desire for criminals - in comparison with the previously commented areas. 
 It shall be highlighted that from the census track of security analysis of commercial locals 
performed hitherto, we extracted substantial information, easy to be transformed into applicable inte-
lligence and useful to decrease the number of crime activities and perpetrators. Notwithstanding that 
fact, we decided to proceed with security analysis of commercial locals and delve into it by preparing 
further level of analysis: presenting percentage of commercial locals with private security by squares, 
which is shown on the map below. By examining data in this scale we can identify with high level of 
precision those areas that present higher risk and those where the risk is lower. 
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 It shall be highlighted that from the census track of security analysis of commercial locals 
performed hitherto, we extracted substantial information, easy to be transformed into applicable inte-
lligence and useful to decrease the number of crime activities and perpetrators. Notwithstanding that 
fact, we decided to proceed with security analysis of commercial locals and delve into it by preparing 
further level of analysis: presenting percentage of commercial locals with private security by squares, 
which is shown on the map below. By examining data in this scale we can identify with high level of 
precision those areas that present higher risk and those where the risk is lower. (defined on the map 
with green color).
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Extremly low (0-25) Low (26 - 50) Medium (51 - 75) Acceptable (76 - 100) No  commercials
Figure 11.3.b. Percentage of commercials with private security by squares
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
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Extremly low (0-25) Low (26 - 50) Medium (51 - 75) Acceptable (76 - 100) No  commercials
Figure 11.3.c. Percentage of commercials with private security by streets facade
Source: author, 2016; Source of data: www.madrid.es
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 At this point it is required to point out an interesting spatial feature with  common patterns 
in the North and South part of the district: a degradation of the level of private security is observable, 
is changing from green (acceptable) to red (extremely low) level. That suggests that the commercial 
securitization process is not an exclusive issue of the commercials’ owner, but is affected by the envi-
ronment. Turning back into the social profiles, we might highlight that despite the conduct patterns 
are the same, the difference is noticeable in the social essence. We remark this aspect in order to inclu-
de it in the security scenario: a variable that is differentiating social profiles with equal spatial patterns 
and conducts and could lead into the same pre-set of transversal variables and consequently, into a 
similar spatial governance.  
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 In order to continue with the analysis of the private security in commerce and its significance 
for the territory we move into the next level of detail: street level, focusing on street facades. This 
level of analysis allows to determine with precision areas presenting high level of vulnerability, what 
equals to higher probability of being a potential target of criminal action. By comparing the three 
dimensions of analysis: census tracks, squares and street facade level, it is observable how the statis-
tics and geomatics increase brightness where there are shadows and vice-versa. This ultimate level, 
presenting an outstanding accuracy - until this moment  unattainable and unachievable - is an exclusi-
ve result of the Author’s fieldwork and hand mapping design. By adopting this perspective and focu-
sing on the street facade analysis we can observe that within the same street the security configuration 
of the same facade is changing. Despite that is not perceptible on the above presented map, the faca-
des by themselves are frequently characterized by an evolution of security level, which is increasing 
in the corners and decreasing in the middle. Moreover, we identified multiple squares presenting mul-
tiple spatial configurations depending on the street that the facade is facing. 
 Once we have defined those areas with the significantly higher exposure to criminal activi-
ties as well as areas, which are better prepared to counter illegal acts, we would to encourage govern-
mental security forces to delve into the profitability of potential crimes within spatial analysis in order 
to prevent criminal conducts. That could be done by adding at least one variable to the previously 
presented equation: the ratio between the existing security - physical or cybernetic - and the potential 
value of stolen goods.
 We decided that in order to proceed with our analysis the best option is to continue with 
specially designed a micro case study. For that purpose we have chosen the Universidad subdistrict in 
which we blended the commercial security analysis, the presence of CCTV at the time of performing 
the commercial analysis (2014), the hidden routes left out of the CCTV configuration reach and the 
buffer areas (5; 25 and 50 meters) of those CCTV as a potential measure to determine which of those 
surveillance tools could be operated by biometric technologies under traceability procedures.  The 
results of this design are visible on the map presented below.     
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
229
  
  
 
    
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
Commercials: Level of security
(expressed in percentage) by facade
Source of data: author field work, 2014
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11.4. Videosurveillance: a smart tool for security purposes
 The CCTV systems, which we already reviewed in the third section of this thesis,  represent 
a contemporary tool for controlling the space. Those systems, which are worldwide installed, cover 
multiple issues and targets. It shall be highlighted that is their global architecture what makes them to 
be useless or useful. Within this research project we covered all the existing CCTV systems located 
in public spaces in the selected area, with no distinction to the nature of their property - private or 
public -, their use, their quality and other variables. All systems were detected, collected and entered 
into a specially designed geodatabase. The control of the space, in the case of Madrid, and being most 
specific: in the Central District, judging on the basis of functional aspects of those systems, presents 
a design where the aim is not to provide the global picture, but to protect imminent perimeters. This 
space architecture design, in this case, is not based on the range of coverage of projection, neither on 
external conditions, is rather based on social and ideological motto that has direct consequences on 
the manner in which there are used  those tools.  
 It shall be highlighted that a singular CCTV can project a single view - the complexity of the 
view concept might be considered as a relatively conventional projection, however, modern survei-
llance tools are able to capture and display 360 degrees view in multispectral channels. Consequently, 
those systems, being focused on imminent perimeters, they are no having the broader view - there is 
no information what is happening outside of the image presenting the imminent perimeter.  Hence, 
this modus operandi applied with CCTV systems are not providing any evidence, nor any preventive 
protocols nor traceability. We can notice that within footages extracted from CCTV systems frequent-
ly revealed by mass media showing the crime action. Nonetheless, those footages are not able to 
provide visual tractability of the same action - just part of action is shown. The reason of this status 
quo is lack of visual and cartographic interconnectivity between CCTV systems. Moreover, we have 
the doubt that forensic groups or any security forces have the ability to extract a visual trace of a 
suspect, subject or object of the crime within a minimal period of time. 
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 Continuing with the traceability, the time has come to review recent terrorist attacks from the 
traceability perspective. In order to pursue with the above-mentioned aim we have chosen the 
following article of Kelly Heather (2013), under the title of: “After Boston: the pros and cons of 
surveillance cameras” as a useful starting point. The author said:
 The above presented words are confirming what we have identified within the fieldwork: the 
importance of the ability of the extracting an image from CCTV. Furthermore, our fieldwork confir-
med that in the Central District of Madrid there is  lack of spatial and visual hyper-network of CCTV 
systems. We cannot accepted that after a criminal action, when the perpetrator is getting away to a 
third country - as we observed in the terrorist attack that took place in Berlin on 24 December, 2016 
(Valero, 2016) - the capability to trace and determine the location of the perpetrator does not exist. 
Consequently, we shall pose the question what is the functionality of the current surveillance systems, 
if when it is required its blind for our needs and cannot provide critical information which is needed? 
 By changing point of view we are dedicating our attention to the article written by Heather 
(2013), who is mentioning the “Ring of Steel” - defined by the author as the complex CCTV system 
in the city of London: nearly half million of cameras covering the heart of the city. In this case we can 
notice lack of the balance between the number of cameras and their effectiveness, as the author poin-
ted “many residents question the effectiveness of London’s system…In 2008, only one crime was 
solved for every 1000 cameras”. The number of 1000 cameras used only for the solution of one crime 
provides the rate of irrelevant effectiveness from our analytical perspective, in particular by compa-
ring the cost of the project and the results obtained. 
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 “After last week’s bombings at Boston Marathon…It took the 
FBI only three days to release blurry shots of the two suspects…Compa-
re their quick turnaround with the 2005 London bombing, when it took 
thousands of investigators weeks to parse the city’s CCTV…footage 
after the attacks” (Ibid).
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 The above-mentioned ineffective reality is revealing that the number, density, or technical 
features of the CCTV’s installed are becoming useless if there is lack of a strategic thinking behind 
the CCTV implementation, in particular: lack of support and spatial network of the system. The 
modern biometric technology is becoming pragmatically blind where there is lack of full understan-
ding of the territory and the areas that are covered. 
 Having in mind the above-mentioned, we were observing the CCTV surveillance system in 
Madrid during the last three years (i.e.: 2013-2016). Within this time we were noticing the evolution 
of the systems and the manner in which is “adapting” to the territory: we discovered, catalogued and 
evaluated each and every CCTV system. In addition, within the same period of time we have visited 
and observed other EU and non-EU cities. It is true that we did not made a full review of their status 
and consequently their detailed analysis cannot be presented, however, the examination and revision 
of the main local guidelines of CCTV systems in other cities was deep enough to create a contrastable 
perception of the CCTV status.
 By comparing the Madrid’s CCTV systems with the systems of the most of the western EU 
members, we came to the conclusion that the Central District of Madrid presents the lowest CCTV 
spatial profitability. Meanwhile the CCTV surveillance in absolute terms - i.e.: public and private - 
shows an average density of circa 1000 CCTV camera per 5 hectares, the system in its entirety fails - 
not because of lack of installed surveillance tools. The failure is caused by: a) the improper spatial and 
organizational distribution; b) the hierarchical division of space; c) the implementation based on 
perceptual archetypes not on true security needs; d) the low quality of the CCTV and its maintenance; 
e) the low or inexistent counter-sabotage measures. 
 However that, there are still noticeable significant divergences between EU members. 
Within the period of analysis, we have observe how the treatment of the public and private space 
change drastically, a matter that was clearly highlighted by Cook (2011) towards the visibility and 
policing of public space. 
  
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
234
  
 In order to continue with the CCTV surveillance analysis we prepared another map. The 
above-presented map shows the number of CCTV cameras per census track (2016), providing a 
global distribution perspective of the CCTV systems. At first glance is differentiable on this map the 
existence of a central corridor, where the number of CCTVs per census track is bigger than 40, in 
contrast with the census of contiguous areas, where the number of cameras is smaller than 9. Those 
divergences between the North and the South are connected with two points located at the western 
side of the subdistrict of Universidad and the eastern side of the subdistrict of Justicia - in both those 
points the presence of cameras is clearly higher  in comparison with their surroundings.
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Map 11.4.1. Number of CCTV 
systems by census tracks (2016)
Source: author fieldwork, 2016
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 This spatial configuration results from the projected building scale as well as its importance 
- in a bigger dimension is commonly observed in the CCTV systems installed in Spain. The census 
track located in the central corridor of the map covers the national and municipal governmental buil-
dings as well as buildings of other institutions. In those terms, those critical areas and infrastructures 
are extensively covered by surveillance cameras. Consequently, we shall consider that the level of 
traceability and of surveillance in the immediate area to those buildings or public spaces, which are 
representing - by its function or iconography - a critical element for the national or citizen security is 
high and is well designed. Nevertheless, once we go out of the immediate perimeter of those institu-
tions or buildings, the threat is out of sight - and by asking where is the traceability out of the above 
mentioned areas, the answer is simple: stuck in the dark.
 The social spatial conduct analyzed in the Section III of this thesis revealed the manner in 
which the subjects are adopting paths of transit and access according with their intentions and perso-
nality. In essence, the forecasting and prevention of an emergency situation begins outside of the criti-
cal zone. The lack of monitoring skills in the proximity to the critical buildings and institutions repre-
sents a serious security failure. Another serious failure is lack of proper design of the system. The aim 
of the above-mentioned statements - is not to encourage to uncontrolled and ‘wild’ and widespread 
installation of CCTV cameras, rather - is to appeal for a better design of the systems, with special 
emphasis on the localization of the cameras, in order to increase the area of coverage, the traceability 
skills and more important, the ability to prevent or neutralize threats before they will take place. The 
previous map is based on the statistic analysis obtained from the fieldwork performed for the purpo-
ses of this thesis. The last update of data was made on June, 2016 and the obtained data shows a 
globally positive picture of the surveillance in the Central District: the presence of CCTV systems is 
generally noticeable within the district. On the contrary, this perception changes for worse when - 
instead of focusing on the census track of cameras - we focus on the presence of CCTV cameras on 
parcels. This change of perspective demonstrate a dramatic picture of the surveillance’s coverage. 
Meanwhile, the map showing the census track of cameras represents a fluid CCTV coverage of the 
territory, the following map focused on the presence of cameras on parcels reveals that there are many 
parcels without any surveillances tools.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
236
0 250 m
Map 11.4.2. Presence of CCTV 
systems by parcel (2016)
Source: author fieldwork, 2016
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 Despite the fact that on the above-mentioned map we cannot distinguish a homogeneous 
typology nor surface of parcel - features that are influencing directly on the perception of the visual 
space coverage, we can differentiate the three following spatial patterns: a) supporting the visual 
perception of the census track map: a central corridor that covers institutional and governmental buil-
dings is present on this map as well - we can see a visual line dividing the Central District on the 
North and the South; b) the existence of surveillance’s black holes - visible in the North and in the 
South - being the one located in the area with the lowest percentage of private security on the street
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with commercial locals; c) is connected with strategic spatial configuration and can be observed in 
the areas of the subdistrict of Lavapies. Starting from the first pattern, we can observe that parcels 
with surveillance tools are mostly located in an imaginary section, which - has size equivalent to the 
surface of the Royal Palace and - creating a corridor goes from the West to the East without spatial 
interruptions. The reasons of the existence of this corridor are following:  (i) the presence of critical 
political and national buildings; (ii) the presence of social iconic areas; (iii) location of main touristic 
zones. This corridor might be considered - in terms of operational security - as the critical and the zero 
zone, where any potential terrorist attack will have emotional and functional impact.
 The second pattern reflects what was previously discussed in the chapter dedicated to the 
commercial security. The northern black hole - in terms of surveillance - is directly connected with 
the square of the 2nd of May, which constitutes an icon of the Spanish history. In this area is present 
strong movement and social protest against any type of digital surveillance - with special emphasis 
on the opposition to the installation of CCTV systems. The second black whole is located in the South 
of the district - in particular in its West side. The lack of surveillance tools is explained by the presen-
ce of a social control. Although this method might decrease the number of committed crimes, it does 
not provide any solution in case of committing a crime: it leaves the society without evidences. In 
particular, when it is needed to review events or specific areas, social control does not provide footage 
which can be view and from which the image of perpetrator can be extracted. Unfortunately, the 
application of social control equals to the blindness of security forces in terms of extracting visual 
evidences from the area for judicial purposes. In addition, the lack of permanent visual surveillance 
systems makes from the area a perfect spot for crimes operations and for hosting subjects of national 
relevance. The third pattern is connected with the stigmatized area of the Central District. The most 
meaningful area in the above-mentioned terms is the subdistrict of Lavapies. The presence of 
migrants and ongoing organized crime operations led to the installation of CCTV systems. We 
evaluated those systems, focusing on the examination of the area of coverage and diagnose their func-
tionality for crime prevention and national security purposes. The result of this evaluation was the 
classification of those systems on the medium level - with increasing tendency to provide low effecti-
veness. The reasons of the above-mentioned classification are following: (i) the inadequate spatial
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distribution of systems; (ii) the high number of hidden routes, left outside of the coverage of the 
cameras; (iii) the possibility of potential sabotage of systems; and (iv) lack of proper maintenance - 
with special emphasis on dust presence on the external layers of cameras. Consequently, the effecti-
veness of those systems is based on the psychological specter, rather than on the functional one. There 
is no hope for our security, if the city security strategy exclusively depends on perceptual archetypes.
 In order to understand even better the security situation in the district, we prepared a map 
presenting a number of cameras per parcel. The above-presented map is showing the same spatial 
configuration as the previous map, but is changing the gravity point: from the general presenc of
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cameras on parcels is highlighting the information regarding the number of CCTVs systems by 
parcel. This new feature increases the knowledge about the level of surveillance in the Central 
District by rating the importance of each parcel for surveillance and monitoring purposes. In conse-
quence of performing a simple fieldwork, such as the one developed within this thesis, we are able to 
observe which areas are demanding more protection, and in which areas surveillance systems consti-
tute an intimidating tool. Simultaneously, the presented map is showing a global vision of the hot 
spots concerning the presence and density of CCTV.  Those hot spots have the aim to cover the securi-
ty needs of the buildings and institutions within their location. This narrow approach is highlighting 
even more that the surveillance system installed in the Central District of Madrid is generally 
dysfunctional. 
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 This aspect, without any doubt, defines the most critical criteria for traceability purposes due 
to the fact that proper security system does not leave any blind spots. It shall be underlined that in 
order to create a truly pragmatic neuronal network able to trace and provide juridical evidences is 
required that the CCTV embraces public spaces. In strategic locations, the best case scenario is achie-
ved when the surveillance tools are not focused exclusively on the strict defense of the immediate 
perimeter, but also on the surroundings of this perimeter. That mixed configuration will close the 
hidden routes and set the chance to trace back and resolve crimes which in other manner will be unre-
solved.
 Another point in our analysis is focused on the property status of the CCTV systems in the 
district. The map presented above this lines represents the property of the CCTV systems per parcel. 
Within this map we established the following three categories: a) public property; b) private property; 
c) mixed property. Undoubtedly, in many cases it is a hard task to determine the property status of a 
single camera. Nevertheless, we constructed the set of evidence that allows to minimize the uncer-
tainty and which - unfortunately - cannot be disclosed due to the security vulnerability of this infor-
mation. Moreover that information shall be considered as irrelevant for the main goal of this thesis.
 Focusing on the map we can clearly state that a private ownership constitutes the majority of 
the systems in the district and shows higher number of cameras than the number incorporated within 
public property. Nonetheless, as we stressed before, the security is not about the number of cameras, 
but about the spatial and technical features as well as distribution of each camera. In consequence, we 
discovered that despite the lower number, the public cameras demonstrate a better global distribution 
of the cameras than the one provided by private cameras. We shall emphasize that private cameras 
presents the tendency to be grouped into limited surfaces - this aspect is increasing the coverage of 
the camera in the area, but is decreasing the global traceability. This spatial conduct reflects a sociolo-
gical tendency of individualism, where the individuals have more importance than the collective. 
Hence, the characteristic of the systems created with this tendency is that a single camera is more 
important than the whole collective of cameras. 
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 This ideological approach is tricky and is objectively more insecure, leaving more areas 
unprotected, than if there would be a properly collective CCTV network adopted by private owners 
of the system. Nonetheless, the issue relevant for the security is not the supremacy of the effective-
ness of the systems provided by private owners over systems provided by public authorities and 
vice-versa.
 The step forward towards real security of CCTV systems begins with the dual integration of 
the installed systems in order to grant a widespread global security, which first and main effect might 
be a true safety. This result could be achieved by two paths: a) prevention; b) judicial evidence access. 
Meanwhile the prevention is a transversal asset of the society, involving hard and soft powers, the 
procurement of the judicial evidence is in essence an exclusive responsibility of the governmental 
security forces and policy makers. In other words, to provide tools to collect judicial evidence is a 
decision to trace and identify perpetrators of criminals actions - or not. Within this thesis, and with 
special emphasis on both study cases of Central District of Madrid and Warsaw, lack of tools to gain 
judicial evidences can be only explained with the lack of willing to fight crime and political connivan-
ce towards it. Following with the architectonic structure for a pragmatic traceability, we consider that 
neither the number nor the density of surveillance tools does not represent any knick point for the 
development of the CCTV system. Conversely, is the number and typology of interconnections of the 
systems what provides the ability to trace. The presence of thousands of CCTV - as we observed in 
case of cameras in London - was useless when an urgent demand of finding a trace was needed. In 
consequence, we analyzed and diagnosed the interconnectivity of the CCTV installed in the Central 
District. We defined this connectivity system under the name of Artificial Neuronal Network Visibili-
ty (hereinafter referred to as: “ANNV”). The ANNV concept was designed exclusively for this 
research and is determined as the hyper-spatial visual cross of axes covering at last 3 from 4 dimen-
sions - the three axes are spatial and the forth axis is the time - which resulted from the virtual projec-
tion of the scoping lines between two or more image recording devices. We constructed this concept 
because we hereby consider it is the key point that will allow to track in time and record any kind of 
criminal conduct. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
242
 This working procedure can fix the time and space of a visual continuum, taking into account 
that actions are not taking place in isolated scenes, but in concatenated lines of sequences. This conti-
nuum enhances the probability to find the person responsible for criminal actions or unapproved 
social conducts by providing the ability to search for the results in a hyper-spatial time product. In 
other words, we can move back in time and space – in order to extract judicial evidences - seeking for 
the subjects’ interaction with the territory. What is extremely important, the ANNV opens the door to 
a permanent panopticon, but to a trustable trace tool - able to extract social and group intelligence in 
real time.
 What shall be highlighted that the eventual search of potential subjects seems to be currently 
based on the use of profiling levels in order to distinguish who can represent a threat a who does not. 
It means that those subjects who play the role of a high-end profile - and by so can be externally 
perceived - might be considered as a  potential threat. In contrast, those groups which dynamics do 
not engage high profiles but operates silently and secretly on the outskirts of our attention, remain  
irrelevant for the system – those groups can carry out their attacks undetected. 
 The perfect example of that trick in role profiling might be found in the terrorist attacks that 
took place in Nice (2016) and Berlin (2016), both undertaken in the same modus operandi, but carried 
out from roles profiled as irrelevant - both subjects remained undetected till the moment of executing 
the attack.
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 The above-presented map is demonstrating the number of ANNV connections by parcel 
extracted from the number of CCTV and its spatial configuration. The first visual conclusion that we 
can draw from the map is that the main corridor finally appears much less protected in comparison 
with the level presented on the previous maps. Although the parcels with the highest number of 
connectivity are located mostly within this area, the main spatial structure is full of gaps and weak 
points. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
0 250 m
Map 11.4.1. Number of CCTV 
systems by census tracks (2016)
Source: author fieldwork, 2016
1 2 - 4 5 - 8 9 - 12 More than 120
244
0 250 m
Map 11.4.6. ANNV connections (2016)
Source: author fieldwork, 2016
 The ANNV analysis is taking into account the current spatial location and orientation of the 
surveillance tools. Due to that, any modification of those parameters could increase or decrease the 
level of ANNV. Moreover, this feature is allowing to extract aspect with negative resonance: the 
hidden routes from the CCTV coverage. By identifying those routes and creating from them a closed 
visual area, it is possible to determine which areas constitute perfect ground for crime actions and the 
level of their profitability; as well as in which areas would be possible a better evidence extraction.
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 Continuing with the features of the ANNV, we prepared the map demonstrating the ANNV 
connections in order to focus on the time scale. The ANNV system requires a perfect synchronization 
of both: speed and AI of social groups and subjects. A deeper review of the time scale can be found 
in the previously mentioned paper (Bailon, 2015), published by the IEEE. In order to have better 
understanding of the importance of the time scale for the security analysis, we prepared another map 
demonstrating the motion of subject and visual closed areas.
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 By introducing one of the many potential cases, we present under this lines one of the layer 
attributed to the time scale for a subject that moves by walk speed standard (4 km/h). In addition we 
preselect five different locations. The result is below this lines. 
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 Taking into account the steps taken in order to achieve this point of the thesis were focused 
on the analysis of the space and on the manner in which the territory is affecting the security, the time 
has come to remark that most of the urban threats is emerging from the human component. This 
observation led us to include the human factor in the traceability process. This inclusion was made by 
the application of the knowledge extracted from the suicide attacks in Bagdad (Iraq). By observing 
suiciders, their conduct and rituals, we were able to extract spatial conduct patterns proceeding and 
following the explosion. From all the visual content we prepared guidelines regarding the movement 
of a potential bomb suiciders in urban areas and their interaction with the territory. In order to increase 
the level of safety and to strengthen the preventive side of this thesis we analyzed the emotional mag-
nificence of the Central District of Madrid from the perspective of a bomb suiciders. 
 The emotional magnificence linked with a terrorist act might be understood as the variations 
of pseudo-emotional status of the perpetrator from the moment of leaving  the safe location to the 
moment of immolation. Within that period of time and space the behavior of the subject is subjected 
to multiple changes of level of emotional stimulation. In accordance with that, it was noticeable that 
the way of moving through the territory is changing stronger when the perpetrator is approaching 
closer to the target location. Despite the fact that we cannot present an exhaustive curve of conduct of 
such perpetrator - due to the complexity of the factor involved, in particular due to the endless list of 
possible modus operandi: attack performed by pedestrian versus vehicle; attack performed in contro-
lled area versus random location; self-activate explosion versus remote activation and long et cetera 
- we acquired the knowledge regarding the way in which a perpetrator: pedestrian armed with a bomb 
jacket presents external signals of emotions while approaching to the target.
 We frequently observed that the target was located in a public space - just to name few of 
them: market, square, mosque. In consequence, apparently the subject is self-immolating within the 
area predefined by him/her. This observation guided us to understand the way in which urban confi-
guration can affect on the extension or sedation of the immolation process. This factor creates a corre-
lation between the aim of the attack, the morphology of the place, the terrorist performing the attack 
and the typology of the attack.
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 Although we cannot forget that the spatial iconography is still playing the main role in the 
target selection process, the path to it is paved by emotional force presented by a direct influence of 
moments preceding the attack. The importance of this issue relays on the fact that in the eyes of an 
expert observer it would be possible to identify who is attempting to commit a suicide attack, what 
opens the door to neutralize the threat before it happens.
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 In order to realize what we were discussing in the above-mentioned lines, we prepared 
another map - focusing on the spatial analysis of the emotional magnificence. The above-presented 
map reflects the previously commented interactions between the perpetrator and the territory. In case 
of Madrid, the spatial configuration, the typology of buildings and the topography are important 
factors in the analysis of the emotional magnificence. Despite that, the locations indicated on the map 
with the most intense purple color are demonstrating  where the perpetrator could be trigger out to 
commit the action – defining the most vulnerable for such attack areas and by so providing the tool 
to neutralize the threat. 
 This achievement was possible due to the deeply and comprehensive understanding of the 
manner in which the territory – especially urban morphology – is influencing the spatial conduct of 
potential perpetrators. The basis of this acknowledgement relays on the video footages, on which we 
can visualize the above mentioned regularity within the research period. All of them are linked with 
criminal actions – mostly connected with suicide’s terrorist. From all those videos we extracted 
spatial conduct patterns that afterwards were applied to the Central District of Madrid. In other words, 
we proposed on our own to understand the way in which a suicide terrorist visualises the territory 
meanwhile is approaching to the selected  target. Consequently, we acquired the skill consisting of 
modeling  and simulating the manner in which third scenarios will influence on potential new suicide 
scenario. We are conscious of the subjective approach contained in the above-mentioned manner, 
taking into consideration all the potential criticism directed against the used method. However, we 
truly believe that the use of a methodology that could better fix the standards of what contemporarily 
is considered as a “science” work would not reveal better results. Notwithstanding the previously 
mentioned, we have just opened the field, discovering that the amount and complexity of the informa-
tion oversees the size and nature of this research project. Despite that, we are satisfied with the results 
which we are able to present herein - due to the fact that they constitute a clear indicator of the prolific 
and immersive dimension of the traceability of the spatial conduct behaviour. 
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11.6. Potential terrorist targets
 
 
 Following with the preventive security phase of this case study, we discovered potential 
locations within the Central District that might be considered by terrorist groups as targets of their 
actions. In addition, we classified them using the typology of target. The extracted potential typology 
of targets are following: a) national security; b) social impact; c) religious motivation; d) international 
impact; e) functional impact; and f) mixed. The results are visible on the map below. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the European contemporary terrorism provided the clue to link typologies of targets with 
type of terrorism. 
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Map 11.7. Potential terrorist actors by targets
 This aspect led us to connect the type of threat with the location of the target. We adopted the 
following  group typologies: a) Islamist; b) left wing / anarchist; c) right wing; d) international insur-
gency; and e) mixed. The results of the above-mentioned are demonstrated on the map below: illus-
trating potential terrorist group actors by target.
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11.8. Conclusion: Traceability in the Central District of Madrid
 Within the previous pages of the thesis we revised the main security driving forces that are 
influencing on the Spanish security: from a global to a local scale, with special emphasis on the secu-
rity of inhabitants of the city of Madrid. The methodological structure revealed multiple spatial incon-
sistencies, some of them being results of stochastic variables, others - of lack of strategic and dedicate 
willing. Regardless of the causes of those inconsistencies, the examined territory presents critical 
security failures. Most of those failures are linked with not properly applied procedures and protocols. 
Although immediate consequences of those failures can seem to be invisible, are suffered by the 
society. It will be needed long term exposure to analyze the effects if we expect to perceive conse-
quences visually. Within the period of the analysis performed for this thesis, we observed some of 
those inconsistencies: their formation, evolution and manifestation on the public streets.
 It shall be remarked that despite the above-mentioned, other typologies of security failures 
linked with protocol, procedures and methodologies can have devastating impact on our societies. 
The terrifying history of terrorism and organized crime constitute clear evidence for that. Being cons-
cious of the importance of the topic, we tried to establish contact with several official representatives 
responsible for security having two goal in mind: a) firstly, to inform about this thesis and to transfer 
the acquired knowledge; b) secondly, to set a path for collaboration. The unpleasant truth is that their 
answers - taking into account that most of them did not even reply to our mail - were denying any 
willing of collaboration from their side.
 In consequence, we developed our research without any collaboration nor institutional 
support and the emerged conclusions  forced us - as individuals and society - to question whether this 
type of security is what we need and desire. Meanwhile the perceptual machinery of current system 
works permanently, we diagnosed fatal security failures from the pragmatic perspective. After 
analyzing variables presented in the case study of Madrid, we have serious doubts about the current 
capability of the responsible institutions to create a trustable traceability of any subject or object 
within the Central District of Madrid. 
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 Meanwhile the installation of the surveillance systems is a random parameters, the spatial 
distribution and rate of efficiency is setting an unprecedented level of chaos and disorder. This diag-
nosis clearly shows a room for improvement: taking into account that the real essence of security is 
not the number of the camera’s installed neither the number of officers on the streets. The real security 
is all about a proper and intelligence management of the resources for an ultimate control of the terri-
tory. This simple fact seems to be far from the current policies.
 From our perspective, the enhance of safety starts at the entry level from a formative process, 
during which officers could acquired the proper knowledge and later be able to distinguish 
psycho-spatial patterns and body expression to prevent criminal actions. The next step in the forma-
tion process shall constitute the analysis and implementation of a visual coverage of the existing 
CCTV, what requires the knowledge of system mapping in order to determine which areas are - and 
which are not - by cameras. If the results of this analysis reveals a not sufficient surface, which is 
covered by cameras, the next step shall be a reconfiguration of the visual fields of existing CCTV 
system - and if that would not be sufficient the ultimate action should be the implementation of the 
new CCTV. Despite the fact that after our research we cannot confirm the perceptual impact of the 
theory of decreasing criminal action, we can ensure that if the surveillance tools would be set properly 
in order to provide evidence of criminal actions that took place, most of the criminal cases would be 
resolved. 
 In conclusion, the Central District of Madrid - evaluating under the prism of the presented 
results herein - is below the traceability skills that the city might have in order to provide safe and 
secure urban area if the CCTV system would be properly designed and managed. Taking into account 
the growing wave of terrorism and the size of organized crime, the time has come that the society and 
politicians will understand that the security is not exclusively a perception issue. The security defini-
tely requires actions that will provide judicial evidences and social benefits.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
269
270
 
 
  
 
    
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
Figure 11.8. Flow in Madrid at Montera street.
Source: author fieldwork , 2017
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12.1. Defining the area of study: The Central of Warsaw
 Moving from Madrid more than 2000 kilometers to the North-East direction, there is located 
our next case study: the capital city of Warsaw (in Polish: miasto stołeczne Warszawa) and, adminis-
tratively, the capital of Poland. This case study was created as a point of reference in order to evaluate 
another space and compare the results of analysis within those two places and, in consequence, 
evaluate the chances of applying the trustable traceability procedures in other environment - characte-
rized by significant cultural and sociological divergences. 
 The urban dynamics of Warsaw, presents noticeable differences in comparison with the 
dynamic of South-West side of Europe where is located Madrid. With the northern locations are 
attached weather and geographical divergences that are driving the cultural and social costumes. In 
Warsaw we have noticed a social adaptation to a diverse seasonal rhythm. Meanwhile the city rhythm 
of Madrid does not required due to the minimal influence by change of seasons. The above-mentio-
ned factors, which could be classified as irrelevant from the geomatics point of view, are earning a 
vital significance in our thesis. Within the following pages of the thesis, we will examine the role that 
local factors play in the security driving forces.  
 Starting from a short comparison between both areas, the municipality of Warsaw is compo-
sed of 18 districts, three less than are in Madrid. Warsaw belongs to Masovian Voivodeship (Warsaw 
is one of 42 counties within this voivodeship). Despite the numerical differences it shall be highligh-
ted that both cities are the biggest cities in each country respectively, with the highest number of 
population. Continuing with correlations between both cities, the Central District of Madrid has its 
Polish equivalent in the district of Warsaw called Srodmiescie (in Polish: Śródmieście). The city of 
Warsaw is classified on the ninth position of population census within the EU members, having the 
number of population close to 2 million of inhabitants meanwhile Madrid has the third place with the 
number of population close to 3,5 million inhabitants. 
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 Regardless of the detail, Madrid and Warsaw are in global terms cities with similar magnitu-
de. Despite the fact that we would be wishing to prepare exhaustive review of both cities, the limita-
tions of this thesis did not allow us to make it, leaving us study cases in order to cover the core areas 
of both cities. 
 The Central District of Warsaw - Śródmieście - covers an area of 1557 hectares and that 
represents a surface circa 300 times bigger that the surface of the Central District of Madrid. This 
comparison demonstrates the difference of scale between both cities. Issue that constituted a big 
challenge in terms of data collection taking into account the correlation between the area to be diag-
nosed and the time available for that purpose. 
 Although the data collection constituted a challenge, by having experience and field experti-
se through previously spend hundreds of hours focusing on the Madrid’s fieldwork, it was possible to 
cope with it by saving time using tactics and technology already tested in Madrid. Without any doubt, 
in Warsaw we polished up our research tools and approach, finally achieving the optimal curve: the 
quantity of data acquired per hour of work was significantly higher in comparison with the data acqui-
red within initial phases. Regardless of the fact that during this research there were undoubtedly noti-
ceable improvements in terms of data acquisition, the relation – between the size of surface covered 
by this research and the time invested in data collection – revealed the need for a further research. In 
order to fully comprehend the urban spatial dynamics of the Central District of Warsaw, we might 
remark the weather and seasonal impact on the urban dynamics. In contrast with southern European 
cities, Warsaw presents a higher thermal range of temperatures: from temperatures below -15 ºC in 
winter to over +30 ºC in summer. This fact, which is highly affecting on the urban spatial dynamics, 
we observed since the very beginning of this research. What is more, during this research we discove-
red that the geographical latitude is a factor complementing spatial conducts – but this aspect still 
requires further investigation. Despite the fact that within this thesis we cannot provide the data to 
fully cover this aspect, we desired to indicate it as an initial direction for further research projects.      
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Map 12.1. Defining the area of study: the Central District of Warsaw
Source: author fieldwork, 2014 - 2016
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 The above-presented map is introducing the spatial configuration of the Warsaw Central 
District (Śródmieście), highlighting the political administrative configuration of its urban core. This 
division clashes with the observed urban dynamics. Within the period of research, we analyzed and 
evaluated those divergences which applicability might be found in the analysis of the urban tendency 
and system modeling. In addition, the spatial controversy generated through the way in which the 
territory is administratively divided and the social mass behavior led us to reconfigure the core 
district according with all those variables in order to determine the security driving forces behind 
each location. Consequently, we started the above-mentioned process by observing day and night 
within the 4 seasons the urban conduct within the Central District. The collected information allowed 
us to distinguish 18 main strategic zones, most of them susceptible for further division in sub-zones. 
The analytical process in this field was based on a combination of contrastable data and perceptual 
variables. 
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  Features involved in that 
process are including: urban morphology 
(planimetric analysis, open spaces and 
public spaces, building distribution), 
social habits (citizens paths and frequent 
routes, social interaction in public 
spaces, economica  interactions), securi-
ty threats (riots, demonstration, drug 
dealing and trafficking, security percep-
tion, level of light, common criminality), 
economical activities (density of com-
mercials, typology of economical activi-
ties, social profiling, space perception).                                                                                                     
Map 12.1.2. Strategic main zones of Warsaw’s Central District
Source: author fieldwork, 2014 - 2016
0 600 m
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process are including: urban morphology 
(planimetric analysis, open spaces and 
public spaces, building distribution), 
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spaces, economica  interactions), securi-
ty threats (riots, demonstration, drug 
dealing and trafficking, security percep-
tion, level of light, common criminality), 
economical activities (density of com-
mercials, typology of economical activi-
ties, social profiling, space perception).                                                                                                     
  The results are contained in the above-mentioned map. By focusing on the field, we shall 
highlight that the zone differentiation is not permanently visible in all of the sub-zones. Some of 
sub-zones present their particularities in specific time of day or night Despite the above-mentioned, 
after the identification of the potential visual borders by an observer, it is becoming easier to distin-
guish them, staying unnoticeable for a not aware observer. Continuing with our research project, we 
evaluated the current proposed spatial distribution of the territory based on its functionality and inter-
nal dynamics through three main axes that are founding the stability of a territory: a) national securi-
ty; b) governmental administrative interest; c) sociological impact. Having in mind the three 
above-mentioned axes, we prepared a sequence of thematic cartographies in order to present visual 
representation of the issue and to provide to the reader the local knowledge required to understand 
further scalable procedures. 
 Using a qualitative description we have divided the vulnerabilities into five scalable levels 
of risk (i.e.: extremely low, low,  medium, high, extremely high) for each variable. Focusing on the 
first axis: the national security, we can observe that several of the predefined zones reveal the existen-
ce of a extremely high impact for national security issues, meanwhile others remain irrelevant. 
 The presented approach as well as the emergence of this variable is the direct effect to a 
thematic zone analysis. On the contrary, an analysis based on administrative boundaries would 
present homogeneous levels of impact, potentially tricking the essence and dynamics of each subdivi-
sion. Unfortunately, due to the security sensibility of that information, we cannot reveal the causes 
standing behind the high level of impact of those areas.
 However, we might point to the structural and urban design vulnerabilities. Those factors are 
specially face in the city of Warsaw and moreover the area of study. Despite the fact that in daily basis 
do not represent an inconsistence to the normal city working flow, in case of riots or subversive activi-
ties could represent the trigger point to the out of control.                        
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Map 12.1.3.1. National Security Areas of Impact
Source: author fieldwork, 2014 - 2016
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 Directing our attention to the second axis: the governmental administrative areas of impact, 
we can notice that are visible slight spatial patterns divergences in comparison with the patterns 
perceptible on the previous cartographic. Meanwhile on the previous cartographic the  distribution of 
the zones with high impact is a-linear, in this case we can distinguish a structure: from the South to 
the North. The following-presented cartographic introduces one of the main spatial patterns that defi-
nes the Central District of Warsaw. This pattern is noticeable from the South to the North and is adjus-
ted to the Vistula - the river located in the East side of the Central District. Concentrating on this quasi 
linear structure, the main governmental institutions are located into what we could call the main city 
corridor and strategic axe. 
 Although this pattern in the same time increases: the inter-institutional efficiency and the 
pragmatic security, its disadvantage relays on the fact that is creating spaces of contrast. Those areas 
are located within the strategic perimeter of the institutions where there are presence police and secu-
rity forces, meanwhile the surroundings are defined by contrast: the number of security forces is 
significantly smaller. This spatial divergences are used by criminals to develop their activities in the 
areas where is noticeable a meaningful reduction of the presence of security officers. 
 Despite the potential functional or structural disadvantages of the current locations, we 
might add the security concerns towards the existence of isolated “islands”. The critical security gaps 
appear since the areas out of the perimeter are considered as irrelevant. It shall be highlighted that the 
areas within security perimeter are considered en mass to 20, maximum 30 meters from the critical 
location (and not in every direction). This regularity of not paying enough attention to security peri-
meters was substantially observed in the Central District of Madrid, where the main tendency is not 
to provide tools for subject traceability for the areas located outside of the 30 to 50 meters from the 
critical locations. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, the presence of CCTV systems in the Cen-
tral District of Warsaw is substantially higher. This simple feature is statistically increasing the chan-
ces for the existence of positive traceability.  
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Map 12.1.3.2. Governmental Administrative Areas of Impact
Source: author fieldwork, 2014 - 2016
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 Concerning the third axis: the sociological areas of impact, we can observe on the presented 
above cartographic visual effects of the sociological impact. This analysis adds a perceptual and 
psycho-spatial layer regarding reactions of inhabitants towards any potential security threat within 
the city. Despite the fact that it is possible to prepare the analysis of this variable based on quantitative 
methods, we desired to implemented it by using qualitative ones. Our decision was dictated by the 
following aim: to play the role of an observer in order to detect spatial conducts without any data 
interference. 
 Undoubtedly, a closed-question interviews sessions with  inhabitants could open the door to 
a wider analysis of this spectrum. However, taking into account that our time in the area of analysis 
was limited, it was not possible to proceed with this idea due to the need of: a) developing the ques-
tionnaire and adjusting it all year around; b) conducting a big number of interviews throughout the 
year. Therefore, we used the spatial social conduct profiling methodology - described in the Section 
II - designed to extract conducts of inhabitants. 
 In addition, we included in this analysis iconic elements, areas of transit, spatial emotional 
connectivity, business areas, as well as after-hours activities and spaces of emotional magnificence. 
The result shows high contrast: the core of the city has an extremely high social impact meanwhile 
the peripheral areas have low and extremely low levels of this impact. The spatial representation of 
this variable is linked with the previous two (national security and governmental administrative areas 
of impact). The fact that certain areas are characterized by institutional functions, what is reflected in 
building typology and what is intensifying the sociological disconnection with the area, is influencing 
on the functioning of the area. 
 In consequence, those ‘institutional’ areas have a high rate of activity within the working 
hours, but after-hours are becoming isolated. There are simply perceived by society as working 
places, not as living zones. This spatial and time dynamics break the perceptual connection of the 
society with the space, making the society less psychologically exposed to any threat located in those 
areas. 
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Map 12.1.3.3. Sociological Areas of Impact
Source: author fieldwork , 2014 - 2016
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 Concerning the third axis: the sociological areas of impact, we can observe on the presented 
above cartographic visual effects of the sociological impact. This analysis adds a perceptual and 
psycho-spatial layer regarding reactions of inhabitants towards any potential security threat within 
the city. Despite the fact that it is possible to prepare the analysis of this variable based on quantitative 
methods, we desired to implemented it by using qualitative ones. Our decision was dictated by the 
following aim: to play the role of an observer in order to detect spatial conducts without any data 
interference. 
 Undoubtedly, a closed-question interviews sessions with  inhabitants could open the door to 
a wider analysis of this spectrum. However, taking into account that our time in the area of analysis 
was limited, it was not possible to proceed with this idea due to the need of: a) developing the ques-
tionnaire and adjusting it all year around; b) conducting a big number of interviews throughout the 
year. Therefore, we used the spatial social conduct profiling methodology - described in the Section 
II - designed to extract conducts of inhabitants. 
 In addition, we included in this analysis iconic elements, areas of transit, spatial emotional 
connectivity, business areas, as well as after-hours activities and spaces of emotional magnificence. 
The result shows high contrast: the core of the city has an extremely high social impact meanwhile 
the peripheral areas have low and extremely low levels of this impact. The spatial representation of 
this variable is linked with the previous two (national security and governmental administrative areas 
of impact). The fact that certain areas are characterized by institutional functions, what is reflected in 
building typology and what is intensifying the sociological disconnection with the area, is influencing 
on the functioning of the area. 
 In consequence, those ‘institutional’ areas have a high rate of activity within the working 
hours, but after-hours are becoming isolated. There are simply perceived by society as working 
places, not as living zones. This spatial and time dynamics break the perceptual connection of the 
society with the space, making the society less psychologically exposed to any threat located in those 
areas. 
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 In contrast, the core of the Central District, where are located the main daily activities of the 
inhabitants, and in the same time: the majority of the visual city icons, reveals a high level of impact. 
Within the period of analysis we observed several demonstrations. In all of them we distinguish the 
same spatial patterns: each demonstration path was passing through those areas of high social impact. 
Despite the fact that institutions towards they were protesting had different final locations, the social 
activity took place in the central corridor where the social movement is significantly higher. In order 
to provide a more accurate portrait of the above-mentioned spatial configuration, we prepared a cell 
analysis where we projected the level of exposure of each area, designed as the outcome of the inte-
raction between the three mentioned axes. In the purpose of simplifying the analysis we adopted a 
grid where each cell has 1 km2 of surface. 
 The following map introduces an operative level of analysis of the main security driving 
forces. In contrast with the previous maps, which were based on functional borders or the administra-
tive ones, this analysis reflects spot areas, where we can observe changes of the following variable: 
level of exposure. This map is the effect of blending the information presented on the proceeding 
pages of this thesis with local relevance - identified during the performed fieldwork.  
 During our analysis of the city, we observed that the areas with high and extremely high level 
of exposure have spatial interconnectivity. In this point we shall differentiate two types of areas with 
the above-mentioned levels: a) first type of exposure is based on the structure; b) second type of expo-
sure is based on the functionality. Regarding the first type (structure): we shall highlight that it can be 
observed within the main (the North-South) city corridor due to the existence of institutional, cultural 
and iconic places – that makes this area extremely exposed to threats (especially to the national secu-
rity). 
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Map 12.1.4. Level of exposure
Source: author fieldwork , 2014 - 2016
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 The second type (functionality) is defined by the particularity of the elements covering the 
surface of the cell: all areas defined on the East side of the map as extremely high level of exposure 
are representing bridges. In this aspect, the bridges in Warsaw constitute a critical infrastructure with 
the highest importance, granting the connection with other districts: in particular with the Praga 
district, where a high percentage of Warsaw workers is living. If the infrastructural connections will 
be broken that will directly affect the main and citizens economy. The above-mentioned is reflecting 
the value and the importance of the infrastructure system in the city of Warsaw.
 Another significant critical zone is located in the Central Business District (hereinafter refe-
rred to as: “CBD”). This zone is marked by skyscrapers, which are sharing their location with an icon 
of the city: the Palace of Culture and Science, a building constructed in the times of the soviet system, 
which constitutes one of the most visual elements of the Central District. Moreover, within CBD are 
located: the Train Central Station, as well as the most crowded shopping malls and representatives 
buildings. 
 Consequently, in our opinion the CBD shall be categorized as the critical zone for security 
purposes. Despite the fact that as far the terrorism in Poland is rather an irrelevant threat - in particular 
when comparing the number of attack in the cities of other EU members (i.e.: Paris, Berlin), the 
global new circumstances - migratory process blended with the regional geopolitics - do not preclude 
that in the close future they will open the door of new era of terrorism and fear.  Continuing with our 
case study, we want to remark the importance of the system of streets in the global dynamics of the 
city. In case of the Central District of Warsaw, the urban morphology is making from the system of 
streets a critical element to the city security. Despite the limited time and magnitude of the surface to 
be covered, we managed to examine this system of streets and to prepare a review of areas requiring 
security and traceability within the Central District of Warsaw. Nevertheless, this global vision it is 
not sufficient to determine the capabilities of traceability already existing in the city. In order to verify 
that issue we focused our analysis on the two following factors: a) detailed research of the selected 
territory; b) detailed analysis of areas of special importance  in the city dynamics.  
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Map. 12.1.5. Street level of exposure  
Source: author, 2014-16
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 Focusing on the first factor: a detailed research of the selected territory, we decided to dedi-
cate our attention to the North side of the Central District. The selected area contained part of the 
subdistrict of Muranow and Nowe Miasto. We considered those two subdistricts relevant for our 
analysis due to the following factors: a) their location – both are remote from the core of the city; b) 
levels of exposure; c) the urban morphology; d) the internal social dynamics. 
 Our choice was guided by intention of finding the territory which will be equivalent to the 
territory analyzed within the case study of Madrid. Hence, the first step of our work was the identifi-
cation of potential critical zones within the Central District of Warsaw - with special interest for 
criminal activities. This step allowed us to determine the vulnerabilities of areas, to select areas with 
higher risk and subsequently; to evaluate the capability of tracing a subject or object. In this point we 
shall highlight that evaluation of the traceability based on visual image requires to prepare a census 
of the surveillance tools. 
 The preparation of this census in the Central District of Warsaw was inevitably connected 
with extended fieldwork, during which the recognition of the whole area was performed. The catalo-
gue of surveillance tools of Warsaw was constructed with the same criteria used in Madrid. Once we 
established the number and location of the CCTV cameras, we introduced the visual field connectivi-
ty, previously defined as the ANNV. 
 Aligned with the state of art in Madrid, several authors tried to point the effectiveness of the 
surveillance tools. From all of them we might remark the approach of Waszkiewicz (2010) who did 
not consider that the detailed data collection regarding CCTV system installed in Warsaw is possible, 
alleging that such a work would have the character of an encyclopedia and would overload any 
research with irrelevant data from the perspective of criminal actions  prevention. This approach 
reveals how, as a rule, researchers focus on the legal and criminal perspective of the matter, passing 
over the spatial impact and its influence on the traceability: this feature we highlighted and covered 
since the initial phase of the thesis. 
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Map 12.1.4. Area of research
Source: author fieldwork , 2014 - 2016
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 We ask ourselves over again how is it plausible to determine the effectiveness of a system 
without knowing its own limitations and features. Surprisingly, this is the contemporary approach 
towards surveillance and traceability. In the literature we can find descriptions, confabulations, cons-
piring theories presented without the knowledge of a) the existing census; b) the capabilities of the 
census; c) the spatial and functional impact; and d) the manner in which systems shall be integrated 
in order to prevent criminal actions. 
 Consequently, we consider that the approach proposed herein has a significant advantages in 
comparison with approaches of other authors. By remarking the above-mentioned, we do not desire 
to disqualify other approaches, but we wish to emphasize the lack of the following critical feature: the 
spatial analysis. In a result, after setting the legal and criminal basis of the surveillance in Warsaw, 
taking into account the guidelines contained in this research, we consider that the city of Warsaw is a 
perfect scenario to implement the operative traceability.
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12.2. Analysis of building security
 During our fieldwork we came to the conclusion that one of the most important and the most 
underestimated driving security forces in urban areas is building integrity. We shall strongly remark 
that security measures deployed in each construction are directly influencing on the probability of 
being target - or not - of criminal actions. The possible economical value of captured benefits is also 
important, but not decisive factor. The decisive factors pushing criminals to take their actions are an 
easy access to location blended with the lack of potential traceability. Due to the fact that the manage-
ment of buildings is within private domain and this thesis is dedicated to the traceability in publicly 
accessible spaces, we focused on the security measures observable from the street level. Consequent-
ly, we did not evaluate inside security level, but external counter-criminal measures. 
 On the following pages we will present map demonstrating final results of our evaluation - 
for obvious security reasons we will not comment the security fails of  buildings. We rated the resul-
ting data regarding security of buildings using three security levels: a)  concordant - when the security 
measures are concordant with the security demands; b) inadequate - when there is an observable 
dissonance between the security demands and adopted measures; c) vulnerable - when the security 
measures are below the security demands, making the target vulnerable. Nonetheless, we need to 
remember that the final level of exposure of each building is determined by the value of the target - 
and that value is a subjective variable determined by criminals, which cannot be standardized. If we 
would standardize that value, the result presented on the map would constitute an expected projection 
of the theoretical value of each building. By sticking to our guideline we had prepared a map presen-
ting building security, which can be examined within the next pages of the thesis.
 Focusing on the map we can differentiate that certain types of buildings have higher level of 
security than others. By correlating the required level of security (taking into account the above-men-
tioned variables) and adopted security measures we can determine the authentic level of exposure of 
each building and in  consequence the level of security.  
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Map 12.3. Analysis of building security
Source: author fieldwork , 2014 - 2016
Concordant level of security
Inadequate level of security
Vulnerable level of security
0 100 m
 
  
 
  
 
    
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
290
   
 
  
 
    
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
291
   
 
  
 
    
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
292
   
 
  
 
    
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
293
   
 
  
 
    
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY DRIVING FORCES BASED ON TWO CASES OF STUDY
294
12.3. Analysis of the surveillance tools
 The detailed analysis of the security of buildings, presented on the proceeding pages, revea-
led areas of high contrast, where we can observe spatial dynamics directed from the West to the East 
side of the city. We shall remind in this point that within this geographical dynamics is overlaying the 
administrative influence: on the West side we have the subdistrict of Muranow and on the East we 
have the subdistrict of Nowe Miasto. Hence, the spatial distribution of surveillance tools, which is 
influenced by the existence of two different subdistricts, will determine the capability to extract prag-
matic traceability procedures. 
 The created census is containing public and private security cameras, which field of covera-
ge is focused on the public space. Every cameras was evaluated and inserted into the census on the 
condition of being visible from the street level, applying the  methodological procedures established 
in Madrid. Within the selected area of analysis we identified 600 CCTV cameras, which were distri-
buted in heterogeneous manner within the territory - what we can observe on the maps on the 
following pages. We discovered correlation in the spatial distribution of the CCTV systems between 
cameras and the level of building security - with the singular exception of areas of public interest, 
where despite that there are cameras securing buildings, there is lack of cameras dedicated to those 
areas. In those conditions areas of high contrast are appearing. This aspect is of extreme relevance for 
the traceability purposes. 
 The current configuration of CCTV excludes a global monitoring of the territory, creating 
hidden spaces of significant dimension. Moreover, we shall evaluate the possibility of acquiring any 
trace during dark hours. Almost the entire registered CCTV census do not posses infrared capabilities 
– even of medium range. Consequently, the probability to record any trace during dark hours is extre-
mely limited to the immediate perimeter of the camera - between 5 to 10 m. 
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Map 12.4. Distribution of the CCTV
Source: author fieldwork , 2014 - 2016
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Map 12.5. Analysis of the ANNV
Source: author fieldwork , 2014 - 2016
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 Meanwhile the previously presented maps were focus on defining and sketching of the 
surveillance’ state of art in this North zone of the Central District of Warsaw, the recent and 
above-presented cartographic was dedicated to the introduction of the trace factor. In case of Madrid 
we examined that the density and number of surveillance elements have lower impact than a well 
designed surveillance system. The pragmatic security is not about quantity, but about quality. Conse-
quently, by blending the presented three layers: building security, CCTV census and ANNV analysis 
- we can diagnose the existing traceability skills of the area. 
 In contrast with the system implemented in Madrid, in case of cameras in Warsaw we see a 
positive correlation between the level of security in the building, the number of CCTV and the ability 
of those cameras to be hyper-connected in time and space with the circumfluent cameras. This spatial 
configuration has its own advantages and disadvantages. Starting with advantages, we shall highlight 
that in areas where we can notice the coalescence of those variables, it is possible to trace any threat 
or criminal action in time and space. The density of devices in public spaces is reasonable: cameras 
are not disturbing for social mass and simultaneously are sufficient - what is far from the excellence 
- existing cameras are not providing the option of general monitoring of actions, which are taking in 
publicly accessible areas. Moreover, this configuration creates micro-worlds, where visually and 
functionally the urban dynamic differs from the contiguous areas.
 The above-mentioned reality constitutes the main disadvantage of existing system in 
Warsaw. The micro-worlds phenomenon creates high contrast from surveillance perspective: inside 
of the micro-world the traceability is achievable, outside - there is a black hole, where traceability is 
out of reach. Moreover, in those black holes, the social dynamic are limited on daily basis and during 
winter – even more. Consequently, criminal actions taken in those areas are not leaving any trace. 
Without any doubt those areas shall be described as potentially representing a threat to the local secu-
rity.  
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12.5. Areas of special relevance in the Central District of Warsaw
 Following the previously presented scheme, we will continue with the case study of the Cen-
tral District of Warsaw by identifying and analyzing areas of special relevance for traceability and for 
security analysis. The first area worth mentioning is the Three Crosses Square (in Polish: Plac Trzech 
Krzyży). Its singularity is defined by the blend of the following factors: a) center location – in the core 
of the city; b) social relevance - historical importance mixed with trendy cafés; c) presence of govern-
mental infrastructure: the Ministry of Development; d) heart of luxury shopping; e) potential target of 
criminal and terrorist actions. Taking into account the above-mentioned, we prepared the diagnosis of 
the surveillance and traceability of this particular area, which is demonstrated on the following map. 
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Map 12.5.1. Traceability analysis of Plac Trzech Krzyży. 
Source: author fieldwork, 2016
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 The public spaces represent one of the most potential threats to the security of the citizens. 
Those places are frequently visited and have surfaces many times bigger than any other location, 
which are also difficult to control and monitor. Hence, they constitute the perfect emplacement of 
criminal activities. Furthermore, additional factors encouraging criminals to take actions is darkness 
and vegetation, which are occurring in those spaces.
 When public spaces are representing an iconic city spots then there exists the political pres-
sure to maintain them in order. Usually this political pressure is tantamount to installation of security 
systems, what - if the systems are well designed – improves security in those places. From our pers-
pective the lack of the proper monitoring and surveillance systems is leading to security isolation and 
failure - any location in the city might be considered as a separated island.
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 Even though we can think that 
the island itself is secured, the security 
of the island does not guarantee the 
security of the whole organism which 
the city constitutes. Therefore, only the 
connections and cooperation between 
monitoring systems can guarantee the 
traceability and – further – collection of 
the proper judicial evidences. Hence, 
the best solution to secure iconic spots 
is to properly design monitoring system 
as a system connected with city security 
system, protecting the whole city – not 
only one place. This simple truth seems 
to be unnoticeable by the authorities of 
various cities.
Map 12.5.2.1. Location of the Royal Lazienki Park
Source: author fieldwork, 2016
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Source: author fieldwork , 2014 - 2016
 The above-presented map of the Royal Lazienki Park reveals its spatial configuration and 
locations of relevant iconic areas. Within the map we implemented  location and typology of the 
surveillance systems within the park. Within the park the total number of CCTV camera is 76, the 
surface of the park covers 76 hectares. Hence, the average heterogeneous spatial density distribution 
of cameras equals to 1 CCTV camera per 1 hectare. As we can observe on the map, the surveillance 
tools are focused mostly on the main buildings. Moreover, there are used 5 types of cameras for 
surveillance purposes: i) omnidirectional, ii) focal, iii) Preference Interest View (P.I.V.), iv) Secon-
dary Interest View (S.I.V.), v) regular. On the graphic below there is statistical visualization of the 
surveillance tools located in the park. 
 The social usage of this public space is significantly higher in comparison with other green 
areas and publicly accessible places. Meanwhile, most of the buildings located in the park are used 
for monumental purpose, it shall be remarked the existence of a luxury restaurant named New Oran-
gery Belvedere. This restaurant constitutes an important perimeter for security due to the two 
following factors: a) its clients have access granted to the park even when the park is closed for 
visitants; b) an average customer represents high social status; c) is a frequent location of diplomatic 
and international meetings.  
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Figure 12.5.2.3. Graphic representation of the surveillance tools located in the park
Source: author fieldwork , 2014 - 2016
Figure 12.5.2.4. Vector ilustration of the New Orangery Belvedere Restaurant 
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 Considering the above-mentioned, the security in this area is critical for the global security 
of the Central District of Warsaw. In those terms is important to examine the traceability skills of the 
zone. In accordance with the adopted procedures, we  procedures we executed the ANNV analysis. It 
is shocking that despite the relevance of this area – taking into account that is bordering with the 
Belvedere Palace (where the Polish President is residing), several embassies and a military center - 
the results are revealing lack of potential traceability. Moreover, we identified within the park several 
areas beyond of any surveillance tool range, what constitutes a critical security failure, providing the 
gap for direct access to governmental and international buildings. 
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Preference Interest View (P.I.V.)
Secondary Interest View (S.I.V.)
Regular Interest View (R.I.V.)
Map 12.5.2.5. ANNV analysis of the Royal Lazienki Park
Source: author fieldwork, 2016
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12.6. Conclusion: Traceability in the Central District of Warsaw
 Among the previous pages we reviewed the main security driving forces in the Central 
District of Warsaw from a global to a detailed perspective. Conscious of the limitations of this disser-
tation, we assumed the limits and deficits of data and analysis. Notwithstanding that fact, with this 
case study we opened the door for security analysis of Warsaw, what can be continued in the future 
with more detailed research. 
 Despite the limitation of this thesis, we prepared brief diagnosis of the existing capabilities 
of the surveillance tools in the area of analysis. The Central District of Warsaw covers a surface of 
significant magnitude. This fact determines a demand in terms of density and distribution of the 
surveillance systems. Despite the above-mentioned, the orthogonal urban morphology is minimizing 
the theoretical number of required systems. 
 After our research we shall emphasize that publicly accessible spaces in the city of Warsaw 
are predisposed to be within permanent traceability tools in order to prevent criminal actions due to 
the fact that currently those spaces are vulnerable. Another issue which shall be  revised and improved 
is the current unequal spatial distribution of surveillance tools, what leads to the creation of areas of 
high contrast and black holes - area without any surveillance systems. From all the cities observed 
during the research period, the Central District of Warsaw presents the best configuration for a 
successful implementation of the authentic traceability project. This conclusion was achieved after 
consideration of the territory, as well as the social interface. The binomial relationship between socie-
ty and space discovered in the city of Warsaw is a great example of human adaptation to the specific 
location. This regularity would allow the installation of the traceability system without strong social 
critics. The phenomenon which is extremely visible in other EU capitals. We are finishing this case 
study with fortunate discovery and description of the path and methodology leading to the significant 
decrease of criminal actions. In order to take that path is only needed the political and administrative 
willing. Without any doubt, the final benefit from its implementation the polish society will gain.  
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 The time has come to look back to the genesis of this thesis: to the moment, few years ago, 
in which the concept of the modern traceability skills was conceived in the author’s mind. This 
moment coincided with leakages of information – mostly from USA – revealing various programs 
regarding mass surveillance and citizens espionage. At that moment, we had rather ingenious idea of 
what are capabilities and limitations of those systems. Our inventive imagination was based on the 
Hollywood driven industry, which is designing the perception of the omnipotent security concept. 
Consequently we had, probably similar with the majority of citizens, the understanding of unlimited 
governmental capabilities to trace and neutralize threats – in accordance with the billionaire expenses 
in the above-mentioned programs. This fact automatically led us to formulate the following question: 
why criminal actions are still unpunished? Fortunately, we used information about those leakages as 
an inspiration, which led us to formulate and execute the research project presented herein. Undoub-
tedly, the time and the effort dedicated to the revision of the existing technologies as well as the 
performed fieldwork resulted in the acquisition of the accurate knowledge regarding applied security 
solutions and in particular: the limitations in this field. However, being conscious of the potential 
epistemological crisis of counterterrorism clearly defended by Jackson (2013), we were determined 
to deal with the research not only from the meta-theoretical perspective but also from the eminently 
pragmatic point of view.
 During our research we were observing systems, which should protect us, and we discovered 
that those applied technologies constitute a simple smokescreen, easy to be broken and – moreover – 
showing constant tendency to be crashed. This screen was created as a curtain – which should make 
us blind to defects of those systems. This curtain is responsible for providing an imaginary perception 
of the our societies security. It was created with a simple aim of providing feeling of being safe – even 
if we do not feel so – in order that the socio-political system will be reproduced for the avoidance of 
the collapse of society and constitutes the trick, which is deceiving the society regarding its security 
status. Under those circumstances we are reconsidering over again what are the responsibilities of 
urban politicians (Coaffe, 2013) in the final equation of ensuring social security.   
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 Within our research, we had found several weak-points of the security status, which are 
directed towards societies, but none of them is so frightening and exceptional as the fact of tricking 
the citizens. Meanwhile new Big Data gurus assume the chances to control and prevent criminal 
actions – including terrorism and organize crime – by using predictive analysis roll in communication 
technologies (Drozdova, 2010), real attacks still happen and run without any control of the authori-
ties. After evaluating the internet activity of those convicted of terrorism action in the UK (Gill, 
2015), we found out that internet activities - globally and strategically - became irrelevant for counter 
policies planning. In addition, is critical nowadays to determine what does and what does not consti-
tute terrorism in the internet. Shmidt and Jongman (1988) analysed over hundred definitions of what 
is and is not considered as terrorism, setting an empirical case-study of judging for a non-committed 
crime when the definition of that crime became eventually ambiguous. 
 The Western governments are constructing defence and traceability tools based on advanced 
technologies, because the neo-fundament of our evolution concept is relying on the technology deve-
lopment, replacing human intelligence for AI. It shall be highlighted that for almost every administra-
tive procedure an electronic account, bank account, mobile phone or any kind of traceable device is 
required.
 We might emphasize that despite the desire of political leaders, the above-mentioned reality 
is not applicable to the entire world. Since the moment that we discovered that technological 
approach towards defence and security, we started to think that this technological reality can be easily 
reforged in favor of our enemy or threat – it is only needed proper level of technological sophistica-
tion and those tools could be used against us or simply – could be avoided. The facts are confirming 
the above-mentioned: groups, which are recently creating chaos in Europe, are using analogue devi-
ces and modus operandi. It means that their activities are untraceable by our sophisticated technology 
construction. In those circumstances we are absolute blind and directly exposed to their willing, 
which means committing any kind of criminal actions: from terrorist attacks through robberies and 
activities of organized crime, hurting our society.  
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 Moreover, their recent tactics are leading to the extreme and basic attacks: the use of a 
robbed vehicle and using it to crash people in touristic and crowded places. We have an impression 
that the goal of mass media is to advertise and support the above-mentioned smokescreen. This goal 
is achieved by highlighting – too often – the significance of the usage of biometric technologies for 
the detection or contribution in the neutralization of criminal actions. Nevertheless, our daily reality 
does not support the advertised vision. In this point we shall accentuate that after the detailed evalua-
tion of the existing surveillance tools in two capital cities: Madrid (Spain) and Warsaw (Poland) and 
the general security evaluation of many others – i.e.: Ciudad de la Plata (Argentina); Palmanova 
(Italy), Jaipur (India), Moscow (Russian Federation) – we came to the conclusion that the possibility 
to record any criminal action by biometric technologies and by the publicly installed CCTV cameras 
is limited to eventual scenarios.
 Furthermore, the census of existing surveillance tools is demonstrating a heterogenic spectre 
of systems in use, which – due to their own features, specifications and limitations – are not meeting 
the requirements needed for successful execution of the modern biometric software. Moreover, the 
capabilities of the existing systems are additionally limited by irregular street lighting, weather condi-
tions and the creativity of criminals: as modification of visual appearance in order to avoid any kind 
of recognition – those features are not commonly highlighted by those responsible for the software 
and hardware installation.
 What is more, the modern trend can be defined as a constant substitution of human observers 
for the analysis based on selected software. In consequence, we entrust our security to the technology 
- which currently is far from being ready to provide us security. In addition, we are brainwashed by 
the assurances that a machine can provide better analysis than an expert. Unfortunately, that fallacy 
is efficiently confusing our societies and leads to social confiding in this mechanical world. We took 
the decision to select urban areas as the subject of this research due to the potential high criminal 
density as well as the potential large number of victims and perpetrators. We started the research 
being unconscious of the fact that the level of security in our cities could be described with one word: 
unsafe.   
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 The goal of the research was the evaluation of the adopted surveillance systems in the Cen-
tral District of Madrid and the Central District of Warsaw in order to rate the possibility of introducing 
a revolutionary and simple solution called ANNV enabling the effective traceability. The obtained 
results of our research showed the inefficient way in which the security of the urban areas of Madrid 
and Warsaw were used to judge the possibility of introducing there ANNV.
 Although the security management in urban areas is inefficient, we do not have any doubts 
that the security situation in rural areas is even worst. While travelling around the Europe, using the 
analytical workshop acquired during the research, we evaluated that the existing traceability capabili-
ties to obtain in time record evidences of a criminal action in rural areas are non-existent. We cannot 
understand what are the grounds standing behind rural status quo: lack of adoption of any protection 
against criminal actions in those areas. What is even more frightening is that there is even lack of 
basic geographical analysis of the security driving forces dedicated to rural areas or thinking regar-
ding securing those areas. 
  The above-mentioned smokescreen is a bigger issue than it seems to be. Our conclusion, 
after the time dedicated to this research, is that geographic critical zones are unprotected because the 
system is designed to maintain the security appearance - not to guarantee the security by default. That 
fallacy can be noticed in urban areas where we have no traceability skills despite the premature insta-
llation of additional cameras. What is more, individuals or groups having criminal intentions can 
easily log out from that fallacious security system just by switching to analogue devices, what is 
guaranteeing that they cannot be traced afterwards. In fact, due to the way in which the system is 
designed it is easy to detect movements of regular citizen but not of a potential criminal; to explain it 
in more efficient words: it is easier and more accessible for an observer to trace the victim than the 
perpetrator. Fortunately, this systematic failures have a relatively easy and accessible solutions. On 
the pages of this thesis we proposed multiple spatial configurations and various conceptual maps 
demonstrating the methods for increasing the effectiveness and accuracy of the surveillance systems 
already deployed in urban areas. 
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 We hereby consider that minimal changes could lead to unprecedented improvements in 
terms of increase of criminal case resolution. In our opinion in order that this new solution will be 
adopted it is only required  the willing and desire of proper authorities. Moreover, each of the methods 
designed by the author was carefully rated in order to exclude the possibility that its implementation 
would be connected with extra costs due to the fact that costs are used by authorities as a ground to 
deny any kind of improvement.
 In modern times, when the criminal conduct represents a hard power against the global and 
social benefit, every effort is an add to neutralize the threats that in daily basis ends with the live of 
many innocent citizens. We cannot close our eyes against our vulnerabilities and failures, because 
they would constitute our biggest threat. They are already. It is not a matter of terrorism, drug dealing, 
irregular migration, sexual violence nor murdering. The sum of all of them influences on our socie-
ties, on our territories, transforming them into spaces of conflict. Hence, we were able to set that the 
resolution of those conflicts does not depend of the willing of a singular entity. Without the collabora-
tion between policy makers, security forces, the entire society and academic researches the solution 
would never be achieved. And in this field there is a huge room for improvement.
 We shall highlight that the findings of this research are limited: firstly, to the urban areas; 
secondly, to very specific urban areas: the Central Districts of Madrid and Warsaw. We consider that 
– taking into account the dynamics of urban areas and wide specter of threats – the choice to focus on 
those areas was justified, especially considering the growing wave of terrorism in Europe. In our 
opinion the selection of those two cities: Madrid and Warsaw, which are so different and in the same 
time – so similar was adequate. Those vibrant and energetic cities represent different urban dynamics, 
but the current level of their security is similar – not sufficient. Taking into account that the research 
was limited to the Central Districts of the above-mentioned cities one of the option of performing 
further research will be evaluation of the remaining districts of those cities. 
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 What shall be emphasized is that this research demonstrates that the solution proposed by the 
Author can be applied in cities with different urban morphology, dynamics, socio-cultural-historical 
backgrounds, what opens the door for further research projects. Furthermore, the Author’s observa-
tion regarding the security status of rural areas shows another possibility of further research. The 
research project performed by the author was challenging for many reasons. First of the reasons of the 
above-mentioned situation was the fact that this research was a pioneer one: the author could not rely 
on the methods used by other researches. A fact that lead to create, develop and test our methodology.
 Moreover, the author needed to overcome various obstacles: from finding proper technology 
on which he could rely on and use for data collection (rough weather conditions were not simplifying 
this task), through determining proper tools in terms of their size, to the application of proper proce-
dures for the evaluation of cameras in order to avoid unwanted attention. In the final evaluation all of 
those obstacles have been successfully overcome. Furthermore, those obstacles constituted an addi-
tional survival test of the methods, tools and general approach of the Author – the test which was 
passed, securing the future usage of the above-mentioned instruments in hard weather conditions as 
well as in different socio-cultural-historical locations.
 We consider that although the research project - discussed within this thesis is limited to the 
specific areas of central districts of European capitals cities: Madrid and Warsaw - is demonstrating a 
completely new dimension of the security analysis. The reasons for the above-mentioned statement 
are listed hereafter. Firstly, due to the creation and usage of reliable methods of data collection within 
this research. During our quest to find academic articles we made shocking discovery that they are 
based on data originating from third sources (see: Chapter IV), which were not even assessed by the 
authors. We dedicated significant amount of time just to prepare the camera census in each city, which 
was subsequently revised twice in order to assure that those censuses are showing correct data. 
Moreover, we developed set of criterions in accordance which we tested each of the camera included 
in census. Secondly, due to the fact that we prepared the solid evaluation of the security status quo in 
each city. 
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 Thirdly, due to the fact we proposed an innovative, economic and easy security solution – 
named as ANNV – to enhance the traceability skills of urban areas. Fourthly, due to the fact that we 
discovered the security smokescreen – political approach focused on making us feel safe even if we 
do not have any grounds to feel so. Moreover, our solution is focused on real – not perceptual – secu-
rity and is leading the way for increase the security of our citizens.  
 All the above-mentioned set two different but complementing paths: the system modelling 
and the operative usage. Each of them provided subsequence results that should - in theory - decrease 
the level of uncertainty towards any decision making process. Regarding the system modelling we 
found the following two approaches being worthy to remark: a) probabilistic; and b)  economical 
models.
 The probabilistic models proposed by the RMS are based on a geospatial confluence 
between the interest of the target and the potential typologies of attackers. However that, the final 
output is not capable to determine neither the D-day nor to ensure the prevention of the attacks. This 
model is all about probabilities. The economical models, from which we might highlight the EITA 
(Economic Impact of Terrorism Attack) and TAVE (Terrorism Attack Vulnerability Evolution), are 
from the operative point of view not far from the probabilistic models. What is characteristic to every 
model, is that it is trying - which is not always synonym of success – to reflect a scenario by abstrac-
ting its parts. But when we are dealing with highly sophisticated variables such as human conduct, the 
abstraction does not resolve the problem, but is spoiling the obtained results creating fake guidance 
points. 
 We are conscious of the current limitations of a pragmatic traceability, notwithstanding this 
fact, it is as far the methodology which potentially can  provide the best result in terms of security 
scenario, not only for criminal prevention but also for decreasing significantly criminal actions in 
urban areas.   
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